

**UC-NRLF**



**\$B 43 460**







The University of Chicago

The Bearing of the Evolutionary Theory  
on the Conception of God—A Study  
in Contemporary Interpretations  
of God in Terms of the Doc-  
trine of Evolution

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE DIVINITY SCHOOL IN  
CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
(DEPARTMENT OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY)

---

BY

UKICHI KAWAGUCHI

---

A Private Edition  
Distributed by  
The University of Chicago Libraries  
1916

BL263  
K3

The Collegiate Press  
GEORGE BANTA PUBLISHING COMPANY  
MENASHA, WISCONSIN

100-1000  
AMERICAN

## PREFACE

The one far-reaching contribution of the nineteenth century is the empirically formulated concept of organic evolution. The object of this investigation is to ascertain the bearing of the evolutionary theory on the conception of God as it is worked out in typical recent philosophies of religion.

The method and scope of the study are as follows. In the introduction, we shall briefly consider certain typical *a priori* theories of evolution, showing reasons for not including these in our inquiry. In the first part of our main study, we shall survey the problems due to the attempt to bring the evolutionary theory into relation with the traditional conception of God, indicating the content and meaning of the inductive evolutionary theory and the essentials in the traditional conception of God. We shall attempt, in the second part, which forms the main body of our work, to make a critical examination of the solutions to these problems given by typical recent philosophies of religion, namely, Royce's absolute idealism, Eucken's philosophy of life, Bowne's personal idealism, and James's pragmatism. In our discussion of these religious philosophers, our treatment of them will be limited by the subject of our study. Hence reference will be made only to those of their works which are more or less directly related to our subject-matter. In the third and the last part, we shall make a summary statement of the results and the implications of our discussion, with particular reference to the solutions examined in the second part. In this concluding part, we shall not endeavor to make an exhaustive treatment of the implications of our inquiry. We shall simply attempt to set forth the general bearing of the evolutionary theory on certain elemental problems connected with the doctrine of God.

In the preparation of this thesis, the writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to those writers who are concerned with present theologically-scientific problems. This indebtedness is indicated by the references made to their works in the following study. But he is under a special obligation to his teacher, Professor Gerald Birney Smith, of the University of Chicago, for his valuable criticisms and suggestions.

UKICHI KAWAGUCHI.

*Chicago, Ill., August, 1914.*

Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2007 with funding from  
Microsoft Corporation

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b> .....	vii
<b>INTRODUCTION: Typical Modern Philosophical Theories of Evolution</b> .....	1
<b>PART ONE</b>	
Survey of the Problems Involved in the Relation between the Evolutionary Theory and the Traditional Conception of God.....	4
I. The Content and Meaning of the Evolutionary Theory.....	4
II. The Traditional Conception of God.....	13
III. The Problems Involved in the Relation between the Evolutionary Theory and the Traditional Conception of God.....	16
<b>PART TWO</b>	
Typical Recent Solutions of the Problems Involved in the Relation between the Evolutionary Theory and the Traditional Conception of God.....	20
I. The Solution of the Problems in Royce's Absolute Idealism.....	21
II. The Solution of the Problems in Eucken's Philosophy of Life.....	35
III. The Solution of the Problems in Bowne's Personal Idealism .....	48
IV. The Solution of the Problems in James' Pragmatism.....	63
<b>PART THREE</b>	
Statement of the Results and Implications of the Foregoing Discussion.....	80
I. The Problem of Method.....	81
II. The Problem of the Relation between Theology and Science.....	84
III. The Problem of God as the Transcendent Supernatural Personality.....	89
IV. The Problem of God as the Absolute Being.....	92
V. The Problem of God's Relation to Man and the World.....	98



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

The main works consulted in the preparation of the thesis are here given, largely in the order of treatment. The other works referred to are acknowledged in the footnotes.

### A. THE THEORIES OF EVOLUTION

Lamarck, *Philosophie Zoologique*, Paris, 1850.  
A. S. Packard, *Lamarck, The Founder of Evolution*, New York, 1901.  
Darwin, *The Origin of Species*, New York, 1867.  
Darwin, *The Descent of Man*, New York, 1874.  
Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, Eng. tr., New York, 1911.  
A. Weismann, *The Evolution Theory*, 2 vols., London, 1904.  
H. DeVries, *Species and Varieties*, Chicago, 1905.  
H. DeVries, *The Mutation-Theory*, 2 vols., Chicago, 1909.  
V. L. Kellogg, *Darwinism Today*, New York, 1907.

### B. TRADITIONAL THEOLOGIES

C. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, 2 vols., New York, 1871-1878.  
W. G. T. Shedd, *Dogmatic Theology*, 2 vols., New York, 1888.  
A. H. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, 3 vols., Philadelphia, 1907.  
Wilhelm-Scannell, *A Manual of Catholic Theology*, 2 vols., New York, 1899.  
*Princeton Biblical and Theological Studies*, New York, 1912.

### C. TYPICAL RECENT PHILOSOPHIES OF RELIGIONS

1. J. Royce,  
*The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, New York, 1888.  
*The Conception of God*, New York, 1897.  
*The World and the Individual*, 2 Series, New York, 1899-1901.  
*The Philosophy of Loyalty*, New York, 1908.  
*William James and Other Essays*, New York, 1911.  
*The Sources of Religious Insight*, New York, 1912.  
*The Problem of Christianity*, 2 vols., New York, 1913.
2. R. Eucken,  
*Christianity and the New Idealism*, Eng. tr., New York, 1909.  
*The Problem of Human Life*, Eng. tr., New York, 1909.  
*The Life of the Spirit*, Eng. tr., New York, 1909.  
*Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, Eng. tr., London, 1911.  
*The Truth of Religion*, Eng. tr., New York, 1911.  
*Main Currents of Modern Thought*, Eng. tr., New York, 1912.
3. B. P. Bowne,  
*Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, New York, 1897.  
*Metaphysics*, New York, 1898.  
*Theism*, New York, 1902.  
*The Immanence of God*, New York, 1905.  
*Personalism*, New York, 1908.  
*The Essence of Religion*, Boston, 1910.

## 4. Wm. James,

*The Will to Believe*, New York, 1897.  
*The Varieties of Religious Experience*, New York, 1902.  
*Pragmatism*, New York, 1907.  
*The Meaning of Truth*, New York, 1909.  
*A Pluralistic Universe*, New York, 1909.  
*Some Problems of Philosophy*, New York, 1911.  
*Essays in Radical Empiricism*, New York, 1912.

## D. WORKS BEARING ON PRESENT THEOLOGICO-SCIENTIFIC PROBLEMS

E. S. Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, Boston, 1910.  
J. M. Baldwin, *Darwin and the Humanities*, Baltimore, 1909.  
L. T. Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose*, London, 1913.  
H. Höffding, *The Problems of Philosophy*, London, 1905.  
F. H. Johnson, *God in Evolution*, New York, London, 1911.  
I. King, *The Development of Religion*, New York, 1910.  
E. W. Lyman, *Theology and Human Problems*, New York, 1910.  
A. W. Moore, *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, Chicago, 1910.  
W. Ostwald, *Natural Philosophy*, New York, 1910.  
K. Pearson, *The Gramma of Science*, London, 1900.  
R. B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, New York, 1912.  
H. Poincaré, *The Foundations of Science*, New York, 1913.  
F. C. S. Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx*, London, 1891.  
F. C. S. Schiller, *Studies in Humanism*, London, 1907.  
J. M. E. McTaggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, London, 1906.  
G. B. Smith, *Social Idealism and the Changing Theology*, New York, 1913.  
J. Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, Cambridge and New York, 1911.  
E. S. Waterhouse, *Modern Theories of Religion*, London, 1910.

INTRODUCTION: TYPICAL MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL  
THEORIES OF EVOLUTION

The most typical modern philosophical theories of evolution are those of Hegel and of Spencer. A brief examination and critique of their conceptions of evolution forms the introduction to the main task of our investigation.

Hegel has given an elaborate philosophical expression of the historical spirit of the nineteenth century. The world of nature and of man, for him, constitute the manifestations of the underlying cosmic reason. The method by which he arrived at this conception is through the analysis of human consciousness. When we discover the laws of our thought, according to Hegel, we know the nature of cosmic reality; for the laws of human thought are identical with those of that reality. Hegel finds that we think in terms of comparison and differentiation. When I define a thing, I define it by setting over against it something which is not that thing; and after this process of comparison and differentiation, I reach a synthetic idea which reconciles the antithesis involved in the relation of being and nought, subject and object, ego and non-ego. In short, we have the Hegelian dialectic: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. This triadic process of thought is seen, for example, in Hegel's analysis of the notion of Being. We have first the notion of Being, and then over against this notion, we have that of Nought. These notions are abstract and antithetical. But their abstractness and antithesis find their concreteness and reconciliation in the notion of Becoming.<sup>1</sup> In this triadic process of thought, Hegel finds the nature of cosmic reality or reason. This reason objectifies itself in nature and comes to its subjective consciousness in the mind of humanity.<sup>2</sup>

Now, the point with which we are here concerned is this: whether the cosmic reality, which Hegel holds to be engaged in the processes of manifestation, is involved in a *real* evolution. From his extensive appeal to history, and from such an expression as: "Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only at the end is it what it is in the very truth,"<sup>3</sup> it would seem that Hegel attributed to reality a real change and growth. But a closer examination shows that Hegel does not find such a change and growth in the ultimate being of cosmic reality. The cosmic reason, in his thought, unfolds in nature

<sup>1</sup> Wallace, *The Logic of Hegel*, 1892, pp. 158 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, Eng. tr., 1890, p. 10.

<sup>3</sup> *The Phenomenology of Mind*, Eng. tr., 1910, I, p. 17, cf. II, p. 822.

and history what it already possesses.<sup>4</sup> "Development or progress," says Hegel, "is not the making of something out of nothing, but the end unfolding, or manifestation of that which in another respect eternally is."<sup>5</sup> Hegel's theory of evolution is, at best, one of thought-process, but not of time-process.<sup>6</sup>

God, from the standpoint of Hegel's dialectic, is the ultimate reason of the world wherein he is manifesting himself and working out his plan (*The Philosophy of History*, p. 38). "God," for Hegel, "is the absolutely True, the Universal in and for itself, the All-comprehending, All-containing, that from which everything derives substance."<sup>7</sup> This God manifests himself in the different stages of religious development, and reaches his highest expression in the absolute religion;<sup>8</sup> and yet he is eternally the same, self-identical God.<sup>9</sup> Thus Hegel stands for a closed system of reality; in his universe, there is no real evolution.

When we pass from the idealistic evolutionary theory of Hegel to that of Spencer, we find a mechanical theory of evolution. Spencer divided reality into that which is relative and that which is absolute. The former is knowable and open to the investigations of objective sciences; the latter is unknowable, and while underlying both science and religion, it is beyond our finite knowledge. The purpose of Spencer is to synthesize the facts of the knowable region into a synthetic philosophy by means of his theory of evolution, which is expressed in the formula: "*Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.*"<sup>10</sup> These phenomena of evolution in the knowable realm of reality are made possible by the

<sup>4</sup> Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, pp. 57, 82; Wallace, *op. cit.*, p. 379.

<sup>5</sup> Quoted by Adamson in his *The Development of Modern Philosophy*, 1903, II, p. 303.

<sup>6</sup> See Ritchie, *Darwin and Hegel*, 1893, p. 47; Baldwin, *Darwin and the Humanities*, p. 88, footnote; McTaggart, *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic*, 1910, pp. 18 ff.; Rogers, *Student's History of Philosophy*, 1908, p. 452.

<sup>7</sup> *The Philosophy of Religion*, I, p. 90.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, II, pp. 327 ff.

<sup>9</sup> For the use made of this Hegelian conception of God, see John Caird, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, 1891, *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, 1899, esp. Lectures, III, VI, VII; Campbell, *The New Theology*, Chaps. II, III, IV; Gordon, *Ultimate Conceptions of Faith*, 1903, Chap. IX; Hyde, *Outlines of Social Theology*, 1895, Part I.

<sup>10</sup> *First Principles*, 1900, p. 407.

cosmic force, the unknowable absolute,<sup>11</sup> but this is not subject to evolution.

The question which we raise in this connection is this: Does Spencer hold to a real evolution in the being of reality? It is manifest that he exempts the underlying, unknowable reality from any evolution. Is there a real evolution, then, in the knowable reality? In the knowable region of reality, according to Spencer, there are going on changes, transformations, evolutions, dissolutions. But, however, we fail to see a real change and growth even in the knowable reality of Spencer; for him, matter, motion, and force are given once for all, and they are constant quantities.<sup>12</sup> Thus the universe, in all its knowable and unknowable aspects, is quantitatively constant in its being. Consequently, God, who is identified by Spencer with his unknowable absolute, is free from all evolution. While the evolutionism of Spencer, therefore, calls for a change in our conception of God's relation to the world, it does not demand a radical change in our view of the nature of God.<sup>13</sup>

Thus both Hegel and Spencer stand, though in different ways, for a closed system of reality; in their world there is no real growth, but all is constant and is given once for all. This being the case, it is not our aim to ascertain the bearing of their theories of evolution on the conception of God. We shall turn at once to the empirical conception of evolution and consider its consequences for the doctrine of God.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 200.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 176 ff., 184 ff., 194 ff.

<sup>13</sup> For the use and criticism of Spencer's conception of God, see Fiske, *Cosmic Philosophy*, 1874, Part III, Chaps. II, III; Picton, *The Religion of the Universe*; Flint, *Agnosticism*, pp. 629 ff.; Boutroux, *Science et Religion*, Paris, 1908, pp. 80 ff.

## PART ONE

## SURVEY OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE RELATION BETWEEN THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF GOD

*I. The Content and Meaning of the Evolutionary Theory.*

Obviously it is a first task in this investigation to determine the content and meaning of the evolutionary theory as held by empirical science. This task is necessitated by the fact that the concept of evolution is used in varied senses. We shall briefly consider typical theories of evolution, and then attempt to indicate the central elements common to the theories. The bearing of these on the conception of God is our main concern.

## A. Typical Inductive Theories of Evolution.

## (i) Lamarck's Theory of Evolution.

It is generally agreed that the first scientist who inductively formulated a theory of evolution was Lamarck (1744-1829). Osborn observes that Lamarck, "as founder of the complete modern theory of descent, is the most prominent figure between Aristotle and Darwin."<sup>1</sup> Prior to Lamarck, it is true, the doctrine of celestial and of terrestrial evolution had been expressed; but Lamarck applied the evolutionary idea to the realm of organic life. And at the time of Lamarck his contemporary naturalists held to the theory of the immutability of species and the doctrine of special creations. Lamarck in his early days shared these views. But by the publication of his *Philosophie Zoologique*, 1809, he reversed all previous thinking on the matter of organic evolution.

Lamarck's theory of evolution is characterized by the three central ideas: the influence of the changing environment on the need and habits of organic beings; the effect of use and disuse of organs in the production of changes in the organisms; and the inheritance of acquired characters. According to Lamarck, changes in the environment affect organisms in two ways: they create new needs and these new needs produce in them new habits.<sup>2</sup> This doctrine of the influence of changes in the environment is closely connected with Lamarck's other idea, namely, that of the effect of use and disuse. Lamarck holds that the environmental changes, in creating new needs in the animals, cause in them new movements to satisfy the new needs; these new needs, which necessitate new actions,

<sup>1</sup> *From the Greeks to Darwin*, p. 156.

<sup>2</sup> Packard, *Lamarck, The Founder of Evolution*, p. 925. In this work Packard gives a translation of Lamarck's *Philosophie Zoologique*.

make demands on the animals to make use of parts which were previously relatively inactive; and these new parts, being thus used, develop and become enlarged.<sup>3</sup> The changes thus produced in organisms under the influence of changing environment and the use and disuse of parts by the organisms are transmitted from one generation to another by means of heredity. This is Lamarck's crowning principle by which he accounts for the origin of new species.<sup>4</sup> These are the essential elements in Lamarck's theory of evolution.<sup>5</sup>

We are in this study concerned solely to indicate the implications of Lamarck's theory with reference to the conception of God. Lamarck holds that all organisms arose from germs. The first germs originated by means of spontaneous generation. This would mean a reduction of the divine activity, not only in the production of new species, but also in the formation of the very beginnings of life. It is nature that carries on the process of organic evolution.<sup>6</sup> Yet Lamarck does not dispense with the activity of God in the production of species. He conceives of God as the Supreme Author of all things who has endowed nature with laws and properties for the production and maintenance of all forms of life.<sup>7</sup> God is thus the first cause, but he is not actually engaged in the work of organic evolution. Thus the God of Lamarck is deistically related to the organic world.

#### (ii) Darwin's Theory of Evolution.

Lamarck formulated, as has been shown, a theory of evolution in 1809. But the thinking world continued, on the whole, to hold that species were fixed realities and that they were each specially created. This is due, on the one hand, to the fact that the world was not ready to accept the theory of organic evolution, and, on the other hand, to the fact that Lamarck did not bring forth sufficient inductive data which would compel its acceptance. But Darwin, through the publication of his *The Origin of Species* in 1859, vindicated the theory of descent through variations as an established fact in the organic realm.<sup>8</sup> It should, then, be noted that the significance of Darwin is to be found not in the fact that he originated the theory of evolution, for he did not, but

<sup>3</sup> Packard, *Ibid.*, p. 303.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 304.

<sup>5</sup> For a criticism of Lamarckism, see Kellogg, *Darwinism Today*, pp. 265 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Packard, *op. cit.*, p. 284, cf. p. 158.

<sup>7</sup> *Philosophie Zoologique*, I, p. 113.

<sup>8</sup> See Wallace, *Darwinism*, p. 6; Höffding in Seward, *Darwin and Modern Science*, 1909, p. 447; DeLaguna, *Dogmatism and Evolution*, 1910, p. 117.

in the double fact that he gathered an astonishing mass of empirical data respecting plants and animals, and that he worked out the theory of natural selection to account for their evolution. Thus the universal acceptance of the theory of descent results from the convincing character of Darwin's data on the subject. Hence to estimate properly the place of Darwin, we need to take account of the thoroughly scientific method with which he proceeded in his work as well as of his theory of natural selection.

The central elements in Darwin's theory of evolution are as follows: The first is the fact of heredity. It is a matter of common observation that plants and animals reproduce their own kind. The regularity and uniformity of this reproductive process of nature is fully recognized and depended upon by Darwin to account for the formation of species. The second element is also the commonly observed fact that all individuals differ from one another and from their parents. This is the principle of variation. The differences, though slight, among offspring from the same parents are, for Darwin, very important, as they afford material for natural selection to accumulate, preserve, and give rise to new species.<sup>9</sup> The third element is the fact that all organized beings multiply at an enormous rate—at a geometrical ratio. The increase of organisms at such a rate leads to what Darwin calls the struggle for existence.<sup>10</sup> This leads to the last and crowning element, the principle of natural selection. Darwin shows that variations useful to organisms are naturally preserved for their good, while those which are harmful to them are likewise destroyed.<sup>11</sup> "This preservation of favorable variations and the rejection of injurious variations, I call Natural Selection."<sup>12</sup> The above elements constitute the gist of Darwin's theory of evolution.<sup>13</sup>

The theological implication of Darwin's theory of evolution is similar to that of Lamarck. Darwin has convincingly shown that the formation of species is not by special creation but by natural selection. He holds that miraculous interventions are wholly unnecessary in the process of organic evolution. The laws of heredity, imperceptible variations, over-multiplication of organisms, and natural selection or the survival of the

<sup>9</sup> *The Origin of Species*, p. 45.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.

<sup>13</sup> For some discussions on *Darwinism*, see Kellogg, *op. cit.*; Schmucker, *The Meaning of Evolution*, 1912. A quite different theory of evolution from that of Darwin is found in DeVries, *The Mutation-Theory*, and *Species and Varieties*. He holds that the formation of species is result of sudden, discontinuous changes.

fittest are sufficient to account for the transformations in organic realm. Darwin does not do away with the work of God, but he relegates the activity of God to the beginnings of life. God, according to Darwin, has impressed laws on matter for the production of organisms.<sup>14</sup> But we must note, in justice to Darwin, that he is not primarily concerned with the metaphysics of evolution but with its processes.<sup>15</sup>

(iii) Bergson's Theory of Evolution.

Hitherto our discussion has been confined to the theories of evolution primarily in their empirical aspects. They make no attempt at philosophic explanation. But in Bergson we find the two interests combined: scientific and philosophic. Bergson starts with the inductive data of biological evolution, and proceeds, on the basis of these data, to build a philosophy of evolution. The central elements of his philosophy may be considered as three: the view of reality as change or duration; the doctrine of the original impetus of life; and the theory of knowledge based on intuition. Of these we are specially concerned with the first two, for they have direct relation to his theory of evolution.

1. Reality as Change or Duration.

Bergson commences his "*Creative Evolution*" with an analysis of human consciousness. Here we are on most certain ground, in that we can take an internal view of ourselves. What do we find, then, in our consciousness? The most universal fact of our consciousness is change, a change not only in the passage from one state to another of our consciousness, but also in the states themselves. In fact, there is no essential difference between the passage from one state to another and the persisting in the same states.<sup>16</sup> In our effort to give validity to these changing states, we fall back on some unchanging ego, a fixed substratum. But for Bergson there is no such thing as a fixed ego, an entity, or stuff; all is change and duration.<sup>17</sup>

From this examination of human consciousness which is bound up with change and duration, Bergson passes to existence in general. Material objects, according to Bergson, do not share the changing characteristics of organic life. Matter as such is lifeless and dead; it is incapable of change by itself. The material world is a world of mechanism where the future is foreseeable. Time does not bite into it. But there is undeniably a succession of time in material systems. Such a suc-

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 424 ff.

<sup>15</sup> *The Descent of Man*, pp. 702 f.

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 1 ff.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

cession is a sign of their likeness to ourselves. Further, matter has a tendency to form isolable systems, but their isolation is not complete; they are bound up with extra-material influences. There is, indeed, a thread which binds all the elements of the universe into an organic unity. It is because of this thread, which is transmitted to the smallest particles of the universe, that we experience in life the duration that is immanent in the whole of the universe. Thus the condition of change and duration in the material systems is that they shall be reintegrated with the whole of reality.<sup>18</sup>

So the universe as a whole changes and endures. It also grows. The universe is not ready-made; it is growing and making new additions. Reality is in the process of continual change and growth. It is ever creating and adding to itself new worlds.<sup>19</sup> The universe is thus acting, creating, and growing.

## 2. The Vital Impetus.

It is the doctrine of the vital impetus that differentiates the theory of Bergson from mechanism, finalism, and the theories of evolution which have been considered. Bergson sets forth his doctrine of the original impetus of life in opposition to what he calls radical mechanism and radical finalism. He considers these systems of thought as utterly inadequate to explain the phenomena of life. Radical mechanism is inadequate in that it views all things as already given and made, whereas in reality we cannot take such a view. "We perceive duration as a stream against which we cannot go. It is the foundation of our being, and, as we feel, the very substance of the world in which we live."<sup>20</sup> Radical finalism must also be rejected, and for the same reason. It likewise assumes that all things are given once for all in eternity. Radical finalism is not, however, so rigid and fixed as radical mechanism. Nevertheless, radical finalism is untenable because it holds that nature is carrying on a foreseen plan—a view which is not verified in nature and life.

Thus Bergson sets aside radical mechanism and radical finalism because they fail to take account of the change and duration which we perceive to be the very essence of life.

Bergson displaces these systems of thought with his doctrine of the vital impetus, which, he admits, is allied with radical finalism in certain respects. Like radical finalism, his doctrine represents the entire

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 248.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

organized world as a harmonious whole. But this harmony is not perfect as is claimed by radical finalism. Each species and even its individuals, deriving a certain impetus from the original impulsion of life, tend to use it for themselves; hence there arises universal conflict. Thus there is no harmony in fact, only in principle. Since all the divergent streams of life receive their impetus from a common source, and since they are not actually in a harmonious relation with each other, if there is harmony at all it is not before but behind us. The future is unforeseeable by us. For we are in the stream of life which is growing, creating constantly new forms. These forms, however divergent they may be from each other, possess a common thread which runs through them all. This common element is the original impetus of life which is immanently working out into divergent lines of evolution. By virtue of this vital impetus there is a harmony in the systems of things.

It is, moreover, the original impetus of life working in divergent directions of evolution that is the fundamental cause of the variations which accumulate to produce new forms of life. While species, separating from their common stock, accumulate differences as they progress in their evolution, yet in certain definite points they may evolve individually the similar structures, for example, the eye of mollusks and of vertebrates. Such similar structures, contends Bergson, cannot be accounted for by the accidental variations of Darwin or the external influences of Lamarck. They are, on the contrary, due to the original impetus of life that is working in the organisms.

The evolution of life in divergent directions is made possible, then, by the vital impetus. Now, what is the nature of this vital impetus? Bergson does not tell whence it came. He holds it as the basic principle of evolution. It is the world-principle, the cosmic consciousness.<sup>21</sup> But it is not omnipotent. Bergson fully admits the limitations of the vital impetus.<sup>22</sup> If the force immanent in life were omnipotent, it would produce all forms of existence at once; but since it is limited, it cannot do so.<sup>23</sup>

The God of Bergson may be identified with the vital impetus. God, according to Bergson, is engaged in the process of perpetual activity. He is like a shell shooting out forms of life in many directions.<sup>24</sup> He does not know beforehand the final outcome of the process of evolution in which he

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 239, 261.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 126.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 141 f.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 98.

is engaged. There are, in the evolutionary process, accidents, setbacks, deviations, conflicts, which he must struggle to control. "God thus defined," writes Bergson, "has nothing of the already made; He is unceasing life, action, freedom."<sup>25</sup> God, from the point of view of Bergson, then, is vitally related to the forms of life, and shares in their experiences of change, struggle and growth. Accordingly, the God of Bergson is not absolute but is finite in his nature; and so his relation to the world is expressed in terms of relativity. Thus with the surrender of all the absolute characteristics of the central being of reality, there is no finality, no absoluteness anywhere; all is reduced to the relativity of becoming.

### B. Essential Elements in the Evolutionary Theory

Typical inductive theories of evolution have briefly been outlined. It remains, at this stage of our study, to indicate the essential ideas in the evolutionary theory.

#### 1. The Idea of Change.

The static view of the world has characterized the prevailing philosophies and theologies from the classic period of Greek philosophy to our time. The satisfactions of life have been found in absolutes, finalities, immutabilities, eternities, fixities. The world of change, suffering, pain, conflict has been declared apparent and illusory. But from the days of Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), and of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), another view of the world has constantly been gaining ground. (Scientists in their investigations of the natural phenomena first observed the movements of planetary systems, then of the earth, and finally of the organic world. From the time of Lamarck, in particular, the organic world has been subjected to intensive and extensive investigations. Evidences have been gathered from palaeontology, geology, geographical distribution, morphology, embryology, to show that there have been going on changes in the world of living beings. It is the unanimous opinion of biologists that all the existing species of plants and animals have descended from former generations of species, which also descended from their predecessors, and so on to the time when the protoplasmic organism arose from inorganic matter in, as yet, an unknown manner. The notion of descent with modifications is not questioned for a moment by biologists.<sup>26</sup> Following this biological theory, Bergson universalizes the

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 248, cf. his remark on God quoted by LeRoy, *The New Philosophy of Henri Bergson*, p. 225.

<sup>26</sup> See, e. g., Weismann, *The Evolution Theory*, I, p. 3; DeVries, *Species and Varieties*, p. 4; Kellogg, *op. cit.*, p. 3; Lock, *Recent Progress in the Study of Variation*, etc., 1911, p. 30; Geddes-Thomson, *Evolution*, pp. xf.; Schmucker, *op. cit.*, pp. 233 ff.

idea of change and makes it the very essence of life. From this point of view, change is not a superficial thing that can be explained away or ignored. For the whole world as we know it is in the process of change.

### 2. The Fact of Growth.

Previous to the full sway of organic science, evolution meant an unfoldment of something already given. All systems of thought stood for a closed system of reality. Reality was held to be ready-made; so it was not subject to the process of growth. Over against this closed view of reality, the modern theories which we have considered hold to actual growth in the being of things (this is particularly true of Bergson). Organic beings, from the point of view of the evolutionary theory, are not merely evolving latent potentialities, but they are actually growing in their being. All the forms of life have come to be what they are by the process of growth in the content of their being. Particularly, it is one of the radical contentions of Bergson that there is a real growth in things. The evolution of life means, for him, a real increase in the being of things. Reality is not ready-made; but it is constantly creating, becoming, growing, adding to itself new worlds. While he admits that there are blind alleys, arrests, setbacks, and the like, yet in the main lines of evolution there are real growth and progress.<sup>27</sup>

### 3. Organic Continuity.

(The evolutionary theory means, further, the continuity and solidarity of organic beings.) Lamarck constructed a phylogenetic tree showing the oneness of organic beings. As to the evolution of man he suggests the view that he probably descended from some arboreal creature allied with the apes. The enormous amount of inductive material accumulated by Darwin in his *The Origin of Species* vindicates the organic solidarity of all living beings. In his later book, *The Descent of Man*, Darwin attempts to show the essential oneness of man with other forms of life. He accomplishes this task by a careful comparative analysis of man with mammals and lower animals respecting their higher qualities as well as their physical characteristics. He fully recognizes the differences between man and the animals, especially, in regard to the higher qualities of man; but he considers that there is no fundamental difference between them.<sup>28</sup> This belief is shared by all the biological scientists. Bergson apparently differs from them in his view of the evolution of life as taking place in divergent directions; and he holds that in consequence of this divergency the vegetable, animal, and human beings differ not

<sup>27</sup> Bergson, *op. cit.*, pp. 251 ff.

<sup>28</sup> *The Descent of Man*, p. 702.

only in degree but in kind. Yet he maintains the fundamental unity of all the forms of life by virtue of the original impetus; and he fully acknowledges the continuity of the different lines of evolution once they are started by the impetus.<sup>29</sup> So Bergson is essentially one with the biologists in regard to the continuous solidarity of organic beings.

This consensus of opinion held by the biologists has frequently been attacked by theologians who seek to introduce certain so-called 'breaks' into the process of evolution. Such breaks are said to have taken place at the dawn of life, the appearance of sentiency, and the awakening of consciousness. Opposition is especially manifest to the inclusion of man in the organic series. This inclusion seems to these theologians to involve a degradation of the dignity of man. But the real motive of their adherence to the breaks is the wish to show the hand of God at those particular points.<sup>30</sup> This theological *a priori* assumption, however, is doomed in view of the results of the painstaking empirical investigations of biological science; and the organic solidarity of living beings is maintained as a scientific fact.

#### 4. Factors of the Evolutionary Process.

Do the evolutionary theories as a whole hold that the processes of change, growth, and continuity are effected by purely empirical factors or by metempirical forces? Are the forces which make possible the evolutionary process natural or supernatural? or are they both natural and supernatural? This is a critical point in the theory of evolution. The factors of evolution recognized by Lamarck and Darwin are, in the main, empirical. These factors, according to them, were given to the original forms of life by the Supreme Creator at the very beginning of the evolutionary process.<sup>31</sup> For both these biologists, God is the omnipotent and omniscient being who created matter and energy and endowed them with the laws and properties for all subsequent development. God is the first cause; but the real factors of evolution are secondary causes.<sup>32</sup> There are, however, many biologists who refuse to bring in any other factors than those which they can scientifically test.<sup>33</sup> Other biologists, such as Wallace, are dissatisfied with the

<sup>29</sup> *Op. cit.* Chap. II, cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 251-271.

<sup>30</sup> See, e.g., Griffith-Jones, *The Ascent through Christ*, 1901, pp. 26-32, cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 243 ff.

<sup>31</sup> Packard, *op. cit.*, p. 374; Darwin, *The Origin of Species*, p. 424.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Jordan and Kellogg, *Evolution and Animal Life*, pp. 9 f., 468 f.

<sup>33</sup> See, e. g., Kellogg, *op. cit.*, p. 378; Henderson, *The Fitness of the Environment*, 1913, pp. 305 ff.

pure empiricism, e. g., of Darwin, and bring in metempirical forces.<sup>34</sup> Bergson holds that the mechanical and accidental factors held by the prevailing theories of evolution are inadequate and maintains that the prime factor in the evolution of living beings is the original impetus of life. Briefly stated, extra-empirical factors are not recognized by most of the biologists. Some are dogmatic on this point, while others take a less dogmatic attitude. But whatever their position respecting the ontological nature of the factors of evolution, it is manifest that they consider them either externally or internally in close relation to the evolving organisms. The forces which carry on the evolutionary process are held to be immanent in the organisms and in their environment. The ontological character of these forces is subject to further investigation.

### 5. The Question of Teleology.

And, finally, does the evolutionary theory hold that there is purpose in the process? This is another mooted question. Lamarck believed that organic beings are tending from less perfect toward more and more perfect forms.<sup>35</sup> Darwin considered that the organic evolution had reached its summit in man; but he refused to commit himself to any definite view as to the ultimate destiny of humanity.<sup>36</sup> Bergson rejects radical mechanism and radical finalism alike, but does not deny that there is some sort of purpose in the evolutionary process.<sup>37</sup> In view of the fact that from the standpoint of the evolutionary theory the whole organic world is changing and growing and is involved in accidents, setbacks, and the like, it cannot hold to an absolute teleology that must be realized at all cost. From its point of view, if there is teleology in the process at all, it is a finite, growing, changing teleology in the evolution of life.

So we may summarize the meaning of the evolutionary theory thus: It holds that all the forms of life are in the process of a continuous change and growth, which is effected by the forces immanent in the organisms and in their environment, for a limited, growing, developing purpose.

## II. *The Traditional Conception of God*

The content and meaning of the evolutionary theory have been outlined. But in order to see the issues called forth by the theory we must now note the essentials of the traditional conception of God.

<sup>34</sup> Wallace, *op. cit.*, Chap. V; Simpson, *The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*, pp. 254 ff., 277 ff.; Schmucker, *op. cit.*, Chap. XIX.

<sup>35</sup> Packard, *op. cit.*, pp. 323, 345 f.

<sup>36</sup> *The Descent of Man*, pp. 702 ff.

<sup>37</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 265 ff.

### 1. God as the Supernatural Personality.

The dominant characteristic of all systems of orthodoxy is supernaturalism. Essential are a supernatural creation, supernatural revelation, supernatural Christ, and a supernatural salvation. Consequently God is essentially separate from the world of nature and of man and is beyond the power of natural human knowledge. Indeed, God as the supernatural Being is the absolutely indispensable foundation of the orthodox system.<sup>38</sup> The world-view underlying this conception of God is a philosophy which divides reality into two realms: a natural and a supernatural. In accordance with this view man and other finite beings belong to the natural realm, while God and his messengers belong to the supernatural. The connection between the two realms is effected by means of the supernatural acts of God.

The emphasis, then, in this conception of God is placed upon his specific deeds in his relation to the world. The acts of God, however, are not altogether normal, that is, such as we observe in the processes of nature and man, but they are supernatural. He mysteriously decreed in past eternity his relation to and the course of the world; he miraculously created the world out of nothing; he made revelation of himself in a supernatural book; he miraculously sent his only begotten son into the world to accomplish the plan of salvation for the elect.<sup>39</sup> What is all important for orthodoxy is supernaturalism in the activities of God in his relation to the world. Accordingly, therefore, orthodoxy maintains its belief in the miraculous acts of God.<sup>40</sup> Now it is this insistence on the supernaturalness of God's acts that leads orthodox theologians to oppose the modern doctrine of evolution. They cannot see the hand of God in the gradual process of evolution; if there be a God, he must be known by his miraculous deeds. To hold that the world and man have come to be what they are by the process of a slow and gradual evolution means atheism.<sup>41</sup> It should be noted that their opposition to the evolutionary theory is due to the desire to maintain intact the finality of their system deducable from the infallible scripture which is given by the transcendent, supernatural God, and to furnish a positive basis of assurance to

<sup>38</sup> See Greene, The Supernatural, in *Princeton Biblical and Theological Studies*, pp. 142 ff.

<sup>39</sup> See Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, I, p. 535 ff., 550 ff., 151 ff.; II, pp. 378 ff.; Shedd, *Dogmatic Theology*, I, pp. 393 ff., 61 ff.; Strong, *Systematic Theology*, I, pp. 353 ff.; II, pp. 371 ff.; I, 111 ff.; II, 669 ff., etc.

<sup>40</sup> Hodge, *op. cit.*, I, 617 ff.; Shedd, *op. cit.*, I, 533 ff.; Strong, *op. cit.*, II, 431 ff.

<sup>41</sup> See Hodge, *op. cit.*, II, 11 ff.; Shedd, *op. cit.*, I, 499 ff.

men that God is powerful to perform even miraculous deeds, if necessary, for their ultimate victory. So God must necessarily be conceived of as the supernatural personality, who expresses his relation to the world by means of supernatural acts.

## 2. God as the Absolute Being.

This is the philosophic view of God, which orthodoxy holds along with its conception of him as a specific, supernatural person, who manifests himself in concrete acts. God, who is conceived of as a transcendent personality in popular Christianity, is given, in the philosophical view of him, metaphysical attributes. Philosophically viewed, God is the ultimate reality, the source and ground of all that exists. God so conceived possesses such attributes as spirituality, infinity, perfection, personality, immutability, and the like.<sup>42</sup> God as such corresponds to the Idea of ideas of Plato, the Form of forms of Aristotle, the mystical One and the Good in Plotinus. The moral aspects of these ideas of God are expressed in the conception that he is eternally complete and perfect. This notion of God as immutable and static in his perfection is based upon the substance philosophy which formed the fundamental presupposition of Greek theology.<sup>43</sup> Every effort is made to maintain the absoluteness of God from the limitations of time. (The eternity of God means that he is above the time and succession which are characteristics of our consciousness.) We do not know how a God who is a conscious personality could be timeless in his thinking, but he nevertheless is free from time.<sup>44</sup> Moreover, God is exalted above all the causes and possibilities of change. He is absolutely immutable in his essence, attributes and purpose.<sup>45</sup> With this insistence of traditional theology on the absoluteness of God goes also its desire to retain the finality of its system. The absoluteness of the divine revelation, the uniqueness of Christ, the completeness of Christianity, all stand or fall with the doctrine of the absoluteness of God. So God is held as the absolute being. (The absoluteness of God, from the point of view of orthodoxy, does not signify that he embraces the whole of reality—Hodge, *op. cit.*, I, 382 f.).

In brief these two elements—God as the supernatural personality and absolute being—constitute the basic ideas in the traditional conception of God. They represent man's practical ethico-religious and philosophical interests, traceable, respectively, to the Hebrew and Greek

<sup>42</sup> Strong, *op. cit.*, I, p. 248.

<sup>43</sup> For the emphasis upon the substance idea of God, see Hodge, *op. cit.*, I, 367 ff.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 385 ff.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 390 f.; Shedd, *op. cit.*, I, 351 f.

influences in theology. Orthodox theologians, such as Hodge and Shedd, start with God as the ultimate reality, the metaphysical source and ground of the universe; but they lay most stress on the idea of God as the supernatural, transcendent person, who governs the world of nature and of man by means of specific, miraculous acts and interventions. God as a cosmic principle is too remote and colorless to satisfy the moral and religious needs of man, so that the chief emphasis has been placed on the view of God as the supreme sovereign who manifests his relation to the world and man in particular deeds and acts of supernaturalistic character. Still the philosophical view of God reached by means of human reason is not ignored; it is held to satisfy the speculative interests of man. So these two views of God are maintained together as the fundamental constituents in the traditional conception of God.<sup>46</sup>

This thoroughgoing supernaturalistic conception of God is wholly opposed to the theological implications of the evolutionary theory. For this theory implies that if there be a God, he must be not only vitally related with the forms of life but also be orderly and gradual in the method of his activity; and furthermore that such a God must be held to be actually himself involved in the process of change and growth. But such an evolutionary conception of God is repugnant to orthodoxy. Hence there arise many problems in the attempt to bring the traditional conception of God into relation with the evolutionary theory. These problems we have yet to state in the following section.

### *III. The Problems Involved in the Relation between the Evolutionary Theory and the Traditional Conception of God*

#### 1. The Problem of Method.

Manifestly the method as to how we may reach and formulate the conception of God is a great question which needs to be settled. The method followed by science in the construction of the evolutionary theory is antithetical to that used by traditional theology in formulating its conception of God: the former employs the inductive, empirical method; the latter, the *a priori*, revelation method. The one outstanding characteristic of the evolutionary theories examined above is that they are formulated as result of more or less careful inductive study of the processes in organic world. (One may question this statement with respect to the theory of Bergson. It should, however, be replied that Bergson, too, set forth his theory of evolution after years of investigation in the field of organic evolution). But it is quite otherwise with tradi-

<sup>46</sup> See, e. g., Hodge, *op. cit.*, I, 366.

tional theology. It maintains that God has made his final revelation in the scripture. Its conception of God is obtained by a systematic analysis of the content of this revelation, for in it there is given once for all the true nature of God.<sup>47</sup> Which method, now, should be used in the formulation of the conception of God? This is a critical problem, for on its solution depends largely the character of our conception of God. (This will appear in the course of our study.)

## 2. The Problem of the Relation between Science and Theology.

This problem has already been implied in the preceding one. But the question of the relation of science to theology involves also a metaphysical problem, i. e., Can the affirmations of science be held as the final word on the ontological realities with which theology deals, or must theology hold that there is more to reality than is revealed by science? Traditional theology, having an infallible and authoritative source for its affirmations, does not make any real use of the results of scientific investigation. This dogmatism of traditional orthodoxy has been polemically transferred to what Perry calls naïve, uncritical naturalism.<sup>48</sup> Such naturalism declares that it has the last word on the matter of reality; it claims that what it discovers by means of its inductive method is all there is to reality. For it, cosmic substance, cosmic energy, eternal matter, mechanical causality are all that there are in the world of reality, and all the facts of human life are explicable in terms of these sub-human entities. Shall these two dogmatisms be allowed to continue, or must we seek for a reconciliation between them? If we accept the latter alternative, how can they be reconciled? The solution of this problem has a close relation to the content of the conception of God.<sup>49</sup>

## 3. The Problem of God as the Supernatural, Transcendent Personality.

The traditional conception of God, following the dualistic view of the universe and political analogies, holds that he is the sovereign person who has determined the course of the world and who expresses his relation to it in specific supernatural acts. The dualistic philosophy, on which this view of God is based, has been undermined by the discovery of the Copernican astronomy. Kant has shown in his *Critique of Pure Reason* that we can never know a God who exists all by himself. The evolutionary theories do not know any other world than this where the forces which carry on the evolution of life are immanent in the organisms

<sup>47</sup> E. g., Hodge, *op. cit.*, I, 182 f., 364.

<sup>48</sup> Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, Chap. IV.

<sup>49</sup> See Perry, *op. cit.*, Chap. V, Religion and the Limits of Science.

and in their environment. These theories know no such supernatural interventions from an unknown realm of reality into the course of evolution, as are essential to the traditional conception of God. Thus is raised the problem of the transcendence or immanence of God. Is God organically connected with the life-process or only occasionally by miraculous interventions? If one is forced to surrender the transcendence of God in the traditional sense, what sort of transcendence can be held? Or if one must conceive of God in terms of immanence, what should be done with the concept of God's personality? Such is the problem called forth by the evolutionary theory in view of the traditional conception of God as the transcendent, supernatural personality. This is closely connected with the next and the other problem to be mentioned.

#### 4. The Problem of God as the Absolute Being.

The traditional conception of God holds to the view of him as the absolute. It conceives of God in terms of completeness, perfection, immutability. The absoluteness of God from the exigencies of time and history is tenaciously maintained. But in our examination of the meaning of the evolutionary theory we discovered, among others, the two essential elements, change and growth, which are held as characteristic of the forms of life. As human life with other forms of life are considered to be engaged in the processes of change and growth, these characteristics of life are applied to all the sciences and institutions concerned with the interests of life. Not only social institutions change and grow but also their ideals. Not only do ethical ideas and ideals change from one age to the other, but also the content of moral conduct changes and grows. So does philosophy change and grow. And religion is not exempt from this process of change and development. Both its expressions and content change and have history. Thus the idea that things have history and so change from age to age has penetrated into all the aspects of human life. Absolutes, finalities, eternities, perfections are not found anywhere in the realm of man. Do they exist beyond the human sphere? Is God free from change and growth? All admit that our ideas of God have changed from the days of primitive man. But do change and growth hold true only of the conceptions of God, and not of the object of the conceptions? Is God absolute or is he in any sense finite? This is the most critical problem which needs to be carefully considered.

#### 5. The Problem of God's Relation to the World and Man.

The traditional conception of God holds that God created the world out of nothing through the fiat of his sovereign will. But our astronomi-

cal and geological sciences tell us that it has taken millions of years to produce the world as we have it. All the forms of life have come to be through the process of change and growth. The theories of evolution, then, reduce existing things to so small and insignificant beginnings that the creation of these seems scarcely worthy of the supreme being. What then shall be done with the traditional doctrine of creation? Furthermore, what view should be taken of the orthodox doctrine of divine providence? According to this doctrine, God has the sovereign control of all things, and he is working out, by supernatural means, a predetermined, absolute plan for the world. But is he actually governing the world in accordance with his plan? Are there not things in the world which seem to be defeating such a divine plan? This is notably the case with the undeniable fact of evil. Are evils in the world merely negations of the good? Are they incidents in the process of evolution? Are the evils in the world there because God could not prevent them? Or are there actually evil forces independent of God's control? Must we accept the orthodox solution and say that God is not an efficient cause of the evils but permits them to exist?

And what should be said of God's relation to man? Traditional theology holds that man is a creation of God, but, since his fall, he is totally destitute of all high values; and hence he is wholly dependent on God for obtaining the lost righteousness and dignity. From this point of view, man has no initiative, no real freedom; but God is all in all. The evolutionary theory, however, teaches that the forces which make possible the on-going of evolution are resident in the evolving organisms and their environment. Are the powers that enable human life to change and develop wholly of God or of man? Or are God and men mutually coöperating to achieve higher values in life? This opens up the larger question of God's relation to social progress. Positivistic philosophers maintain that the movements of social progress are due to the workings of human social forces. Orthodoxy, on the other hand, holds that they are of God. Which view should be accepted?

The above constitute the essential problems involved in bringing together the evolutionary theory and traditional conception of God. We shall now turn to the typical attempts at their solution.

## PART TWO

## TYPICAL RECENT SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE RELATION BETWEEN THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF GOD

We shall not deal, in this section, with present-day treatises on systematic theology. For these either ignore the problems raised by the evolutionary theory, or else refuse seriously to face the issues involved. This is the case, in the main, with all systems both of Catholicism and Protestant orthodoxy.<sup>1</sup> Some theologians do, indeed, recognize the difficulties raised by the doctrine of evolution and make efforts at their solution; but in such efforts their chief interest is to preserve the traditional conception of God. This attitude is characteristic of certain liberal interpretations of orthodoxy.<sup>2</sup> Other writers are much influenced by the evolutionary theory and apply the theory to the history of religions, but as yet have not worked out a doctrine of God from their evolutionary point of view. This is true, in a limited sense, of Catholic Modernism;<sup>3</sup> and more particularly of the *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule*.<sup>4</sup> For any profound appreciation, then, of our problem, we must turn to philosophers rather than to professional theologians. In this study we shall concern ourselves with the solutions worked out in typical recent philosophies of religion, namely, Royce's *Absolute Realism*, Eucken's *Philosophy of Life*, Bowne's *Personal Idealism*, and James's *Pragmatism*. For all the advocates of these systems of thought recognize

<sup>1</sup> See Wilhelm and Scannell, *A Manual of Catholic Theology*, I, pp. 158-256, 358-427; Hodge, *op. cit.*, I, 366 ff., II, 3 ff.; Shedd, *op. cit.*, I, 151-546; *Princeton Biblical and Theological Studies*, 1912, pp. 136-207; for Ritschian theology, see Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, Freiburg, 1897, pp. 161-189, 231-241; Wendt, *System der Christlichen Lehre*, Göttingen, 1906, I, 82-122, 133-161; and Haering, *The Christian Faith*, Eng. tr., 1913, I, 315-363, II, 499-513; for Positive theology, see Seeger, *The Fundamental Truths of the Christian Religion*, Eng. tr., 1908, pp. 135-172; and Forsyth, *Positive Preaching and Modern Mind*, pp. 41-72, 199-290.

<sup>2</sup> See, e. g., Clark, *An Outline of Christian Theology*, 1903, pp. 63-161, *The Christian Doctrine of God*; Brown, *Christian Theology in Outline*, 1907, pp. 81-298; and King, *Reconstruction in Theology*, 1901, Chaps. V ff.

<sup>3</sup> See Tyrrell, *The Programme of Modernism*, 1908; and Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church*, 1903, pp. 1-22, 180-225.

<sup>4</sup> See Troeltsch, *Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte*, Tübingen, 1912, The Dogmatics of the "Religionsgeschichtliche Schule," *A. Jour. Theol.*, Jan., 1913; Empiricism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion, *Harvard Theol. Rev.*, Oct. 1912; Miller, The Teaching of Ernst Troeltsch, *Harvard Theol. Rev.*, VI, 426-450; and Bousset, *What is Religion?* 1907.

the inadequacy of the traditional conception of God. They are fully conscious of the problems raised by modern scientific concepts, including the evolutionary theory, and make critical attempts to solve the problems.

### *I. The Solution of the Problems in Royce's Absolute Idealism.*

The classic modern formulator of absolute idealism is Hegel. He defined reality in terms of logical processes of thought, and reached the concept of a philosophic absolute which he made equivalent to the God of Christianity. Among the recent representatives of this general system of thought, who are interested in the religious problems, are such men as Otto Pfleiderer, John and Edward Caird, T. H. Green, John Watson, R. J. Campbell, W. DeW. Hyde, G. A. Gordon, and Josiah Royce. Among absolute idealists Royce has kept most abreast of modern scientific movements, and has endeavored to construct his conception of God in the light of these. The essential features of his system are that the ultimate reality of the world is an all-inclusive Mind or Spirit; that all finite forms of existence are manifestations of the fundamental reality; that this reality and finite spirits are organically related; that, therefore, when we discover the laws of our thought and volition, we know the nature of the ultimate reality; and that when we reach this reality, the absolute, it becomes the criterion of our thought and all our evaluations.<sup>5</sup> With this general remark we proceed to our immediate task.

#### 1. Royce's Conception of God.

##### (1) The Method of Royce.

The fundamental philosophical and religious task of Royce is to get from our finite point of view over to that of an absolute, so that the latter shall determine all the activities and values of our life. The method followed by him in working out this task is a method which analyzes the processes of human social consciousness. Former neo-Hegelians, for example, J. Caird, used a rigidly individualistic method. But Royce, especially in recent years, makes use of the principles of social psychology. (This is very marked in his recent work, *The Problem of Christianity*). His method, however, is essentially identical with that of his predecessors; for his primary object is to ascertain the thought processes of social mind. He is confident that, through this analysis of the logical processes of social mind, he can get at the heart of reality. This intellectualistic procedure of Royce is consonant with his assumption that the finite thought-process and infinite thought-process are

<sup>5</sup> Royce, *The World and the Individual*, I, 42, 127, 181, 394, 426; cf. J. Card, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 229, 233 ff., 245, 252.

organically related, and that the former mirrors the latter.<sup>6</sup> This is the method which Royce employs to derive his conception of God. He depends neither upon an objective revelation nor on the inclinations of subjective feeling, but he completely trusts in the power of human thought, whether individual or social, to ascertain the nature of God. What then is the character of God reached by the use of this dialectic method? This we must proceed to ascertain.

(2) The Content of Royce's Conception of God.

i. God as the Absolute Being.

God as the absolute Being reconciles the antinomy between the two aspects of our experience—thought and fact. Our experience, according to Royce, comes to us as sheer light and shade, sound and silence, pain and grief, all intermingled. But we have in the depth of our experience ideas or attempts to give meaning to these sheer facts. As a sum total of these ideas we have thought. This thought and the facts of experience are in conflict with each other. To escape this antithesis we long for a reality which shall reconcile these two phenomena of our life. This reality is found in God the Absolute Being; for in him there is no conflict between fact and thought.<sup>7</sup>

The fundamental significance of God as the Absolute Being, then, according to Royce, is found in the thought of him as the objective fulfilment, in final form, of the internal meaning of all our finite ideas or thoughts. This view of God is reached through a critical analysis of the meaning of Being and the conditions of true ideas. After a critical examination and rejection of the theories of Being held by Realism, Mysticism, and Critical Rationalism,<sup>8</sup> Royce develops his theory of Being. This is determined by his conception of the meaning of an idea. An idea, according to Royce, possesses two meanings—an internal and external. The internal meaning of an idea is the expression of a specific purpose. The external meaning of an idea is found in a specific object which is willed to be the idea's object.<sup>9</sup> The internal meanings of ideas are at first vaguely embodied in their objects; but gradually they gain in clearness; and any ideas are true when they are embodied completely in their ultimate objects. Any idea is true when even in its vagueness, it corresponds "to its final and completely individual expression."<sup>10</sup> From this follows Royce's theory of Being: "*What*

<sup>6</sup> *The World and the Individual*, I, 8, 424 ff.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 55 ff.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 62 ff., 103 ff., 137, 181, 196 ff.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 24 ff., 325, 327, 329, 331, 337.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 339.

*is, or what is real, is as such the complete embodiment, in individual form and in final fulfilment, of the internal meaning of finite ideas.”<sup>11</sup>* This Being is something Other than themselves which finite ideas seek. They seek a Being which, when found, would end all their doubts. Being, for Royce, then, is not something independent of finite ideas, not the Immediate of Mysticism, nor the validity of ideas as held by Critical Rationalism; it is, on the contrary, the ultimately individual embodiment of the object of all finite ideas.) To summarize in his words, Being is “(1) a complete expression of the internal meaning of the finite idea with which, in any case, we start our quest; (2) a complete fulfilment of the will or purpose partially embodied in this idea; (3) an individual life for which no other can be substituted. . . . It is an individual life, present as a whole. . . . This life is at once a system of facts, and the fulfilment of whatever purpose any finite idea, in so far as it is true to its own meaning, already fragmentarily embodies. This life is the completed will, as well as the completed experience, corresponding to the will and experience of any one finite idea.”<sup>12</sup> Such a complete life is conclusive of all search for perfection which every finite idea seeks. When we reach this Being in its ultimate, individual life, we can lay aside all ifs, thens, validities, and the rest; because all our seekings and troubles will then be at an end. Such a Being is a world in which the meanings of all our finite ideas and experiences are completely expressed. Such a Being, such a world of experience, is God. “Since this one world of expression is a life of experience fulfilling ideas, it possesses precisely the attributes which the ages have most associated with the name of God. For God is the Absolute Being, and the perfect fulness of life. . . . In God we live and move and have our Being.”<sup>13</sup>

## ii. God as the All-inclusive Consciousness.

This conception of God as the cosmic consciousness, possessing a knowledge of all things in their wholeness, is already implied in the foregoing view of him as the Absolute Being. Royce holds that his theory of Being as the ultimate fulfilment of the meanings of all finite ideas involves the unity of all knowing process. From this point of view he proceeds to show that there is one all-inclusive consciousness embracing all finite consciousnesses, and that this cosmic consciousness is God.) Whatever is, according to Royce, is consciously known either

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 339.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 341.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 349 f.

by us or by an all-inclusive knower as fulfilment of some finite idea.<sup>14</sup> The meanings of our finite ideas find only a partial fulfilment in our experience—consciousness. These partially fulfilled meanings of our experience are completely and finally fulfilled in a cosmic experience. The world of individual experiences exists in relations. These relations are known to us only partially, but they are known as a whole to a cosmic consciousness.<sup>15</sup> Our social experience accepts, as real, minds, the past and future. But they are real only as they are known to a universal consciousness. Our individual and social experiences are fragmentary and chaotic. These fragmentary experiences are completely present to an all-inclusive knower. Such a cosmic knower is God. (For he is the Omniscient Being, who possesses an absolute unity of thought and experience.) (This Omniscient Being, God, finds present before him all things not as result of fragmentary and gradually completed process of inquiry, but directly and all at once.) For such a God there are no problems; all things are present before him completely solved. (All our experiences are fragmentary and partial, but the Omniscient Being or God has an absolute experience, in fact he *is* the Absolute Experience.<sup>16</sup>) That such an Absolute Experience exists is shown in the very fragmentariness of our experience, which implies the existence of an Absolute Experience.<sup>17</sup> We find the significance of our existence in the Absolute Experience which comprehends all our strivings, tasks, purposes as completely fulfilled. In such an Experience we are eternally at home.<sup>18</sup> To this God, the Absolute Experience or Cosmic Consciousness, Royce assigns the attribute of personality, which is defined in terms of an all-inclusive consciousness.<sup>19</sup> In his recent work, *The Problem of Christianity*, Royce conceives of God as the Universal Interpreter.<sup>20</sup> So Royce conceives of God in terms of an absolute experience or cosmic consciousness.

### iii. God as the Absolute Moral Will.

So far we have considered Royce's view of God as the Absolute Being and Experience. In these views of God there is also involved the idea of him as the Absolute Moral Will. But in this idea of God we see particularly the voluntaristic element in Royce's system. That

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 396.

<sup>15</sup> Royce, *The Conception of God*, pp. 1 ff.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 31 ff.

<sup>17</sup> *The World and the Individual*, I, 427.

<sup>18</sup> *Op. cit.*, II, 418 ff.

<sup>19</sup> II, p. 324, cf. *ibid.*, 373 ff., 296.

God is the Absolute Will is seen in the fact that to be means to fulfil in final, individual expression the only purpose, the Absolute Purpose.<sup>20</sup> (This Absolute Purpose is not an abstraction, but it is infinitely complex; so that its unity is a unity of many Wills, each of which finds its final expression in an all-embracing Will—God.) The expression of this Absolute Purpose is both temporal and eternal.) But these two expressions are completely unified in the Absolute Will.

A special problem for Royce to solve, in this connection, is whether this God who is declared the Absolute Will can be conceived of as moral. Royce maintains the view that God is the Absolute Moral Will. That God is such a being follows from the contention of Royce that the world, which is in essence identical with God, is moral. Royce's argument for the moral nature of the world is based upon his conception of the temporal and eternal orders and of the human self.<sup>21</sup> Royce holds that in the temporal order of the world there is provided ample room for moral deeds and tasks to be performed; and since the finite individuals, in their unique manner, express the will of God, they have individuality and freedom. Thus, in short, the world is moral, and, in consequence of this fact, God is the Absolute Moral Will, which Will, from an eternal point of view, is absolutely fulfilled.<sup>22</sup>

(3). The Relation of God and the World.

i. The Relation of God and Nature.

Nature, according to Royce, is the World of Description, while finite minds constitute the World of Appreciation. The reality of the physical world is bound up—since it has no independent existence—with that of social beings—the World of Appreciation. The world of social beings is real, because they furnish to us the meaning of our vague ideas; they give us the constantly needed supplement to our own fragmentary meanings.<sup>23</sup> Having thus established the reality of the social world, it is not difficult to see that of the natural world. The physical world is real because my fellow beings experience material objects beyond them and this their experience supplements my own limited experience. The phenomenal world, then, exists beyond my private experience—it exists in the experiences of my fellow beings. Thus the reality of the external world is dependent on that of the social world.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>20</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, 335.

<sup>21</sup> See *Ibid.*, Lectures III and VI.

<sup>22</sup> For Royce's treatment of the problem, see *Ibid.*, esp. Lecture VIII.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 170, 172.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 175 ff.

(As to the constitution of the natural world, Royce holds that it together with the finite minds is an aspect of a larger life of the world. The processes of nature and human minds are essentially alike; at bottom they are identical—the only difference between them is that the processes of nature go at a different time-rate than ours.<sup>25</sup> The mechanical laws and theories of science do not tell us the essence of nature; they indicate only how nature behaves. Royce easily accepts the doctrine of evolution, because, from the standpoint of his theory of reality, it can be made to show that the processes of nature and mind are alike, and it can thus establish the fundamental oneness of these elements of reality with the larger life of the Absolute.<sup>26</sup> While nature, at bottom, is thus mental in its processes and alive with the life of God, yet it does not form a complete manifestation of him. It only gives us a glimpse into the larger life of the Absolute Being; it furnishes to us only a hint of a vaster realm of life of which we form a part.<sup>27</sup> Nature, for Royce, then, is an order of genuine conscious life, manifesting, in a limited way, God the Absolute, who is not its external cause but its very existence.<sup>28</sup>

## ii. The Relation of God and Man.

In accordance with his theory of Being Royce affirms the essential unity of man with God the Absolute, and makes the former an aspect of the latter. Man appears to us an incident and product of nature, heredity, education, and social environment. But how do you know that you are a such being? It is because you are ontologically linked with the life of God. (By virtue of this organic unity of man with God, man shares, in essence, all the attributes of the infinite in finite forms.) His problem is to attain to a conscious knowledge of this fact. But this affirmation of the ontological unity of man and God the Absolute raises a great problem, which Royce is called upon to solve, viz.: whether or not man really possesses freedom and individuality, and so is capable of a real moral life. Royce contends that man has freedom and individuality, and therefore is a real ethical being. The essence of freedom, in Royce's view, consists in the selective activity of conscious life. That is, I have several objects which may express my internal meanings, but I uniquely select from them an object and allow it alone to be the objective fulfilment of my internal meaning.<sup>29</sup> In all his discussion of the

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 219 ff.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 219 ff., 242.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 8 ff., 204; cf. J. Caird, *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, I, 75.

<sup>28</sup> Royce, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 242, 330.

<sup>29</sup> *Op. cit.*, I, pp. 449 ff.; cf. II, Lectures VI, VII, where the same view is worked out in detail.

relation of God to man, Royce holds that man has his freedom and individuality by virtue of his organic relation to God; but he maintains that in God man still dwells as an unique individual, for he is an unique expression of God's purpose.<sup>30</sup> While in Royce's world there is only one final and complete self—the Absolute Self—, yet within this Self there is articulation, contrast, variety. Hence there is a place for the individual finite self. But this finite self is not as yet an accomplished fact, but an ideal to be achieved in the future.<sup>31</sup> There are difficulties in the way of realizing this ideal self in view of the fact that the present finite self is closely bound up with nature and social environment. But these difficulties are dissolved when we see that this world, in its wholeness, is the expression of the determinate and absolute purpose, the fulfilment of the divine will.<sup>32</sup> God accomplishes his absolute plan in the world as a whole. (Any finite self is free not in isolation from the whole in which God expresses his plan, but in relation to it and in expressing in its unique manner the will of God.) So with all one's dependence one is free by expressing in his own way the will of God.<sup>33</sup> Thus Royce attempts to secure the place of the individual in his system of the Absolute.

## 2. Criticism of Royce's Solution of the Problems.

An outline statement of Royce's general position and conception of God has now been set forth. This has prepared us for the task before us, namely, to make a critical examination of the position of Royce respecting the problems which we have indicated as due to the effort to bring the evolutionary theory into relation with the traditional conception of God.<sup>34</sup> In accomplishing this critical task we shall be able to see, more concretely, the extent to which Royce has worked out the bearing of the evolutionary theory on his conception of God.

In general it can be said that Royce has worked out his conception of God from the standpoint of his absolute idealism. Through the medium of this system of philosophy, he has given an idealistic interpretation of the world, in opposition to the mechanistic theory of naturalistic philosophy, and a conception of God in terms of dynamic immanence, in contrast to the traditional conception of God in terms of realistic supernaturalism. It is, then, from the point of view of absolute idealism,

<sup>30</sup> *Op. cit.*, II, p. 286.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 289 f.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 292.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 293.

<sup>34</sup> See above, pp. 16 ff.

that Royce has ultimately worked out the bearing of the evolutionary theory on the conception of God. (This fact must be borne in mind in the criticism that follows.)

In the first place, as regards his method of formulating his conception of God, we note that Royce has not made use of the inductive empiricism employed by the formulators of the theories of evolution which we have considered. He has devoted a major portion of the first series of his great work, *The World and the Individual*, to the exposition of his theory of Being, and makes the theory the basis of all his subsequent investigations. Hence he frankly claims a full independence of his philosophy from scientific results.<sup>35</sup> Royce analyzes human temporary, and fragmentary experiences and absolutizes them into an all-inclusive, absolute experience.<sup>36</sup> Or he makes an analysis of human ideas or thoughts and reaches his theory of an absolute Being or Thought, and considers this theory as the basis of his system.<sup>37</sup> Thus the Absolute Experience or Being is made the ultimate basis of our finite experience and thought. If we ask how our fragmentary experiences could be synthesized into the Absolute Experience or Thought of Royce, when the chasm between the content of our finite experience and that of an all-inclusive reality, if there were such a being, is so great; Royce makes the identification between them on the ground of logical oneness of our thought with cosmic thought. It is from the standpoint of an *a priori* Absolute Experience or Thought that we find the criterion of all the evaluations which Royce makes on the world and man. He has no ultimate confidence in the facts of our common experience; for these are fragmentary and fallible. Instead of basing our view of the world on the revelations of our finite experience, we must build our philosophy on a Being which has an absolute knowledge and experience, on an all-embracing reality, and interpret the sheer facts of our experience from the viewpoint of such a Being. Our conception of God, in the thought of Royce, should not be derived from the standpoint of our experience, but should be constructed in accordance with the theory of an absolute Being, yea in terms of that Being. Accordingly the method of Royce is wholly opposed to that of the scientific evolutionary theory.

The intellectualism and apriorism of Royce's method, however, is in full accord with his general system of thought. Such a method he must follow in order to maintain his system of philosophy. He must ever

<sup>35</sup> *Op. cit.*, II, p. 8.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, Lecture III.

<sup>37</sup> *Op. cit.*, I, pp. 339 f.

insist on the primacy of reason as the source of religious insight, and on that to which this reason leads, namely, the all-inclusive and all-knowing insight, as the criterion of the truth and falsity of our views of things.<sup>38</sup> But it should not be overlooked that there are statements in Royce's works, which are not in agreement with his dialectic, absolute method. He accepts, for example, the Kantian dictum: *Nur in der Erfahrung ist Wahrheit*;<sup>39</sup> and he maintains that the problem of reality is first of all a problem of experience and practical needs, and that his conception of reality, in one aspect at least, is thoroughly empirical.<sup>40</sup> In the work which is distinctly devoted to the problem of religious knowledge, Royce speaks much of individual and social experiences as sources of religious insight,<sup>41</sup> and appeals to the actual experiences of those who practise religion as guides for us to the truth.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, in his recent work, *The Problem of Christianity*, he acknowledges that he aims to deal with the subject from the standpoint of life;<sup>43</sup> and this claim is fully justified, particularly, in the first volume of the work. These and other assertions of Royce<sup>44</sup> show that a real interest of Royce is to ascertain the data of our common individual and social experiences, and to build his view of the world on them. Hence just in so far as Royce deals with our experience in its varied aspects, he is not in line with his absolute method; for it cannot be consistently maintained, as he does, that the method of experience would point us to an all-inclusive experience.<sup>45</sup> On the other hand, just to the extent that Royce makes use of the data of our experience, he is in agreement with the method of the scientific evolutionary theory. So to this degree, he has worked out the bearing of the theory.

In view of the fact that philosophically Royce does not use the inductive method of science, it is not difficult to see what his attitude toward science is. We have seen that he claims an absolute independence of his system from the results of science. This he effects by dividing the universe into two worlds: the world of fact and that of thought; the world of description and that of appreciation; the temporal and eternal orders. Science deals with the former, while his philosophy deals

<sup>38</sup> *The Sources of Religious Insight*, pp. 84 ff., 109 ff.

<sup>39</sup> *The World and the Individual* II, p. 362.

<sup>40</sup> *Op. cit.*, I, pp. 55, 401.

<sup>41</sup> *The Sources of Religious Insight*, pp. 26 ff., 37 ff.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 166 ff.

<sup>43</sup> Pp. 12 ff.

<sup>44</sup> See *op. cit.*, I, pp. 387 ff.; II, p. 5.

<sup>45</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, pp. 11 ff.; cf. *The Sources of Religious Insight*, pp. 109 f., 137, 144 f.

with the latter; so they are independent of each other. This independency, however, can be maintained only as each of them is willing to restrict itself to its own field prescribed by Royce. But our scientific and philosophic interests are so related in our experience that such a rigid separation between them as indicated by him is practically impossible. As a matter of fact, science is always enlarging its borders; there is no closed region for its investigation,<sup>46</sup> so that we cannot say to science: Thus far thou mayest go but no further. Philosophy or theology cannot shut its eyes to the fields ordinarily covered by special sciences, for the results of these sciences are closely related to the interests of life, with which theology and philosophy must concern themselves.<sup>47</sup> Thus the futility of dividing the world into two distinct fields and of assigning the one to science and the other to philosophy is clearly evident.<sup>48</sup>

But, in reality, Royce does not confine himself to his allotted field. He is not satisfied with the interpretation of the world given by science, and offers his idealistic theory of it, and considers it as the final view of the universe.<sup>49</sup> There is much truth in his statement: "The modern naturalistic and mechanical views of reality are not, indeed, false within their own proper range, but they are inadequate to tell us the whole truth."<sup>50</sup> But to maintain that the theory of being, which Royce holds, must determine all his interpretation of nature and man,<sup>51</sup> is against the empirical temper of our age. The present age desires neither scientific nor philosophic dogmatism. Consequently, both science and philosophy must assume a thoroughly empirical attitude in order that there may be a proper relation between them. But such an attitude Royce does not entertain. And his refusal to assume the empiricism, which characterizes the evolutionary theory, is characteristic of his absolute idealism. Yet the very fact that Royce affirms even the temporal reality to our experience of the world, and assigns this temporal order to the work of science, shows that he is interested in viewing the facts of life from an empirical point of view; and so he departs from his absolute philosophical theory. But just to the degree that Royce thus takes an empirical attitude, he has solved the problem of the relation of his theology or

<sup>46</sup> Pearson, *The Grammar of Science*, pp. 12 ff., 24.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Baldwin, *Darwin and the Humanities*, p. 81.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. I, King, *The Development of Religion*, pp. 9 f.

<sup>49</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, pp. 207 ff.; *William James and Other Essays*, pp. 60 ff.

<sup>50</sup> *William James and Other Essays*, p. 72.

<sup>51</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, pp. 8 f.

philosophy to science; and so to that extent he has indicated the bearing of the evolutionary theory on the question of God.

Now, in regard to Royce's conception of God, enough has already been said<sup>52</sup> to show that it is fundamentally different from the kind of a God made necessary, if we accept the evolutionary view of the world. The evolutionary theory would hold that if there be a God, he must not only be immanent in the world but should himself be actually involved in the process of change and growth. The God of Royce is, however, wholly unlike such an evolving God. True, his God is immanent in the world of thought and is not such a colorless being as held by the mystic. True, his God is engaged in the processes of thought—he is interpreting the world. But he is eternally what he is—there is no change and increase in his being.) He is not such a static absolute as that of Spinoza, but he is nevertheless forever complete and self-contained. This conception of God as the Absolute, All-inclusive Being, free from the vicissitudes of time and evolution is perfectly consistent with Royce's system of philosophy—absolute idealism. From the standpoint of this philosophy we can have no other God than the eternally perfect God of Royce.

But what is worthy of note in this connection is that this conception of the eternal absoluteness of the God of Royce needs to be modified in the light of many of his statements which indicate finite aspects of his God. To cite a few, we note the following: "The only way to give our view of Being rationality," writes Royce, "is to see that we long for the Absolute only in so far as in us the Absolute also longs, and seeks, through our very temporal striving, the peace that is no where in Time, but only, and yet absolutely, in eternity.) Were there no longing in Time, there would be no peace in eternity. . . . The right eternally triumphs, yet not without temporal warfare. . . . This warfare occurs, indeed, *within the divine life itself*. . . . I sorrow. But the sorrow is not only mine. This same sorrow, just as it is for me, is God's sorrow."<sup>53</sup> "God wins perfection through expressing himself in a finite life and triumphing over and through its very finitude. . . . Our sorrow is God's sorrow. . . . (In me the temporal being, in me now, God is in need, is hungry, is thirsty, is in prison. (In me, then, God is dissatisfied. But he is God. He is absolute. Eternity is his. He must be satisfied. In eternity, in the view of the whole temporal process, he is satisfied."<sup>54</sup> These and similar expressions of Royce indicate clearly that his God is

<sup>52</sup> See above, pp. 21 ff.

<sup>53</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, pp. 386, 398, 409.

<sup>54</sup> *William James and Other Essays*, pp. 183, 296.

(striving to attain the goal of his perfection. But in the last analysis Royce would hold that this impression of God's finitude is due to our finite, temporal point of view. From the point of view of the Absolute, its will is completely expressed, its tasks perfectly done, its moral life absolutely finished.<sup>55</sup> If God is thus eternally complete in himself, why does he suffer, struggle, and long to be perfect at all? (Is his temporal suffering only apparent and his eternal perfection an actual fact? In other words, Royce, to be consistent, has to affirm either the stated suffering of God as real and so his God finite, or his suffering as an illusion and hence his God eternally complete. Royce, it seems, does not wish to do either. He feels too keenly the realism of life to pronounce God as all complete and perfect, and so untouched by our finite experiences. He would consider his God as closely related to our temporal life, and, therefore, he attributes to his God the elements of finite experience. Yet, impelled by his absolute idealism, Royce maintains that the all-inclusive perfect being is at the heart of the world.<sup>56</sup> But we must remark that just in so far as Royce interprets God in terms of our evolutionary experience, which he does, he departs from his philosophical position, and comes to the conception of God necessitated by the evolutionary theory. These aspects—those that are in agreement with his absolute idealism and those that are in accord with the evolutionary theory—we also note as we come, finally, to remark on his conception of God's relation to the world and man.

It is maintained by Royce that his God is morally perfect.<sup>57</sup> This moral perfection of God is not the result of moral struggle on his part.<sup>58</sup> Royce, moreover, declares that his God is not merely immanent in the world but is identical with the totality of the universe in all its expressions. God is identical with "the totality of what is, past, present, and future, the totality of what is physical and what is mental, of what is temporal and of what is enduring . . . . Like the Logos of the Fourth Gospel, this entire world is not only with God, but is God."<sup>59</sup> This being the case, the world of nature and of man must be absolutely good, as Royce asserts.<sup>60</sup> But the empirical theories of evolution, we have examined,

<sup>55</sup> See, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 442 ff.; *The Conception of God*, pp. 8 ff.; *The World and the Individual*, II, p. 302.

<sup>56</sup> See *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 436 ff.

<sup>57</sup> *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 441 ff.; *The Conception of God*, p. 8.

<sup>58</sup> *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 448.

<sup>59</sup> *William James and Other Essays*, pp. 168 f.; cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 285 f.

<sup>60</sup> *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 444.

indicate to us that there are connected with the evolutionary process of the world merciless struggles, miseries, wastes, anomalies, sufferings. These forms of evil we cannot deny to exist, nor can they be explained away. Royce maintains that the world is good when it is viewed in its entirety.<sup>61</sup> An empirical evolutionist would scarcely consider the processes of nature so idealistically as does Royce.<sup>62</sup> The actual process of nature suggests either that the God immanent in it is impotent to carry out his plans without evil consequences, or that there are evil forces which are counteracting his activities. But Royce admits neither hypothesis. He must contend for the view that the world from an eternal point of view is perfect. Yet he does not deny all reality of evils in the world; he admits their temporal reality, and seeks to give significance to their presence.<sup>63</sup> Here again we see his deviation from his absolute idealism and a tendency on his part toward the point of view of the evolutionary theory.

To speak now of Royce's view of God's relation to man, we need to note that since his God, being the all-inclusive individual of the world, embraces all finite beings; and since the latter have no existence apart from the former, a logical consequence would be that finite beings possess no real freedom and individuality. Finite beings are aspects of the Absolute. They possess no existence of their own; their ultimate goal is to be ontologically one with the Absolute. This view of finite beings logically follows from Royce's absolute idealism. But he distinctly attempts to show that finite beings possess individuality and freedom.<sup>64</sup> In view of the fact, he holds, that each finite being expresses in his unique manner the will of the Absolute, he possesses real freedom and individuality. Because finite beings thus possess freedom and individuality there are provided all the possibilities for moral life.<sup>65</sup> And in the temporal order of the world there are real moral deeds done and real achievements toward a better world. Hence you as a finite being must strive with all your might to accomplish the will of God in your life and society. Especially in his recent works Royce is urgently advocating the necessity of this moral activity—we must live the life of loyalty to an eternal cause. (See *The Philosophy of Loyalty*; *William James and*

<sup>61</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, p. 379.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 219 ff.

<sup>63</sup> *The World and the Individual*, I, pp. 380ff.; II, pp. 388 ff.; *The Sources of Religious Insight*, pp. 215 ff.

<sup>64</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, Lecture VII.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 343 ff.

*Other Essays; The Sources of Religious Insight; The Problem of Christianity).*

But this insistence of Royce upon moral activity leads us to ask: Why should we be loyal and struggle against the apparent forces of evil to create a better world, when the world in its essence is all complete and finished? Why must we struggle through the evils of life to obtain perfection, as is held by Royce,<sup>66</sup> when there are no *real* evils in the world, and we stand before our God all complete?<sup>67</sup> Thus unless there are possibilities for change and growth in the world, we cannot see how there could be real moral life for us finite beings. If the world is finished from an eternal point of view, as Royce holds, so that we cannot change its course; the only course open to us is to deny the reality of movement and progress in the world of our experience, and engage ourselves in a mystic contemplation of an "eternal" world. Moreover, God is not found in the world where an actual evolution is taking place; therefore we can find God only in escaping from the world of evolution. What other course than this can we take when we are told that the real world is perfect, but that this perfection is not found in time, and that our comfort lies in the knowledge of the Eternal?<sup>68</sup> But such a contemplative life is wholly against the spirit of our time. And Royce would not tolerate such a life. His interests lie in the actual experiences of social realm and he urges that we shall realize a universal community.<sup>69</sup> A consistent absolute idealism would give up interest in our evolutionary experience and would urge a life of speculation on the eternal perfection of the world. Royce, however, declines to accept this path. The moral and religious appeals of our world are so great that he must accept and deal earnestly with them. In following this course, as he does, Royce deviates from the position of his absolute idealism, and comes to the standpoint of the evolutionary theory which stands for the reality of the time-process in which God and men are engaged for the creation of a better world.

This brings us to the close of our criticism of Royce's solution of the problems raised by the evolutionary theory. We have observed that fundamentally Royce has not carried out consistently the implications of his theory. We have indicated to what extent he has departed from his idealistic position and worked out the bearing of the evolutionary

<sup>66</sup> *William James and Other Essays*, pp. 171 ff., 287 ff.

<sup>67</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, p. 150.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 379, 411.

<sup>69</sup> *The Problem of Christianity*, Lectures II ff.

theory on the problem of method and on the conception of God. While it cannot be said that Royce has positively solved the problems, yet he has done much to interpret God in terms of the evolutionary theory.

## *II. The Solution of the Problems in Eucken's Philosophy of Life*

### 1. General Philosophical Position of Eucken.

The primary concern of Royce, as we have seen, is to formulate a philosophical theory of the world which shall determine all the interests of life. The construction of a *Weltanschauung* is not, however, Eucken's first object. His fundamental interest lies in the life-process itself—in its attempts, struggles, tasks. Eucken does not consider this life-process in its isolated aspects—the intellect, emotion, will—but he views it as a whole, that is, in its inner connections. This is one reason why he differs from other vitalistic systems.<sup>70</sup> That is to say, Eucken deals with life, not intellectually nor psychologically, but noëologically—making an examination of the life-process in its wholeness. In this noëological examination of life, he observes that it is engaged in the process of struggle, opposition, conflict with the physical world, with merely human culture, and even within the higher domain of life itself. To get rid of these enervating chains, life must not have recourse to philosophical speculation, nor to aesthetic or pietistic contemplation of the world; but it must struggle with all its might; work it must, if life is to triumph over all its foes.<sup>71</sup> But it is a firm conviction of Eucken that work, which is thus an indispensable element in life, cannot, however, assure its final victory; if life were to gain—as it must—its ultimate triumph over all its enemies, it must be grounded in an independent spiritual life.<sup>72</sup> It is with this affirmation of an independent spiritual life that Eucken's conception of God is connected. Consequently, we shall consider his conception of God from the standpoint of the spiritual life.

### 2. Eucken's Conception of God.

#### (1) God the Independent Spiritual Life as the Indispensable Factor in the Life-process of Man

God, in all the intellectualistic systems of philosophy, is the cosmic, explanatory principle of the universe, the ultimate criterion of human thought. It is otherwise with Eucken. God, for him, is that ultimate Reality without which the life-process of humanity, in its struggles with

<sup>70</sup> *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, pp. 3-80.

<sup>71</sup> Here emerges his activism, *Ibid.*, pp. 255-261.

<sup>72</sup> On these points, see *The Problem of Human Life*, Preface; *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 84 f., 455 f.; *The Life of the Spirit*, pp. vii, 401 ff.; *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, pp. 113 f.; *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, p. 242, etc.

the forces of evil, cannot win or be assured of its final victory. The necessary existence of God, according to Eucken, lies in the fact, first, that there emerges in man a higher life in contrast to that of nature; secondly, that so soon as this higher life becomes evident in man, there ensue tremendous conflicts between it and the forces of the physical world, social culture, and of the merely human; and, thirdly, that our work cannot enable us ultimately to triumph over all these opposing forces.) We must briefly consider these points.

Eucken fully accepts the doctrine of evolution which views man as a product of nature.<sup>73</sup> But he contends that this is not tantamount to man's complete identity with the life of nature. The very fact that we have knowledge of nature and its processes shows that we transcend nature.) Thought sets up an inner transcendent unity by which to judge nature; it asks the whence and why of the natural phenomena. Thought thus creates a conflict, a dissatisfaction of man with nature. But thought cannot free man from the powers of nature.<sup>74</sup> This impotency leads us to ask whether life is not more than thought. And in this inquiry, we find in life a higher interest developing itself. Life based on nature aims only at its self-preservation. But as life advances beyond nature, there develop altruistic motives and man lives in the interest of the family, the state and the like. In this forgetfulness of mere self, there appears a new form of life, a new relation between men; and a new relation to nature is also developed—nature becomes a means of man's advancement. In this detachment from nature, there occurs a liberation from external ties and a development of a self-conscious spirituality. It is this development of a self-conscious spirituality in man that essentially differentiates him from the life of nature.

But so soon as this higher life appears in the domain of man, he is confronted with oppositions from all sides. So long as man remains in the self-preserving stage of nature, he is not opposed by nature. But as man attempts to raise his higher life above the degrading pulls of nature, he feels keenest its opposition. Death, for example, coming from the order of nature, cuts short the life of the individual, and so frustrates his hope for an infinite span of life, his longing for an immortal existence. The natural order is thus unconcerned with the aims and values of human life.<sup>75</sup> So we must seek for a Divine spiritual life to help us win the spiritual victory.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>73</sup> *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, pp. 110 ff.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 117 f.

<sup>75</sup> See *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 292 f.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 293 ff.

Opposition to the autonomous development of man's spiritual life comes, also, from the region of culture. (Culture at first seems to create a world of reason and order; yet in reality it hinders the onward march of the spiritual life.) The spiritual life would make itself independent of all the external shackles of life, and thus be made the end in itself; but culture aims to make itself an independent end, and so to subordinate the spiritual life to its own service. Social culture creates customary forms of life and urges individuals to conform themselves to them. In this effort of social culture, it levels down the individual differences and gives no special recognition to great personalities; and thus it crushes individual greatness.

Great as are the oppositions of nature and culture, still greater entanglements are found within man's spiritual life itself. The oppositions from without are small in comparison with the difficulties found within the spiritual life.<sup>77</sup> The effort of the spiritual life to possess the whole of life is opposed by the individual movements: scientific, aesthetic, moral, religious interests each and all claim exclusive rights. Further, there is a cleft between the subject and object—between the individual consciousness and external world. And, finally, there is an antagonism between the noölogical and psychological methods of dealing with life.)

Thus the higher life of man is confronted by the oppositions from without and entanglements from within. The situation of man, therefore, is exceedingly dark and hopeless. Desperate as it is we can neither remain in the region of nature nor give up the task to acquire an independent spiritual life.<sup>78</sup> What can, then, aid us to triumph over the depressing forces of evil and to create in us an independent spiritual life? We may appeal to our work, for it is not a mere incident in man's life; "but it is that through which he first develops a spiritual life; through which he acquires a spiritual existence."<sup>79</sup> But can this work completely enable man to rise above the conflicts and oppositions? Eucken says, No. We must, in our desperate situation, he would say, appeal to a world-transcendent reality, a universal life. It is through our participation in such a transcendent spiritual life that we ultimately triumph over all the opposing forces. Even when there is a complete failure in our work, a depressive frustration in our struggle against the world, through the world-transcendent spiritual life, we may be more than conquerors.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 307; cf. *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, p. 172.

<sup>78</sup> *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 291-363; cf. *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, pp. 134 ff.

<sup>79</sup> *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, pp. 202 f.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 275 ff.; cf. *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 126 ff.

Thus Eucken affirms God as the indispensable presupposition of the life-process of man. Our next concern is to determine the character of this God.

(2.) God as the Absolute Spiritual Life.

God has already been characterized by Eucken as the universal, world-transcendent spiritual life. (But more particularly he conceives of God as the *Absolute Spiritual Life*.<sup>81</sup>) Eucken thus summarizes the content of his conception of God: "It signifies to us nothing other than an Absolute Spiritual Life in its grandeur above all the limitations of man and the world of experience—a Spiritual Life that has attained to a complete subsistence in itself, and, at the same time, to an encompassing of all reality. . . . The idea of God signifies to us nothing other than an Absolute Spiritual Life—a life in possession of a complete existence for itself, and constituting the substance of reality."<sup>82</sup> This conception of God is set forth by Eucken in contrast to two other conceptions—the anthropomorphic and the ontological speculative. The former attempts to keep God as near to man as possible, while the latter aims to lift God as high and far above man as possible. The anthropomorphic view of God as a magnified replica of human being has been characteristic of the conceptions of God in historical religions. Over against this tendency, ontological speculations have endeavored to hold God as a being without any qualities and above all concepts. This speculative conception of God as devoid of all anthropomorphic feature has led man to passive contemplation. The anthropomorphic tendency is right in its insistence that, in order for religion to be power in man, God must be held as near him; while the ontological speculative view of God is right in that it lifts religion above the presentations of the merely human. Eucken holds that his conception of God as an Absolute Spiritual Life reconciles these antithetical tendencies, for this conception, he contends, is derived from the life-process itself.) In the life-process of man there develops an independent spiritual life which lifts him not simply above the life of nature but also above that of the merely human; so that man in his union with the spiritual life becomes one with the nature of God the Absolute Spiritual Life. Thus through this transcendentalization, the finite and the infinite do no longer appear in sharp opposites. Thus, with Eucken, the conception of God as the Absolute Spiritual

<sup>81</sup> This conception of God is worked out, especially, in his book, *The Truth of Religion*.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 208f., 214.

Life is the ultimate principle which solves the problems involved in the relation of the Divine and human.<sup>83</sup>

(3) God's Relation to Man and the World.  
i. God's Relation to Man.

We have already seen that Eucken considers the Absolute Spiritual Life, God, to be the indispensable presupposition of the spiritual life of man in its struggle against the forces of evil. We have now to ascertain Eucken's view of man's ontological relation to God. This is a difficult task; because Eucken is not interested in logical distinctions, and consequently does not make definite statements. We may perhaps state his view of God's relation to man thus: (God the Absolute Spiritual Life is free from all struggle and conflict; this Absolute Spiritual Life is not a natural property of man; and yet it is operating in him from the commencement of his evolutionary process. In the course of the evolutionary process of man, there develops in him, in consequence of the immanent activity of the Universal Life, a higher life in distinction to that of nature. This higher life of man has not yet become one with the life of God, for it is still subject to conflict and struggle; so that man must fight, by the help of God, against the forces of evil, rise above them and so make the infinite life of God, his essential nature.<sup>84</sup> Thus Eucken conceives of God's relation to man in terms of both immanence and transcendence.<sup>85</sup>)

But now how do God and man become so related? It is here that Eucken differentiates himself from orthodoxy and other systems. Orthodoxy affirms that God comes to man through supernatural and external means; Eucken, on the contrary, holds that God reveals himself to us inwardly and immediately. Romanticism and pietism hold that we realize God's presence in our subjective feeling; but Eucken maintains that it is through our volitional activity that we become aware of God. Speculative philosophy tells us that we obtain our union with God through the activity of our thought; Eucken, on the other hand, asserts that it is mainly (through our practical struggles against the forces of evil that we come into an intimate touch with God.<sup>86</sup> It is, then, through volitional activity that man realizes his relation to God.<sup>87</sup>)

<sup>83</sup> For his attitude toward the personality of God, see *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 208 ff., cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 430 ff.

<sup>84</sup> See *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, pp. 60 f.; *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 119 ff., 158, 163 f.; *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, p. 154.

<sup>85</sup> *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, pp. 143, 152, 154; *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 221 ff.

<sup>86</sup> *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 250 f., 251 ff., 583 ff.; *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, p. 172.

<sup>87</sup> *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, p. 247.

As to the effects which follow from this relation of God to man, Eucken holds that there takes place a complete transformation of man into the likeness of God, and the life of God becomes man's essential nature.<sup>88</sup> Man's higher aspirations—after infinity, freedom and equality, eternity, fellowship, a soul-life, and inward greatness—are made real, when he is at one with the Absolute Spiritual Life.<sup>89</sup> Through the Universal Life, we become freed from the conflicts of life.<sup>90</sup> The universality, sovereignty, autonomy of the Spiritual Life becomes the possession of man who struggles to embrace the whole of reality.<sup>91</sup> Thus Eucken holds up an inspiring future for the man who fights to achieve in himself an independent spiritual life. But such a life is always a task to be accomplished.<sup>92</sup>

## ii. God and the World.

Eucken seeks to reconcile, through his conception of God as the Absolute Spiritual Life, the antithetical tendencies of thought between transcendence and immanence, dualism and monism, supernaturalism and naturalism. He is opposed to the crass dualism of ordinary thought; he would view the Godhead in an intimate relation with the nature of things. But a thoroughgoing denial of dualism leads inevitably to pantheism. Eucken appreciates the merits of pantheism; it holds up before us the unity, grandeur, beauty, and the greatness of the world. But he is opposed to the system because it represents the world in all its aspects as completely harmonious. Now, our life-process discovers itself involved in desperate struggles and oppositions against the world which are ignored by pantheism.<sup>93</sup> Pantheism, moreover, holds that the great aims of life are already attained; it thus leads to mere contemplation of reality, and to a quietistic optimism. It is the view of Eucken that it is characteristic of religion to affirm that the Divine world represents along with itself another world which is brought into relation with the Divine world not by its own strength but by that of the Divine.<sup>94</sup> So religion, with its affirmation of the Absolute Spiritual Life which is effective above and within the world, must constantly oppose both pantheism and dualism.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 145 f.

<sup>89</sup> *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 261-282; cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 437-453; *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, pp. 168 ff.

<sup>90</sup> *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 120, 126, 131, 188, 191.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>92</sup> *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, p. 229.

<sup>93</sup> See *The Truth of Religion*, p. 218.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 220 f.

With this contention of religion for a close relation of God to the world, Eucken agrees. (He considers God the Absolute Spiritual Life to be the very foundation of the world.) In spite of the fact that there are evil forces operating against the activity of God, the existence and processes of the world must be due to the immanent activity of God. If out of nature man arises with a capacity for appropriating the Universal Life, there must have been present in the evolutionary process such a life as its ultimate cause. (With the recognition of the Absolute Spiritual Life as the foundation of our life, "our whole view of the cosmos changes, and with it our task in life. Nature no longer constitutes the whole of reality, and the latter acquires a deeper significance."<sup>95</sup> "Nature must be more than a soulless machine if its evolution is to lead, as it does, to the point where a self-conscious life emerges."<sup>96</sup> Thus in the thought of Eucken, God is the ultimate cause of the world.)

### 3. Criticism of Eucken's Solution of the Problems.

We have observed, in our exposition of Eucken's conception of God, that he has sought to bring it into line with the evolutionary thought of our age. This is particularly manifest in his emphasis upon the life-process and its activity. Here we find an equivalent for Darwin's central idea, the struggle for existence. But we have now to enquire more particularly whether Eucken has made use of the essential elements of the evolutionary theory in his formulation of his conception of God.

The central thought in Eucken's philosophy of life is his conception of a world-transcendent spiritual life, a whole of reality, which he identifies with God. This God, the cosmic spiritual life, furnishes the solution to all the problems of our life. He is the fundamental basis of human life and its activities. A pertinent question is: How does Eucken come to his conception of such a God? Eucken repudiates the intellectualism of idealistic philosophy (that of Hegel, for example), the subjectivism of Romanticism, and such voluntarism as that of Schopenhauer.<sup>97</sup> He is especially opposed to the psychological method, which would base our view of reality on what it discovers in the immediate psychical life of man. That we cannot base our philosophy of life on what we find in the immediate psychic existence is evident from the fact that it is characterized by uncertainty and transitoriness. Therefore we must oppose the psychological method, as it cannot discover a durable truth which we

<sup>95</sup> *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, p. 459.

<sup>96</sup> *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, pp. 270 f.; cf. *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 165 ff.

<sup>97</sup> *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 73 ff.

seek. In the place of psychological method, Eucken follows what he calls the noölogical method. "To explain noölogically," writes Eucken, "means to arrange the whole of the Spiritual Life as a special activity, to ascertain its position and problem, and through such an adaptation to illumine the whole and raise its potencies."<sup>98</sup> By thus viewing the various aspects of life noölogically, Eucken comes to the view of an independent spiritual life as the basis of his philosophy; all things must be viewed from the standpoint of such a life.<sup>99</sup>

It is evident, even from this brief reference to his method, that Eucken does not make use of the inductive method employed by the formulators of the evolutionary theories. Eucken, like Royce, explains reality deductively, that is, from the standpoint of an independent spiritual life which he affirms to be *a priori* necessary (Royce's intellectualism, of course, is absent from Eucken). With this *a priori* assumption, Eucken discounts the elements of reality ascertainable in history and in our experience. And this *a priori* method is perfectly in accord with his general philosophical position. Nevertheless, in spite of his fundamental interests in an absolutist metaphysics, Eucken, like Royce, is constantly concerned with the actual struggles and conflicts of experience; he is incessantly engaged in setting forth the life-process in its progressive development. It is not something beyond our experience with which Eucken deals; he is investigating the living and empirical interests of the life-process itself. What attracts his attention and leads him to inquire is thus our evolutionary experience. His interest in the evolutionary experiences of life is indicated to us by his historical works.<sup>100</sup> Yet it is his fear that we cannot discover a stable basis of life through the use of empirical method that leads him to distrust this method and to fall back on his *a priori* procedure.<sup>101</sup> Thus we see in Eucken, as we have found in Royce, a double tendency: a tendency to deal with the facts of life empirically, and a tendency to view them from the standpoint of an *a priori* assumption.

This double tendency appears in his attitude toward science. Eucken fully appreciates the worth of science as it enables us to control the forces of nature.<sup>102</sup> This appreciation of modern science is made mani-

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 178; cf. pp. 453 ff.; *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, pp. 158, 242 f., 351 f.

<sup>99</sup> *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, pp. 129 ff.

<sup>100</sup> E. g., *The Problem of Human Life*, *Main Currents of Modern Thought*.

<sup>101</sup> For a criticism of Eucken's method, see Waterhouse, *Modern Theories of Religion*, pp. 257 ff.

<sup>102</sup> *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, pp. 345 ff.

fest in his repudiation of the naïve supernaturalism of traditional Christianity.<sup>103</sup> He readily accepts the fact of evolution.<sup>104</sup> He holds that it is not natural science that creates trouble for us, but our own weakness in spiritual convictions.<sup>105</sup> But a question here is: Can he really appreciate and do justice to scientific concepts, the evolutionary theory included, without accepting the method by which these concepts are formulated? Can he accept the theory of evolution apart from its method? The method and theory of evolution seem to be so closely bound up with each other that one will find it very difficult to accept the one and reject the other in any consistent way. Eucken is perfectly willing to view man as a product of nature, provided he is allowed to maintain that in man there appears in the course of his evolutionary process an independent spiritual life.<sup>106</sup> He thus lays his greatest emphasis upon the super-empirical factor in the evolutionary process of man.

It is this emphasis of Eucken on an independent spiritual life above evolution that leads him to oppose the naturalistic philosophy which results from the phenomenal success of modern science. He cannot tolerate the theory that the whole life of man is identical with the physical and chemical elements of nature, and that it can be explained by something lower than man.<sup>107</sup>

But what we wish to indicate here is that Eucken has done much to bring science and philosophy or theology into cordial relations. He is willing that science should deal with the whole physical realm of reality. And it may also concern itself with the psychical facts of existence. Eucken does not introduce breaks into the evolutionary process; he accepts man completely as a product of nature. The only thing in science, which he strenuously opposes, is its naturalistic tendency to explain human life purely in terms of natural elements. Eucken rightly holds that there is more to reality than it is discovered by natural science. So that natural science must surrender its dogmatic tendency if there is to be a tenable relation between it and theology. But, in order to establish a completely harmonious relation between them, Eucken would have to give up his *a priori* assumption of an absolute spiritual reality

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6 ff.; *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 521 ff., 549 f.

<sup>104</sup> *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, pp. 257, 262 f., 278.

<sup>105</sup> *The Problem of Human Life*, pp. 541 f.

<sup>106</sup> *The Life of the Spirit*, p. 271.

<sup>107</sup> *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, pp. 24 ff.; *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, pp. 184 f.

standing outside the evolutionary process. Eucken, however, in accordance with his philosophical position, refuses to be content with the kind of reality indicated by the evolutionary theory. But the very fact that he views so much of reality, as we have seen, from the standpoint of the evolutionary theory, shows that he has departed from a strictly absolutistic position, and gives positive value to the aspects of reality ascertainable in our evolutionary experience.

Now in regard to the traditional conception of God as the transcendent, supernatural personality, it should be noted that Eucken has set aside its supernaturalistic features, and retains what he regards as its eternal element. He cannot conceive of God as coming to us by means of external revelation, miracles, mediations, even by the Son of God.<sup>108</sup> He would not, therefore, hold to the view of God as a realistically conceived transcendent personality. To be sure, Eucken holds to the transcendence of God, but not in the sense of traditional theology. The God of Eucken is transcendent only in the sense that he cannot be identified with the mere totality of evolving things, and so is above time and history which characterize empirical reality. But this rejection of the traditional conception of God as transcendent personality is not, however, for Eucken, equivalent to the denial of its eternal kernel. This eternal element in the traditional doctrine of God is found in the affirmation of an Absolute Spiritual Life in union with man.<sup>109</sup> This leads us to the problem of God as the Absolute Being.

Enough has been said in our treatment of Eucken's conception of God to show that he conceives of him as the Absolute Spiritual Life above the limitations of time and history.<sup>110</sup> Eucken maintains that God as the Absolute Spiritual Life is the foundation of all time-order. An Eternal Order of things is the basic principle of history. Man cannot find satisfaction in history, if there is not disclosed in it to him "*an over-historical nature*."<sup>111</sup> Time becomes to us a phantom if eternity is lacking in it. We get to the Spiritual Life through the movements of time, but it is above time and history.<sup>112</sup> We seek for a basis of life. But we cannot find it in our immediate experience, thought, or activity; for in the whole life of immediate existence, all is change. We must, therefore, seek for it beyond our psychic state—in a whole of life which

<sup>108</sup> *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 576 ff.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 544 ff.

<sup>110</sup> See above, pp. 38f.

<sup>111</sup> *The Truth of Religion*, p. 175.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 176.

is not subject to time.<sup>113</sup> To conceive of God as subject to the changes of history means to surrender the absoluteness of all truth. "To place variableness in God means nothing less than to surrender the absoluteness of truth, it means no less than to leave the field to a blind positiveness and a destructive relativism."<sup>114</sup> Religion lays hold of "an Absolute Life which in its very nature is timeless."<sup>115</sup> To reduce all reality to becoming means to empty of life all its content. "The transformation of all reality into a stream of Becoming . . . . . destroys all truth and empties life of all its content. Reality itself seems nothing more than an ephemeral world of shadows."<sup>116</sup> So that "All Spiritual Life is here a struggle against the flux of time—an ascent to eternal and immortal truth."<sup>117</sup> Thus Eucken cannot subject God to the changes of time, to which we are exposed. In order to give a firm and unchangeable basis to the changes of our experience, God must be conceived of as the Absolute Spiritual Life free from all the vicissitudes of time.<sup>118</sup> This affirmation of God as above time and history is the indispensable kernel of Eucken's philosophy.<sup>119</sup>

But, now, there are many elements in the philosophy of Eucken which would naturally lead him to conceive of God in terms of change and growth. For example, his emphasis on activity rather than on thought as an essential means of appropriating reality;<sup>120</sup> his recognition of movement and history as characteristic of modern age;<sup>121</sup> his view of God as immanent in the world of man helping him to be one with himself;<sup>122</sup> —all these and other like elements call for the view of God as a changing, growing being. Eucken, however, affirms that, in the interest of human life and civilization, we must conceive of God in terms of an Absolute Spiritual Life above the changes of time. This affirmation of God's unchangeability can be consistently maintained by Eucken only if he views the ultimate meaning of the world of experience in static terms, and conceives of God's relation to the world and man in somewhat after the fashion of traditional supernaturalism. But he is too keenly conscious

<sup>113</sup> *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, p. 154.

<sup>114</sup> *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 379 f.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 477.

<sup>116</sup> *Christianity and the New Idealism*, p. 41.

<sup>117</sup> *The Truth of Religion*, p. 446.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 537 ff.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 455.

<sup>120</sup> *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, pp. 220 ff., 255 ff.

<sup>121</sup> *The Life of the Spirit*, pp. 104 ff.

<sup>122</sup> *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 221 ff.

of the life and movement of the world of nature and of man to conceive of them in static terms. Neither the physical world nor the human world is, for Eucken, a finished entity; they are, on the contrary, changing and growing realities.) The essential characteristic of our empirical life is its movement, struggle, conflict. We are not yet personalities, but growing to be such. Moreover, his activistic faith does not permit him to confess his allegiance to the traditional supernaturalism of Christianity. He would rather conceive of God as involved in a vital relation with the movements of history.<sup>123</sup> If Eucken consistently followed out this conception which attributes movement and growth to nature and humanity and views God's relation to them in dynamic terms, it would be exceedingly difficult to maintain the static absoluteness of God. Can the God of Eucken, who is held to be in dynamic relation to the world of nature and of man which are involved in the process of change and growth remain unaffected by their change and growth? It does not appear possible for such a God to be essentially unrelated to these processes which are seen to be the dominant characteristics of the world and humanity. Thus if Eucken maintains the absoluteness of God in the midst of change and movement and progress, he must do it in opposition to the undeniable facts of our common experience and the inductive evidences of science. But we have shown that there are many features in the philosophy of Eucken which are irreconcilable with his contention for the static absoluteness of God. But these elements which oppose the central thought of Eucken indicate that he has not been able to escape the bearing of the evolutionary theory on his conception of God. This aspect of his philosophy will appear as we come, finally, to his view of God's relation to the world and man.

Eucken ultimately conceives of God's relation to the world in terms of immanent idealism.<sup>124</sup> This conception, however, is not in accord with his opposition to immanent idealism and his indictment of the processes of the natural world. One of the considerations which leads Eucken to oppose the system of immanent idealism is its assumption that reality is completely rational. He feels that the historical and scientific studies of the nineteenth century have made the world appear very dark and irrational.<sup>125</sup> This sense of the irrationality of the world and of its oppositions to the values and aims of human life is so strong that Eucken

<sup>123</sup> See *Christianity and the New Idealism*, pp. 45 ff.; *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, pp. 188 ff.; *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, pp. 318 ff.

<sup>124</sup> See above, pp. 40 f.

<sup>125</sup> *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, p. 20; cf. *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 290 ff.

is forced to acknowledge that the evils in the world present to us an insoluble enigma of life.<sup>126</sup> If God is the ultimate cause and foundation of the world, as Eucken claims, why should there be evils, and why could they not be explained? The admission of Eucken as to the reality of the evils in the world and its irrationality suggests either that his God is impotent to control the evil forces of the world, or they are due to some non-divine factors. In either case God would be finite in power. But Eucken, influenced by the rationalizing tendency of immanent idealism, maintains that the world, despite its insoluble evils, is due to the immanent activity of God.<sup>127</sup> Yet his firm conviction and constant reiteration of the wickedness of the world manifested in its oppositions and hindrances to the interests of human life tend toward the conception of a finite God.

To come now to Eucken's view of the relation of God and man, we observe that he considers this relation from the standpoint of the practical interests of the life of man. God as the Absolute Spiritual Life is absolutely necessary to give content and subsistence to man's life; without such a God man would be bound by the evil forces of nature and so could not attain to his destiny. The method, by which we come in touch with this all-necessary God for our life, is practical. It is through struggles, sufferings, conflicts, according to Eucken, that we come to the sense of our union with God; we must fight with all our might against the evil forces of the world if we are to possess the life of God in our soul, for in the hardest fight we gain the clearest vision of God.<sup>128</sup> In accordance with this emphasis of Eucken on the indispensableness of volitional activity, we find that only in a few passages a vision of a life above the struggles of our temporal experience is promised.<sup>129</sup> Holding this life of bliss before us we must ever struggle to make it our own.

A question arises at this point: What is God's relation to us in our struggle? Is he implicated in our struggles against the antagonistic forces of the world? If he is not involved in the sufferings caused by these depressing experiences, how could he actually help us? Eucken flatly denies that God participates in our struggles and sufferings. All that we need to know, according to Eucken, is that God does help us out of the apparent defeats of our life.<sup>130</sup> He desires to preserve the

<sup>126</sup> *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, pp. 280 f.; *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 490 ff.

<sup>127</sup> *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, pp. 270 ff.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 246 f., 255 ff.

<sup>129</sup> See *Ibid.*, pp. 277 f.; *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 126 ff.

<sup>130</sup> *The Truth of Religion*, pp. 432 ff.

freedom of God from the changes and experiences of time. But what we need particularly to observe is that Eucken gives very little space to an exposition of his contention that God is above the changes and sufferings of our life. On the other hand, abundant space is given to his exposition of the life-process of man in its historical development. And the very terms in which he speaks of God are derived from the actual experiences of human life. The phrase most used by Eucken to represent God, namely, spiritual life, stands for a reality of which we are directly conscious and conscious in terms of changing experience. The God of Eucken is thus not consistently portrayed as so far above the limitations of human experience as he claims.

We may conclude our criticism of Eucken with the remark that there are many elements in his philosophy which contradict his avowed absolutistic position, and which, on account of this very opposition to the central thesis of his system, namely, an independent spiritual life as the fundamental basis and ideal of human life, show how largely he has been led by the evolutionary experiences of our life to deal with it empirically and to interpret God in terms of these experiences. He thus shows plainly the influence of the evolutionary theory on his conception of God.

### *III. The Solution of the Problems in Bowne's Personal Idealism*

#### 1. Bowne's General Philosophical Position.

The primary concern of Bowne is to work out a system of philosophy and of religion which shall undermine unscientific naturalism and do away with a false supernaturalism, and which shall yet do justice to both science and religion (This is particularly manifest in his book, *The Immanence of God*). He employs to accomplish this task a twofold method. In dealing with the problems of metaphysics, Bowne confesses that we have no other means of inquiry but thought. The world exists in and for thought, and the categories of human thought are taken to be identical with the principles of cosmic being.<sup>131</sup> Hence "We have no means of dealing with reality other than through the conceptions we form of it."<sup>132</sup> With regard to our moral and religious problems, however, Bowne holds that we must appeal to our practical experiences.<sup>133</sup> Yet it should be observed that, for Bowne, the ultimate nature of reality is finally to be determined through the medium of thought; at any rate, thought forms the starting point in his treatment of philosophy and of religion.

<sup>131</sup> *Theism*, pp. 138, 132.

<sup>132</sup> *Metaphysics*, p. 3.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 411 f., 427, 429; *Theism*, pp. 153, 261-280, 320.

The essential nature of reality, discovered by this method of thought, is, according to Bowne, conscious intelligence or personality. For him, "the entire world is a thought world; that is, a world that exists only through and in relation to intelligence. The mind is the only ontological reality."<sup>134</sup> This conscious intelligence, mind, or personality is the inexplicable presupposition of all reality;<sup>135</sup> it constitutes the fundamental nature of the universe. But this conscious personality, which is the ultimate nature of the world, is not Royce's all-inclusive being. It consists of an infinite mind and finite minds. Here emerges Bowne's personal idealism in the theory that the ultimate reality is a world of persons with a Supreme Person at its head.<sup>136</sup> From the standpoint of this conception of reality, Bowne constructs his doctrine of God and meets the problems raised by the evolutionary theory.<sup>137</sup>

## 2. Bowne's Conception of God.

We shall consider, following Bowne's method, first his metaphysical conception and then his religious conception of God.

### (1) God as the World-Ground.

Bowne's metaphysical conception of God is summed up in the view of him as the world-ground, the causal and explanatory principle of the universe. (This world-ground is characterized, according to Bowne, by unity, intelligence, and personality.)

(God is first of all the unitary ground of all things; all forms of existence have their being in and through him.) The world, from one point of view is many, while it is, from another point of view, one. It is not, however, the many that sustain the world, but the one. This view that the one is the causal ground of the world is worked out by Bowne through the theory of interaction (which he inherits from Lotze). Bowne assumes that the world forms a system of interaction; things are related with each other through the medium of interaction. The interaction between them is made possible "through the unity of an all-embracing one, which either coördinates and mediates their interaction, or of which they are in some sense phases or modifications."<sup>138</sup> Thus there are two sorts of interaction. In the case of phenomenal reality which has no ontological reality of its own, the interaction is immediate; while in regard to finite spirits that have a certain measure of onto-

<sup>134</sup> *Metaphysics*, p. 423; cf. *Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, p. 50.

<sup>135</sup> *Theism*, pp. 168 f.

<sup>136</sup> *Personalism*, pp. 277 f.

<sup>137</sup> For other essential elements of his philosophy, see *Metaphysics*, esp. Part I.

<sup>138</sup> *Metaphysics*, p. 81; cf. *Theism*, p. 59.

logical reality and so to this extent are distinct from the all-embracing one, the interaction is a mediated and coördinated interaction. The unitary being which thus sustains the world of many in the relation of interaction is absolute and infinite. As absolute this being does not exclude all relation; but it freely determines its own relation to the world. As infinite this being does not deny the existence of the finite world; but it is the only sufficient source of the latter.<sup>139</sup>

This absolute and infinite unitary ground of the world is intelligent. To show that God, the world-ground, is intelligent, Bowne employs two kinds of argument—the inductive and speculative.

The chief inductive arguments employed are those from order, teleology, and finite intelligence. The argument from order means that the order seen in nature is not due to some non-intelligent, but to an intelligent, principle.<sup>140</sup> The argument from teleology holds that in inorganic and organic realms not only do we see order, but an order directed toward ends; there we discover an intelligent purpose. In nature there is a reign of law but also of purpose and ends. This argument must be used with caution. For it does not teach an external making of things, but an immanent guiding; nor does it hold that whatever can be explained by natural laws and agents is exempt from mental causality.<sup>141</sup> Positively the teleological argument teaches that the processes in nature are determined by ends; that there we perceive an intelligent activity at work for the accomplishment of purpose or purposes. But a purpose cannot act except as a conception in the consciousness of some agent. Hence this activity demands a preconceiving intelligence as its implication or condition.<sup>142</sup> The last inductive argument, that is, that from finite intelligence, points out that we cannot go from our finite intelligence, of which we are conscious, to some non-intelligence for its explanation; but we must refer our finite intelligence to some cosmic intelligence for its explanation.<sup>143</sup> It is the view of Bowne that these inductive arguments are valid as far as they go, but they are not final. So he turns to his speculative arguments to show the intelligence of the world-ground.

He mentions two speculative arguments—the epistemological and metaphysical. The epistemological argument shows that atheism des-

<sup>139</sup> *Metaphysics*, p. 93; cf. *Theism*, pp. 60 f.

<sup>140</sup> *Theism*, pp. 69 f.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 82 ff.

<sup>142</sup> For Bowne's attitude toward the counter arguments to the above theistic design argument, see *Theism*, pp. 89 ff.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 119 ff.

troys the trustworthiness of reason.) In a mechanical system of mind there are no mental acts, but only psychological occurrences. Further, a necessitarian, mechanical system cannot make any distinction between truth and error.) But we must hold that our faculties are made for truth. Hence epistemologically we are led to the position of theism. We must affirm an intelligent principle in order to give validity to our knowledge. The argument from metaphysics indicates that a self-contained atheistic world of common-sense realism does not actually exist. (The only extant world is a world of thought relations. The intelligent world is a world of meanings and thought contents, and these are impossible except with reference to intelligence. Such an intelligent principle is the only adequate explanation of the finite world.<sup>144</sup>

We have now reached the view that the world-ground or God is the unitary causality of all things, and that he is their rational or intelligent principle. But does it follow from this that the world-ground is also personal? (Is the unitary and intelligent being of the world unconscious or conscious personality?) Bowne contends that to conceive of the world-ground in terms of intelligence—as we must—means to view it also as personal.<sup>145</sup> The alleged antinomy between personality and absolute-ness is avoided by holding that intelligence as applied to the world-ground is not an adjustment of the inner condition to the outer; it simply means the power to know. Personality, moreover, does not mean corporeality or spatiality; by personality is meant only self-knowledge and self-control.<sup>146</sup> Despite the objections made against this affirmation of personality,<sup>147</sup> Bowne maintains that we are shut up to the notion of divine personality.<sup>148</sup> Personality for us finite beings is an ideal to be achieved, but it belongs unconditionally to the infinite. A perfect and complete personality is found in God only.<sup>149</sup>

(It has already been indicated that this unitary, intelligent, and personal world-ground or God is the ontological cause of all things. But Bowne repudiates all systems which deny or militate against the absolute independence of God from the world. He maintains that God is the independent cause of all finite existence. Hence he rejects all forms

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 134 ff.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 160.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 162; cf. *Metaphysics*, p. 116, *Personalism*, p. 226.

<sup>147</sup> *Theism*, pp. 164 ff.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 169.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 150 ff.; cf. Rashdall, Personality: Human and Divine, in the volume *Personal Idealism*, edited by Henry Sturt.

of pantheism as derogatory to the absoluteness of God,<sup>150</sup> and contends for the view that all finite forms of existence have their being in and through the immanent activity of God.) The physical or phenomenal world owes its existence to God absolutely; while the finite spirits have "thing-hood" to a certain degree, and so that they are not related to God absolutely. But both these forms of reality are caused to be by God, that is, all finite existences are dependent on God for such existence as they have.<sup>151</sup> Bowne is especially concerned to guard the ontological reality of the finite spirits. They cannot be said to possess the same quality of existence as that of the infinite. Nevertheless, they have a substantial reality, for they can act and be acted upon. In our experience we find that we have a certain measure of freedom as well as the sense of our dependence on the external forces. It is because of this limited freedom that we are made responsible for our moral deeds. But we are ultimately dependent on God for our existence.<sup>152</sup>

So far we have considered Bowne's metaphysical conception of God. We now turn to his religious conception of God.

(2) The World-Ground as Ethical.

Bowne's religious conception of God is expressed in the doctrine that the world-ground is ethical. Thus he identifies the absolute and infinite intelligent personal God, the world-ground, which he has found to be the necessary metaphysical principle of the world, with the God of religion (in this also Bowne is following Lotze). Bowne, however, candidly admits that the God of metaphysics is as such unsatisfactory to religion. Religiously the metaphysical conception is secondary. The human mind, on the whole, has sought for a religious conception of God prior to a metaphysical conception. As a matter of logic the metaphysical attributes<sup>153</sup> of God are barren ethically and so religiously; they furnish a possibility of an ethical nature, but do not necessarily imply such a nature. But from the religious point of view the important attributes are those which affirm the ethical character of God. Religion demands a God whom man can love, trust and worship. To satisfy this demand of religion, God must be conceived in terms of highest ethical qualities. The immediate task, then, for Bowne, is to determine whether the God of his metaphysics can be declared ethical, so that he may be considered the proper object of religious faith.

<sup>150</sup> *Theism*, pp. 199 ff.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 207.

<sup>152</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 218 ff.

<sup>153</sup> See *Theism*, pp. 172 ff.

If we accept the idea of a perfect being as the ground of the universe, the question of the moral character of God is settled at once. For in that case, the true, the beautiful, and the good would immediately follow. But Bowne proceeds to examine the empirical arguments to ascertain whether they convince us of the ethical character of the God of metaphysics. The empirical arguments attempt to show the moral character of God by a consideration of the moral nature of man, the structure of society, and of history. (In regard to the moral nature of man it may be said that it owes its existence to a moral God, for we cannot think of it as coming from an unmoral God.) This is an argument from moral effect to a moral cause. "Hence spontaneous thought has generally regarded the moral nature in man as pointing to a moral character in God as its sufficient ground. Speculation, too, knows of no better account to give."<sup>154</sup> One of the implications of this argument is that our conscience immediately testifies to a moral character of God; sin is sin against the moral will of God. This consciousness of sin as being against the will of God as well as other moral considerations have led mankind to posit a supreme justice and goodness in God. Another empirical argument concerns itself with the structure of life and society and of the course of history. These are held to reveal the moral nature of God. Life is so constituted that it makes for values and ends. The structure of society, too, is such as to further moral ends through its moral institutions. The course of history, moreover, shows the rise and development of moral ideals, and indicates also that nations have been wrecked by their own oppression, injustice, and immorality. These are the chief empirical arguments that have been used to show the goodness of God.

These empirical arguments, however, in the opinion of Bowne, are not productive of certainty as to the ethical character of the world-ground; they do not form a source of the faith in a moral God; neither do they convince us of the superiority of a moral universe. They are based upon picked facts and so ignore other facts which are against the moral nature of the world. They in themselves, therefore, do not furnish a conclusive evidence as to the ethical character of God. The outcome of an empirical examination of the facts which the world presents to us, then, "would probably be the affirmation of a being either morally indifferent, or morally imperfect, or morally good, but limited by some insuperable necessity which forbids anything better than our shabby

<sup>154</sup> *Theism*, p. 252.

universe."<sup>155</sup> But our mind cannot be content with such a being. It would rather maintain its faith in a perfect being as the basis of the morality of the world, and set aside the dark features of it until we shall gain a better insight which may enable us to harmonize them with the idea of God as the perfect being. Bowne holds that this assumption is made on cognitive and moral grounds to save life from logical and moral destruction; it is an act of instinctive self-defense on the part of the mind to save life from its mental and moral collapse. "This implicit teleology of life," says Bowne, "leads with equal necessity to the affirmation of a Supreme Reason and a Supreme Righteousness."<sup>156</sup> So Bowne appeals to the deep experiences of life itself, and not to logical proof, to reach a final verdict as to the moral character of the world-ground.<sup>157</sup> Since our understanding is only an instrument for interpreting the data furnished by experience, it is dependent on experience for its interpretation of the world, particularly, in regard to its ethical character. So we must have vital experience, for it is in active, living experience that we really come to discern the goodness of our Creator. When logic fails to give us the certainty as to the ethical character of God, the experiences of life thus come to our aid. "Experience is held to testify not only to a cosmic reason but also to a cosmic righteousness."<sup>158</sup> Thus Bowne, especially in dealing with ethical and religious interests, lays a great emphasis on experience as the final arbiter in these matters.

With this appeal to vital experiences Bowne seeks to solve the problem of evil. This cannot be settled by ratiocination but by active moral living. For when we consult this life of humanity we find that it reveals "faith in the moral goodness of God."<sup>159</sup> This faith is an ineradicable part of the human nature. It enables man to "wander in the wilderness until he has fitted himself to enter the promised land."<sup>160</sup> So through his appeal to the experiences of life Bowne finds reason to believe that the world-ground or God is ethical.

The essential characteristics of God as an ethical being are held to be love and holiness; God is a being of holy love. These ethical elements of God must be held in their organic unity. For love without holiness would be mere sentimentality, that is, it would lack the necessary moral

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 258.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 258, cf. p. 261.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 259.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 261.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 285.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 284.

content; and holiness apart from love would be a lifeless negation. Thus we would view God as a morally perfect being, and hence our moral ideal.<sup>161</sup> Such a morally perfect God is the necessary presupposition of our moral life. We are so constituted that, in order to live a substantial moral life, we must believe in a God who is at the same time the supreme reason and supreme righteousness of the world, who is constantly working in the natural order, in the course of history, and in the world of man for a supreme moral goal, the creation of a community of free moral persons.<sup>162</sup>

We have thus far set forth positively Bowne's conception of God. We shall now turn to the criticism of his solution of the problems with which this study is concerned.

### 3. Criticism of Bowne's Solution of the Problems.

Our discussion of Bowne's philosophical position and his conception of God has shown that he represents a type of religious philosophy which seeks to vindicate the validity of the essential content of the Christian doctrine of God in an age of philosophical skepticism and of scientific progress. Conscious of the difficulties raised, particularly, by modern science, Bowne has sought to bring the traditional conception of God into relation with the scientific concepts of our time through the medium of his personal idealism. It is our concern here to make a critical examination of his solution of the problems occasioned by the evolutionary theory.

As regards Bowne's method of formulating his conception of God it is not easy to generalize. For in his mode of procedure there are intermingled *a priori*-deductive and empirical-inductive elements.<sup>163</sup> In his treatment of the metaphysical conception of God, he is following an *a priori*-deductive method shut through with intellectualism; though he claims that the practical experiences of life also lead us to the view of God as a Supreme Reason;<sup>164</sup> while in his discussion of the religious view of God, he lays a particular emphasis on experience as having the last word on the subject. It is with his emphasis on life in the formulation of his conception of God that we find the most difficulty. We agree with the suggestion of Bowne that the vital experiences and interests of life must ultimately determine one's conception of God. But it does not follow that empirically we shall be able to identify the God of metaphysics with

<sup>161</sup> For Bowne's effort to show how such a perfect moral being is capable of real life, see *Theism*, pp. 287 ff.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, Chap. VII.

<sup>163</sup> See, e. g., *Theism*, Chaps. VI f.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 258, 261.

the God of religion, as does Bowne, and consider him as the Ethical Absolute.<sup>165</sup> Hence we are justified in saying that Bowne, even in his construction of his religious conception of God where he lays the most emphasis on experience, is proceeding on the basis of his preconceived theory of the universe and of God.<sup>166</sup> Such a procedure is, however, wholly in harmony with his *a priori* metaphysical assumption. Yet we need to observe that the very fact that Bowne lays so much emphasis on vital experience; that he distrusts the power of logical syllogizing to furnish our final conception of the character of God,<sup>167</sup> and that he frankly admits the priority of religious conception of God to that of the metaphysical,<sup>168</sup> shows that he has departed from his metaphysical apriorism, and approximates the inductive method of the evolutionary theory.

To come next to Bowne's attitude toward science, we note that he stands for a division of labor between it and philosophy. He relegates science to the region of phenomenal reality. There science has a free hand in its work of describing the occurrences of natural events and their causal nexus; but it has no word to say concerning the ontological realm.<sup>169</sup> With this division of labor, science, on the one hand, and philosophy and theology, on the other, are independent of each other; the former concerns itself with the phenomenal world in its inductive causation, and the latter deals with the noumenal reality in its ontological causation. Difficulty arises only when science steps out of its field and gives a mechanical-causation explanation to the facts of the noumenal world; or when it claims that what it discovers is all there is to reality.<sup>170</sup> In order, then, to keep the peace, science must always be content with its task of inductive description, and must admit that its realm is continually dependent on the noumenal; while philosophy and theology should accept the descriptions of science as inductively valid and be allowed to insist that the realm of science is only one aspect of reality. These must be the terms of reconciliation between science and philosophy. So contends Bowne. He accepts the doctrine of evolution in its inductive sense; but he absolutely refuses to accept it, if it means that the

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 285 ff.

<sup>166</sup> This is very manifest in his indictment of atheism, *ibid.*, pp. 291 ff.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 258 ff.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 248 ff.

<sup>169</sup> *Metaphysics*, pp. 68 f.; *Theism*, pp. 241 f., 323; *The Immanence of God*, pp. 18 ff.

<sup>170</sup> *Metaphysics*, pp. 250 ff.; *The Immanence of God*, pp. 6 ff.

processes of evolution are carried on by means of merely phenomenal causes.<sup>171</sup>

This solution is one that can scarcely be maintained. It depends upon the validity of dividing the universe into phenomenal and noumenal realities, and upon the success with which we can keep science in its field. Reality, as we know it, is so organically inter-related in all its parts that it is difficult to maintain the distinction made by Bowne. Moreover, science does not restrict itself entirely to the physical world, but is constantly enlarging its field of investigation and aspires to deal with our spiritual realities. Philosophy and theology, on the other hand, cannot be unconcerned with the results of science. Hence it would seem that the best way to work out a helpful relation between them is to view reality as one and as open to both for investigation.<sup>172</sup>

It should be noted, however, that the division of labor between science and philosophy, which Bowne makes, and the use of the scientific concept of order in his conception of God<sup>173</sup> point to the view that, in these regards at least, Bowne is not strictly consistent with his idealistic position; but that he has a large positive place for modern science. To this extent, he admits certain implications of the evolutionary theory in his conception of God.

Respecting the traditional conception of God's personality and his relation to the world, it should be said that Bowne has set aside its realistic-supernaturalistic features so as to make it more acceptable to our age of science and immanent philosophy. To be sure, Bowne retains the concept of God's personality as his essential character. Yet the God of Bowne is not a transcendent personality who lives in a supernatural world and occasionally makes inroads into the realm of the natural by means of miraculous interventions. (His God is actively immanent in the natural order, in the course of history, and in the human realm, working in these realms in an orderly manner.<sup>174</sup>) Further, Bowne does not hold to the traditional doctrine of creation as a temporal occurrence, nor does he set forth the other traditional doctrines of preservation and providence; these doctrines are comprised in Bowne's thought of the continual dependence of the world on the immanent activity of God.<sup>175</sup> (The God of Bowne, it must be granted, is transcendent; but

<sup>171</sup> *Metaphysics*, pp. 276 ff.; *Theism*, pp. 103 ff.

<sup>172</sup> Cf. Shaler, *The Interpretation of Nature*, 1893, 11.48 ff.; Lyman, *Theology and Human Problems*, pp. 118 ff.

<sup>173</sup> *Theism*, p. 323; *Metaphysics*, pp. 7 ff.; *Theism*, pp. 241 ff.

<sup>174</sup> *Metaphysics*, pp. 285 ff.; *The Immanence of God*.

<sup>175</sup> *Metaphysics*, pp. 99 ff.; *Theism*, pp. 218 ff.

he is transcendent only in the sense that he is not identical with the totality of the world, and that he is its ultimate cause. And as to Bowne's conception of the personality of God, the difference between it and that of the traditional doctrine is fully manifest. While the traditional conception of God's personality is that of a magnified replica of human personality; Bowne, on the contrary, conceives of his personality in cosmic terms—it is the ultimate principle of the universe (one may well question the use of the term personality in this sense). But here also we note that his practical religious interest has led him to conceive of God in concrete terms.<sup>176</sup> Thus his hospitable attitude toward empiricism appears.

We may now come to his solution of the problem of God as the absolute being. It has been sufficiently indicated that Bowne thinks of God in terms of absoluteness and infinitude. He consistently maintains God's independence of the world. God is related to the world, but this relation is freely posited by him.<sup>177</sup> Evils are undeniably in the world, but God is entirely free from the responsibility for their existence. The world, as we actually find it, cannot be said to show the absolute goodness of God; yet considered as an instrument for the working out of a divine plan, it is perfect; so we may legitimately keep our faith in a righteous God who has a complete control of all things.<sup>178</sup> In short, God is complete and perfect, and his relation to the world is a matter of his favor. This being the case with God, the central elements of the evolutionary theory, change and growth of things, do not apply to him. While Bowne repudiates the notion of rigidly static reality,<sup>179</sup> and recognizes changes in the world, he views God as unchangeable and free from time. Not that that unchangeability means "an ontological rigidity of fixed monotony of being." Rather with God unchangeability "means only the constancy and continuity of the divine nature which exists through all the divine acts as their law and source."<sup>180</sup> God is the conductor of the world-process, yet is totally free from time. We must maintain this unchangeability of God, because to surrender it means to wreck the trustworthiness of human thought; there must be a changeless element in the world in order to have a valid metaphysics.<sup>181</sup>

<sup>176</sup> *The Essence of Religion*, pp. 7 ff.

<sup>177</sup> *Theism*, pp. 163.

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 273 ff.

<sup>179</sup> *Metaphysics*, Chaps. I, III.

<sup>180</sup> *Theism*, p. 178.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 183 ff., 212.

But we need to inquire whether Bowne has really established his contention for the unchangeability of God. To begin with, his view of reality as active, and his admission that being is process,<sup>182</sup> imply some sort of progressive action on God's part. Further, Bowne opposes the theory that the world of nature and of man alike have their existence independent of God; nature is no self-running machine, nor is man a natural product. In other words, according to Bowne, God and the world are organically related. To be sure, Bowne maintains that this relation is not imposed on God from without, but is a self-posed relation. Nevertheless he affirms God's immanent relation to it. If God and the world are thus related with each other, how could the former remain unaffected by the movement, change, and progress which mark the latter? In order that God may be held immune from these processes, he must be conceived of as existing in isolated reality. But such a realistic view of God, Bowne does not entertain. Moreover, according to Bowne, the finite spirits have an ontological otherness over against the being of God. Though they owe their existence to the eternally creative activity of God, yet they have a certain measure of distinctness and independence. The God of Bowne is not such an all-inclusive being as that of Royce, but is a supreme person at the head of a community of finite persons. Now if Bowne's God is not thus an all-embracing and all-inclusive being, and if the finite spirits have their ontological otherness, though it may be very slight, how could his God be declared absolute and finite? Is he not in some way limited by the existence of finite spirits? A true metaphysical absoluteness of God, which Bowne wishes to maintain, can be obtained, it seems, only by conceiving of him as totally unlimited by the existence of the world and man. We cannot get around the difficulty involved in God's relation to the world by saying, as does Bowne, that this relation is defined and posited by God himself; for if God is absolute, why need he posit this relation to the world at all? Bowne, again, holds that God has assumed his relation to the world as its omnipresent ground for the purpose of realizing some worthy end, a community of moral persons.<sup>183</sup> Now, the realization of this goal, according to Bowne, is not effected by miraculous intervention; it is to be achieved through the process of historical development. If God thus possesses a goal the realization of which involves a process of development in which he is engaged, how could he be held to be free from development in his own experience? Does not the possession of

<sup>182</sup> *Metaphysics*, pp. 28, 30, 53 ff.

<sup>183</sup> *Theism*, pp. 213, 231.

such an end as objective for God imply that he is not yet satisfied, and so is not complete? And if he has this goal that is as yet unrealized, how could he be a perfect absolute? It seems very difficult to conceive of a God, who has an unrealized end in any way, as an absolute and infinite being.

Finally, Bowne admits the existence of evils in the world of nature and of man.<sup>184</sup> He is too fully aware of the evils in the world as to deny their existence or to maintain that they can be justified.<sup>185</sup> But Bowne frees God from any share in the evils of the world. He can do this because he holds that the world considered as a means of achieving an end is perfect, while it is actually imperfect. True, certain evils in the world may be turned toward the production of something good. But this fact does not render the actual system faultlessly perfect. Bowne makes men wholly responsible for the moral evils in the world, and so exempts God from any share in them.<sup>186</sup> True, men must be held accountable for their evil acts. But if the system of the world is good because it is controlled by a perfect God for the accomplishment of an end, why does it furnish any occasion for the evil deeds of men? If, however, men commit moral evils, not in relation to their environing world, but as result of the determination of their will, why should not their will always be turned toward the accomplishment of good deeds, when God, the perfect being, is its ontological ground? Bowne reduces the evils in the animal world to the matter of pain, which he holds, is of small consequence.<sup>187</sup> But if God the all perfect and omnipotent being is the causal ground of the animal world, how could there be any pain at all? It would seem empirically from the fact of evils in the world, which Bowne does not deny, that God is either impotent to control the world without involving it in imperfections, or is incapable of putting down as yet the forces of evil which are opposing his work.] Bowne, however, does not consider any such suggestion. He still contends for a morally perfect God. But, even granting that there is such a God, the existence of evils militates against his moral perfection. For how could a God, who is organically related with the world, be morally blessed, when there are evils in it? These and the like considerations lead us to say that Bowne's contention for the absoluteness of his God is not supported by the empirical elements in his own system. The above cited elements in his philoso-

<sup>184</sup> *Theism*, pp. 273 ff.; cf. *The Essence of Religion*, pp. 45 ff.

<sup>185</sup> *Theism*, p. 284.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 273 ff.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 285.

phy, when consistently followed, would lead us to a view of God as struggling with the forces of evil, in coöperation with human personalities, and as actively engaged with them in the creation of a better world. Hence he would be a limited, changing, growing being.)

The essential finitude of God as Bowne conceives him appears when we view, finally, his conception of God's relation to man. Respecting this matter, Bowne is opposed to such a theory of absolute idealism as that of Royce, for example, according to which God is the all-inclusive being of the world, apart from whom man has no real existence whatever. Bowne, on the contrary, stands for the view that finite spirits, while they are causally dependent on God, have a certain degree of independent existence.) But from the standpoint of his metaphysics, the ontological otherness of the finite spirit is not easy to determine. For the finite spirit, as he says, "has only a limited and relative existence at best. . . . In the fullest sense of the word only the infinite exists; all else is relatively phenomenal and non-existent."<sup>188</sup> Such is the conclusion to which, he holds, we are speculatively forced. It is the appeal to the experiences of life that really, as he admits, leads him to maintain the selfhood of the finite spirit.<sup>189</sup> (This affirmation of the ontological otherness of finite spirits on the basis of experience, it should be observed, is incompatible with the strict absoluteness of God; for God is limited by these other *real* spirits.) When we consider Bowne's view of God's moral relation to man, the above criticism is reinforced. God, who is the ontological ground of the world of nature and of man, is, according to Bowne, also the moral ruler of the universe. God as such has the absolute control of all things; all the processes of nature and the course of human history are ultimately determined by the creative will of the infinite.<sup>190</sup> In view of this fact that God has absolute control over the world, all its forces must inevitably work toward the accomplishment of the divine plan. Evils do exist, but they cannot thwart the work of an omnipotent God. Whatever finite spirits may do to prevent the realization of the purpose of the infinite, it will ultimately be accomplished. Fundamentally it would not make very much difference whether the finite spirits work for or against the divine plan; for God the infinite being will finally bring it to its consummation.<sup>191</sup> But Bowne lays great stress on the necessity of moral activity. The essence of religion, for

<sup>188</sup> *Metaphysics*, pp. 100 f.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 101.

<sup>190</sup> *Theism*, pp. 230 ff.

<sup>191</sup> *The Essence of Religion*, p. 7.

him, consists in righteousness, and not in religiosity.<sup>192</sup> There are mysteries in the world; but we are not to speculate upon them; what we are called on to do is to follow the will of God.<sup>193</sup> In our life of prayer, we must do all that can be done by us instead of relying upon God to do everything.<sup>194</sup> A wonderful transformation in the world will take place if men turn to love God and their neighbors as themselves.<sup>195</sup> This emphasis of Bowne upon the necessity of practical moral activity must inevitably modify his conception of the absoluteness of God. Men become conscious of unreality in their moral endeavors, if God has the *absolute* control of their moral future, and if they cannot, therefore, in any way, change the course of their moral destiny. Bowne refuses philosophically to give up his faith in the absolute purpose and government of God. But from the standpoint of practical morality and religion, he has done so. This fact appears, for instance, in such words as these: "We are to work because it is God who works in us. We cannot work apart from God, and God also works only in connection with our working."<sup>196</sup> (This coöperative activity of God and ourselves is what we find in our experience. To adhere to such a view of our moral and religious relation to God means, however, to modify the conception of him as an absolute or infinite being whose plan for the world is eternally fixed. There are thus many elements in Bowne's system, which would lead to the conception of God as a metaphysical and moral being who has along with him other persons with whom he is closely related in the work of creating a better moral community.

We may conclude our criticism of Bowne's solution of the problems with the remark that there appears in his efforts, as we found in those of Royce and Eucken, a double tendency: a tendency to maintain the independence of God from the world of time and history, and a tendency to conceive of him in terms of evolutionary experience. Metaphysically the former tendency predominates, and from the point of view of practical morality and religion, the latter tendency has the preeminence. But even from the standpoint of his metaphysics the elements of empiricism cannot be said to be absent, for we have referred to his appeal to experience to settle some metaphysical problems. So then these elements of empiricism in Bowne's solution of the problems show distinctly

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 73 ff.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 46 ff.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*, 127 ff.

<sup>195</sup> *Theism*, pp. 278 f.

<sup>196</sup> *The Essence of Religion*, p. 237.

the influence of the evolutionary theory on his method, and on his conception of God.

#### *IV. The Solution of the Problems in James's Pragmatism*

William James represents a contemporary movement of thought which completely accepts the evolutionary theory and interprets realities from its standpoint.<sup>197</sup> By frankly accepting the empirical theory of evolution, pragmatism is the most radical of the philosophies of religion with which we are concerned in this study. This will appear as we proceed to examine James's pragmatic philosophy and his conception of God with a special reference to his solution of the problems.

##### 1. James's General Pragmatic Position.

James offers pragmatism as a philosophical attitude which shall mediate between rationalism, on the one hand, and empiricism, on the other, by adhering to the religious interest of the former while keeping the empiricism of the latter.<sup>198</sup> Pragmatism, according to James, is thus first of all a method. It is a method which attempts to solve philosophical problems with reference to the practical consequences of the notions involved in the problems. Pragmatism deals, for instance, with the question whether the world is one or many by pointing out the differences in life, which may result from one view or the other.<sup>199</sup> Pragmatism, as a method, does not concern itself with principles, wholes, universals, but with the concrete, empirical, particular facts of practical life; its attention is directed toward an inquiry into the ascertainable practical aspects of life.<sup>200</sup> From this point of view, James as a pragmatist accepts only those things which are actually experienced.<sup>201</sup> This empirical pragmatic method leads necessarily to certain theories some of which we must briefly indicate.

James holds that our ideas, theories, laws, and the like are not copies of objective realities; but rather they are means for action—tools for adjusting ourselves to the environing realities.<sup>202</sup> True ideas, from this point of view, are those which help us most in our practical life, that is, those are true ideas which will aid us successfully to attain to the objects

<sup>197</sup> Other foremost representatives are F. C. S. Schiller and John Dewey; but James has most seriously undertaken to work out a pragmatic philosophy of religion.

<sup>198</sup> *Pragmatism*, p. 33.

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 54 f.

<sup>201</sup> *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, pp. 42, 160 f., 182; *The Will to Believe*, pp. vii f.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 56 f.

of our desires, and so give us the maximal combination of satisfactions.<sup>203</sup> This does not mean, however, that the objects of our ideas are unreal.<sup>204</sup> But it does mean that our ideas are never final. If our old ideas have become useless to us, we lay them aside and get new ideas which will really help us in our life. Thus our ideas are constantly shifting and changing as our experiments proceed.

This changing nature of our ideas is closely connected with the changing and growing aspect of all reality. Not only do our ideas change but also the realities with which we deal change and grow. Reality consists of the flux of our sensations, the relations which obtain between them, as well as the previous truths which every inquiry must take up. These elements of reality are never fixed; we have a great part to play in making them real and vital to our life; in fact we add new factors to reality.<sup>205</sup> So reality is not ready-made, but it is forever in the making.<sup>206</sup>

This conception of reality as changing and growing is related to another view of James that there are possibilities for novelties in the world. The world is not fixed; in it there are occurring new things which surprise us. In view of this fact James would agree with the remark of Bergson that the doors of the future are wide open. So James stands for what he calls the chance theory of moral freedom, according to which there are real possibilities for doing either good or evil in the world; we cannot tell beforehand what we shall do in the future; but we have to wait for the moments when we shall choose either possibilities.<sup>207</sup>

Pragmatism, with its empirical method of dealing with reality, leads, finally, to the concept of a pluralistic universe. It is the contention of James that the facts of experience do not warrant the theory of cosmic Unity as held by rationalism. Rather they indicate the view that there are many forces which are inter-related in a more or less external way. "Pragmatically interpreted," writes James, "pluralism or the doctrine that it is many *means* only that the sundry parts of reality *may be externally related*. Everything you can think of, however vast or inclusive, has on the pluralistic view a genuinely 'external' environment of some sort or amount. Things are 'with' one another in many ways, but

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 58, cf. pp. 73, 201, 218; *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, pp. 159, 253, 260.

<sup>204</sup> *The Meaning of Truth*, pp. xv f.; cf. *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, pp. 247 ff.

<sup>205</sup> *Pragmatism*, pp. 239 ff.; cf. *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, pp. 193 ff.

<sup>206</sup> For James' characterization of the difference between pragmatism and rationalism on this point, see *Pragmatism*, pp. 251-261.

<sup>207</sup> *The Will to Believe*, Chap. on The Delimma of Determinism; *Pragmatism*, pp. 118 ff.; *Some Problems of Philosophy*, Chaps. IX ff.

nothing includes everything, dominates over everything. . . . The pluralistic world is thus more like a federal republic than like an empire or kingdom. However much may be collected, however much report itself as present at any effective centre of consciousness or action, something else is self-governed and absent and unreduced to unity."<sup>208</sup> These are the essential elements in the pragmatism of James, which must be considered in connection with his conception of God, and with his solution of the problems which we are considering.

## 2. James's Conception of God.

### (1) God as the "More" in Human Experience.

James holds that, from a strictly empirical point of view, we cannot deny the existence of a world beyond our finite experience; for we actually come into direct contact with such a world. (This is in full agreement with his contention that the pragmatic theory of ideas does not signify the unreality of their objects.) So he says that if the notion of a world beyond our physical world aids our practical life, pragmatically we must accept the idea of such a world.<sup>209</sup> This empirical attitude of James means that he opposes the dogmatism of naturalism which maintains that the physical world is the only world and that there is no other world beyond it.<sup>210</sup> Religious faith means, for him, a belief in the existence of an unseen order of some kind beyond this natural world.<sup>211</sup> That there exists some unseen order of things James is positively certain. We are so related to such an order of reality that we must take some positive attitude toward it. Faith in this unseen realm is our constitutional need.<sup>212</sup> But how are we related to this unseen universe and why must we assume a positive attitude toward it?<sup>213</sup>

James attempts, in this work, to explain the "more" in our experience by the theory of the "subconscious self." He suggests that "the 'more' with which in religious experience we feel ourselves connected is on its hither side the subconscious continuation of our conscious life."<sup>214</sup> When we inquire into this subconscious region, we find that conscious persons are continuous with a wider self from which come saving experiences,

<sup>208</sup> *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 321 f., cf. p. 325.

<sup>209</sup> *Pragmatism*, pp. 267 ff.

<sup>210</sup> *The Will to Believe*, p. 52.

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 54 ff.

<sup>213</sup> James's theory of this order is developed at length in his work, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 512.

with an enrichment of religious life objectively true so far as it goes.<sup>215</sup> (We call this realm a supernatural or mystic region.) Whatever it may be called, it is in this region that most of these ideal impulses originate of which we are unable to give articulate account; yet to this realm we are more intimately related even than to this visible world. This unseen world is not, moreover, simply an ideal. For when we commune with this world beyond our physical order, there are produced in us practical effects; we are turned into new men, and so our manner of life is transformed.<sup>216</sup> Hence we have no philosophical reason for calling this realm unreal.

James connects the name of God with this higher part of the subconscious realm with which we are in a close contact. "God is the natural appellation," he says, "for us Christians at least, for the supreme reality, so I call this higher part of the universe by the name of God. We and God have business with each other; and in opening ourselves to his influence our deepest destiny is fulfilled."<sup>217</sup> Our personal life is made better or worse in proportion as we follow the demand of God. Thus God is real because he produces in us real effects.<sup>218</sup> To say that this farther side of our experience is the absolute world-ruler, is of course, a considerable over-belief. This over-belief is commonly held. It may be legitimate to the extent that there exists another world which has its natural constitution different from this material order.<sup>219</sup> James confesses, however, that we do not know exactly what characteristic divine facts enter into our life from the hither side of the subliminal region. But he holds that such a yonder realm does actually exist. "The whole drift of my education," writes James, "goes to persuade me that the world of our present consciousness is only one out of many worlds of consciousness that exist, and that those other worlds must contain experiences which have meaning for our life also; and that although in the main their experiences and those of this world keep discrete, yet the two become continuous at certain points, and higher energies filter in."<sup>220</sup> Thus James maintains his faith in the existence of a larger and more significant world than this physical world, and connects the former with the name of God. He is led to this position by the concrete practical

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 515.

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 516.

<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 516 f.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 517.

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 518.

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 519.

effects produced by this yonder world in the life of the individuals whenever they commune with it through their prayers and other exercises of faith. But why must we continue to affirm the existence of such a world? May we not be satisfied with what physical scientists tell us as to the "real" world? This leads to another aspect of his conception of God, where James gives his pragmatic answer to the above question.

(2) God as a Practical Moral Necessity.

James postulates the "more" in human experience as represented by our common religious object, God, on the ground of psychological and practical effects produced in our life. It is on the same grounds that he considers God as an elemental necessity in human life. In analyzing the ethical life of man, James discovers there two types of mood—the strenuous and easy-going. The latter is based on prudence and natural human claims. He indicates that the merely human claims do not produce in us strenuous moral life. A merely human world without a God to lay his claims upon us does not furnish to our moral life its needed stimulating power. (If we believe that there is a God who makes his high moral claims upon us, we are stimulated by the claims to a rigorous moral life.<sup>221</sup>) For the sake, then, of living a strenuous moral life, we would affirm the existence of a God.<sup>222</sup> But this is not, however, the only reason that leads us to affirm the existence of God as a moral necessity.

Our spiritual world, according to James, must contain a God, for without him our future would be dark, our ideals and hopes would lack the possibility of their realization, and hence there would be no assurance of any victory to our struggles. It is for these reasons that James sets aside all materialistic substitutes for the theistic faith.<sup>223</sup> James holds that so far as the *past* of the world is concerned, there is no essential practical difference whether we deem it the work of matter or of spirit; but it makes a great difference in regard to the future of the world.<sup>224</sup> What does the world promise? Can matter promise a world which goes to nearer and nearer perfection? (Scientific materialism, in the thought of James, promises nothing but a cold death of the world. It does not hold out to us that goods are in store for us in the future. All goods will be gone.<sup>225</sup> Scientific materialism then does not warrant

<sup>221</sup> *The Will to Believe*, p. 212.

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 213.

<sup>223</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 134.

<sup>224</sup> *Pragmatism*, pp. 96 ff.

<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 105.

the realization of our ideal hopes.<sup>226</sup> Spiritualism, on the contrary, with its notion of God, gives us an assurance of the success of the world. "A world with a God in it to say the last word," writes James, "may indeed burn or freeze, but we think of him still mindful of the old ideals and sure to bring them elsewhere to fruition; so that, where he is, tragedy is provisional and partial, and shipwreck and dissolution not the final things. This need of an eternal moral order is one of the deepest needs of our breast."<sup>227</sup> The essential difference between these two systems lies, not in their metaphysics, but in this: "Materialism means simply the denial that the moral world is eternal, and the cutting off of ultimate hopes; spiritualism means the affirmation of an eternal moral order and the letting loose of hope."<sup>228</sup> Thus James stands with those who affirm the existence of a God as a practical moral necessity. The godless universe is, for James, like the automatic person who may do for us mechanically those things which a living person performs; yet the former lacks the personal touch and interest of the latter, which men crave.<sup>229</sup>

With the affirmation of God as a practical moral necessity there emerges the question whether James conceives of him as the *absolute* guarantor of our final moral victory. It should frankly be said that James does not commit himself to the view that God gives us such an assurance. The forces of evil and of good are really in the world, and they are competing with each other for mastery. Our ultimate victory depends upon the vigor and success of the coöperative activity of ourselves and God. With regard to this matter, James stands for the melioristic view as to the ultimate future of the world, that is, the world *may be saved* in the end, but we are not now sure of its final victory.<sup>230</sup> Thus the world contains real ventures, chances, risks, possibilities for either losing or winning—a real game of life, the success of which depends on the coöperative activity of all the agents concerned.<sup>231</sup> While God does not promise us the guaranteed victory of our moral world, yet he does, through his active interest in our struggles, hold up before us the hope that there is an eternal moral order and that we may finally succeed. On this account we must have God on our side in the game of life. What then is the nature of this God? We may now turn to James's answer to this question.

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 106.

<sup>227</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 106 f.; cf. *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 517.

<sup>228</sup> *Pragmatism*, p. 107.

<sup>229</sup> *The Meaning of Truth*, footnote, pp. 189 f.

<sup>230</sup> *Pragmatism*, pp. 232 ff., 290 ff.

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 296 f.

## (3) God as a Superhuman, Finite Personality.

James sets forth his conception of the nature of God in opposition to that held by monistic idealism and rational theology. But he does not dogmatically deny all truth to the absolutist theory of God. As a good pragmatist, James says that he has no rationalist bias against such a theory. (The Absolute is true in so far as it affords the assurance that the world in reality is good, so that men who trust in it may take moral holidays.<sup>232</sup>) Can I then accept the Abslolute? asks James. In regard to this question he points out that if any idea or belief helps us to lead a better life, we should accept that idea unless our belief in it clashes with our greater vital benefits.<sup>233</sup> In accordance with this principle he rejects the Absolute, because the acceptance of it conflicts with his other vital interests.<sup>234</sup> The main considerations for his rejection of the Absolute may be summarized as follows: The theory of the Absolute as the all-inclusive consciousness of the universe is logically untenable;<sup>235</sup> the view of the Absolute as possessing one absolute purpose for the world is in contradiction to the real dangers, risks, possibilities, novelties which we find in actual experience;<sup>236</sup> the idea of the Absolute as eternally perfect is inconsistent with the existing imperfections in the world;<sup>237</sup> and, finally, the conception of the Absolute as free from the experiences of suffering, struggle, time, history, change and growth creates the sense that God is alien to our problems.<sup>238</sup> Thus it is evident that what James objects to in the monistic as well as the scholastic conceptions of God is their view of him as eternally complete and perfect. With this rejection of the Absolute, James proceeds to outline his conception of God from the viewpoint of his pragmatism.

In accordance with his general philosophical position James sets aside all the infinite attributes with which God had been endowed by philosophy and theology, and conceives of him in terms of finitude and relativity. The extensive study he has made in regard to religious experience cannot be cited, he holds, to support the infinitist conception of God. "The only thing that it unequivocally testifies is that we can experience union with *something* larger than ourselves and in that union

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 73 ff.; cf. *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 113 f.

<sup>233</sup> *Pragmatism*, p. 76.

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 78 ff.

<sup>235</sup> *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 198 ff.; *Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 138; *Pragmatism*, pp. 145 ff.

<sup>236</sup> *Pragmatism*, pp. 140 ff.; *Some Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 139 f.

<sup>237</sup> *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 123 f.; *Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 138.

<sup>238</sup> *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 47 ff.; *Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 139.

find our greatest peace.”<sup>239</sup> Philosophy and mysticism identify this something larger with God who is the all-inclusive soul of the universe.) (“Meanwhile,” continues James, “the practical needs and experiences of religion seem to me sufficiently met by the belief that beyond each man and in a fashion continuous with him there exists a larger power which is friendly to him and to his ideals. All that the facts require is that the power should be both other and larger than ourselves. Anything larger will do, if only it be large enough to trust for the next step. It need not be infinite, it need not be solitary.”<sup>240</sup> There may be a collection of such larger selves, with different degrees of inclusiveness, with no absolute unity realized in it at all. So a sort of polytheism returns upon us.) It is the pluralism of James that leads him to take this view of God. But he does not dogmatize on this point.

God, then, who is identified with this something larger element of religion, is a superhuman, finite, growing personality.) Unlike the God of rationalism, the God of James is one of many beings in a pluralistic universe. Pluralistically conceived, his God is “one of the eaches.”<sup>241</sup> Such a finite God, in the thought of James, is identical with the God of popular Christianity. “The God of popular Christianity is but one member of a pluralistic system. . . . I can hardly conceive of anything more different from the absolute than the God, say, of David or of Isaiah. *That* God is essentially finite being *in* the cosmos, not with the cosmos in him, and indeed he has very local habitation there, and very onesided local and personal attachments. . . . I believe that the only God worthy of the name *must* be finite.”<sup>242</sup> In order to be consistent with our common experience and to get out of the monistic difficulties, both philosophy and theology should accept, “along with the superhuman consciousness, the notion that it is not all-embracing, the notion, in other words, that there is a God, but that he is finite, either in power or in knowledge, or in both.”<sup>243</sup> While the God of James is like us in his experiences of struggle, striving, change, and growth, yet he is far greater being than ourselves.) He is to be conceived of “as the deepest power in the universe,” a mental personality distinct from and yet related to our personalities, a power not ourselves “which not only makes for righteousness, but means it, and which recognizes us.”<sup>244</sup>)

<sup>239</sup> *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 525.

<sup>240</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 525.

<sup>241</sup> *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 44.

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 110 f., 125.

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 311.

<sup>244</sup> *The Will to Believe*, p. 122.

Because of the finiteness of his God, James holds that he and we are closely related in our common task of creating a better world. "Having an environment, being in time, and working out a history just like ourselves, he escapes from the foreignness from all that is human, of the static timeless perfect absolute."<sup>245</sup> Thus he and we stand shoulder to shoulder in the process of self-realization and of working out a better moral order in an indefinite future. Evils exist in the world. God and we work together to lessen their amount or crush them out of existence. In this struggle for a better world, God being greater than we, does the work more effectively than ourselves. Yet he cannot do it all; we must coöperate with him in this great work.

Not only are we thus practically related with God, but also we find ourselves in a close psychological relation with him. The religious experiences of men point to the belief that we are related with a large spiritual environment. Moreover, all the empirical evidences seem "to sweep us very strongly towards the belief in some form of superhuman life with which we may, unknown to ourselves, be co-conscious."<sup>246</sup> So we are practically and psychologically in an intimate relation with God, which is made possible by the fact that he and we are fundamentally one in nature.<sup>247</sup>

### 3. Criticism of James' Solution of the Problems.

Much has been said, in our discussion of James' conception of God, to show that in his philosophy of religion we find a thoroughgoing use and application of those principles of empiricism which characterize the scientific investigations of our age. In the other philosophies of religion which we have studied, while the element of empiricism was not absent, it was not the pivot around which these philosophies turned. The determining factor in them was something wholly or partially underivable in and through the actual experiences of life, something assumed *a priori* as the all-conditioning principle of their procedure. And what enabled them to posit such a principle is the intellect which is deemed, in the main, the highest category of human life (Eucken forms a possible exception; but even for him, thought, when it is grounded in an independent spiritual life, enables us to get at the heart of reality.). In James, for the first time in the course of our investigation, do we observe that all the *a priori* elements and intellectualism of the preceding systems of philosophy are abandoned, and that an effort is made to formulate a doctrine of God

<sup>245</sup> *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 318.

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 309.

<sup>247</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

on the basis of empirical investigation. Moreover, in order to give meaning and basis to the actual experiences of life, Royce, Eucken, and Bowne have all attempted to maintain that behind the mirror of our present existence there exists an eternal order which is our real home. James, on the contrary, has given up all notion of a duplicate universe; for him there is only one world, the world of our common experience where realities are ever in the process of making, where our deeds are done, where our goods are achieved; and he is fully satisfied with this world made real to us in and through our concrete, practical experience (True, James is constantly seeking to discover more and more of the depth and significance of the one world; but he does not ask for a second world that cannot be experienced by us.). Thus the most significant feature in his philosophy of religion is his empiricism in method and in theory. Hence our criticism must be undertaken in full recognition of these facts.

James, to begin with, has completely set aside the revelation-method of traditional theology and the *apriori*-intellectualistic dialectic of all speculative systems of philosophy. He makes use of a thoroughgoing empirical method in the formulation of his conception of God. This does not mean, of course, that James employs the categories of physical sciences in dealing with the problem of God, nor that he follows the intellectualistic procedure which usually marks the inductive formulation of natural science; but it signifies, on the contrary, that he adopts the same scientific spirit which is manifested in all scientific works, and carries it out in his investigations in the higher realms of reality. An anti-intellectualistic, voluntaristic-emotional, psychological empiricism is what James uses in dealing with man and God. We need not dwell longer on this general empirical method.

But a word should be said concerning the individualistic aspect of his method, which is specially marked in his discussion of religious experience. Religion, according to James, means for us "*the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider divine.*"<sup>248</sup> Defining religion thus in terms of individual relationship, James does not concern himself with the social aspects of religion which find expression in liturgies, theologies, ecclesiastical organizations; but he deals primarily with the individual cases of religion. "The pivot around which the religious life, as we have traced it, revolves," writes James, "is the

<sup>248</sup> *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 31.

interest of the individual in his private destiny. Religion, in short, is a monumental chapter in the history of human egoism. . . . Religious thought is carried on in terms of personality, this being, in the world of religion, the one fundamental fact.<sup>249</sup> It is in the realm of individual feelings that we come into the depth of reality.<sup>250</sup> Thus with his affirmation of the primacy of individual feelings, James sets forth a kind of religious mysticism over against the intellectualistic view of religion. Individuality and feelings are organically related. "Individuality is founded in feeling; and the recesses of feeling, the darker, blinder strata of character, are the only places in the world in which we catch real fact in the making, and directly perceive how events happen, and how work is actually done."<sup>251</sup> But it is doubtful whether we have to get at the content of religious experience through the avenue of purely individual expressions, as James holds. It seems, in view of the fact that both the individual and social expressions of religion are organic parts of the on-going process of religious evolution, that we need to take account, in dealing with religion, of both these elements. By following this more comprehensive method rather than the atomistic procedure of James, there opens up to us a vast field for investigating religion—we can now view religion in its historical and social connections, and not merely in its isolated individual expressions.<sup>252</sup> If James were true to his thoroughgoing empirical attitude toward all the facts of experience, he should make use of the data on religion obtainable through its social expressions as well as its individual expressions.<sup>253</sup>

With regard to his attitude toward science, it is to be remarked, first, that James gives a full recognition to the practical value of scientific work.<sup>254</sup> But this acceptance of the results of science is not equivalent to viewing its laws as literal copies of reality. Practically all the so-called laws of science, in the thought of James, "are only approximations. . . . They are only a man-made language, a conceptual short-hand, as some one calls them, in which we write our reports of nature."<sup>255</sup>

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 491, cf. p. 501.

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 498 ff.

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 501 ff.

<sup>252</sup> See Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, and I. King, *The Development of Religion*.

<sup>253</sup> For criticism of James' method, see Royce, *The Sources of Religious Insight*, pp. 61 ff.; Faber, *Das Wesen der Religionspsychologie und ihre Bedeutung für die Dogmatik*, pp. 25 ff., cf. pp. 101 ff.

<sup>254</sup> *Pragmatism*, pp. 186 ff.

<sup>255</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.

They are simply our hypotheses which are useful to us in our dealings with nature. Further, we have already had occasion to remark that James is opposed to the scientific materialism which results from the success of science, because it is opposed to the ideal interests of men.<sup>256</sup> And, finally, James is not content with the view that the revelations of natural science are all that there are to reality. Beyond our physical order, there is an unseen spiritual realm whose nature our physical science cannot determine.<sup>257</sup> In regard to our moral problems science cannot give us the answer we need, so that we must consult "our heart."<sup>258</sup> Science deals with its elements, laws, and the processes of nature regardless of their bearing on human life. But James contends that it is not through our dealing with reality in terms of cosmic laws and processes that we come to the heart of reality; but rather "*as soon as we deal with private and personal phenomena as such, we deal with realities in the completest sense of the term.*"<sup>259</sup> Thus James from the standpoint of his distinctly human interest rightly opposes the extravagant claims of uncritical naturalism, so often made in the name of natural science.

To speak next of James's attitude toward the traditional conception of God as transcendent personality, we find that he is in opposition to its arbitrary and realistic aspects. He cannot tolerate the idea of God as a sovereign monarch who saves some and damns others in an arbitrary fashion.<sup>260</sup> Moreover, for James, the traditional conception of God as totally distinct from the world, all complete unto himself from eternity, leaves us foreigners to the deepest reality of the universe. James holds that the tendency of thought in our time is for "the pantheistic field of vision, the vision of God as the indwelling divine rather than the external creator, and of human life as part and parcel of that deep reality."<sup>261</sup> He stands with this tendency of thought and conceives of God in terms of intimate relationship with men.<sup>262</sup>

This leads us to James's solution of the problem of God as the absolute being. Royce, Eucken, and Bowne have all conceived of God in terms of dynamic immanence. But they have exempted God from the process of change and growth which mark our empirical world. God is

<sup>256</sup> See above, pp. 67 f.

<sup>257</sup> *The Will to Believe*, pp. 52 f.

<sup>258</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>259</sup> *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 489.

<sup>260</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 329 f.; cf. *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 30.

<sup>261</sup> *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 30, cf. pp. 24. ff.

<sup>262</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

essentially immutable. James, however, has given up all static notion of reality; for him all realities are forever in the process of making. This is what he finds in experience. Hence God, who is vitally related to this evolving world, is also changing and growing; the time-process is not an illusion or appearance to him; he has history just like any human being. Consequently, the God of James is essentially a finite being, a member in a pluralistic universe. This conception of the finiteness of his God is repugnant not only to absolutistic philosophers but also to all the theologians who wish to retain the traditional doctrine of God as a perfect being. But it is noteworthy in this connection that when the theologians oppose the idea of a limited God, they do so largely on philosophical grounds, and not usually on religious grounds. Ever since the Christian religion came in touch with the philosophically trained Greek Christians, notably the Apologists, there have been present in Christian theology two interests, the religious and philosophical. The philosophical interest of Christian theology has always sought to conceive of God in terms of infinitude, while its religious interest has held to the view of God as a being who is striving with the struggles of his people, hence essentially a limited God. But Christian theologians, on the whole (with the possible exception of Ritschl), have not seen the antithesis involved in these two conceptions; they have rather interpreted the finite aspects of the God of religion in terms of an absolute and infinite being of philosophy. In the pragmatic religion of James, we find, for the first time the two antithetical conceptions of God brought to a sharp issue. He has pointed out that the God of ordinary Christianity is but a member in a pluralistic universe.<sup>233</sup> Such a conception of God, no doubt, has been held by Christians in their practical moral and religious life. And it is for practical reasons, in the main, that James advocates his view of God as a finite being who is striving with us in our common task of creating a better world. He cannot accept the Absolute who is the all-inclusive being of the universe and who has absolutely determined the course of the world; so that the world presents no new possibilities. James would rather have a God who is not absolutely sure of the world's outcome than to believe in a supreme deity who has absolute control over the destiny of the universe in all its details.<sup>234</sup> For a world with open possibilities in it is far more desirable than a world whose destiny is eternally fixed.

<sup>233</sup> *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 110.

<sup>234</sup> *The Will to Believe*, pp. 181 ff.

James' sort of God and of the world are, on the whole, in line with the standpoint of the evolutionary theory. God and the world from the viewpoint of the evolutionary theory must, it seems, be conceived of in terms of change and growth, hence in finite terms. The trend of the empirical investigations of science and the spread of the evolutionary view of the universe seem to point towards this conclusion.

To conceive of God as a finite being, however, does not mean to hold him as a very insignificant reality. "The finite God whom I contrast with it (the absolute)," says James, "may conceivably have *almost* nothing outside of himself; he may have triumphed over and absorbed all but the minutest fraction of the universe; but that fraction, however small, reduces him to the status of a relative being, and in principle the universe is saved from the irrationalities incident to absolutism."<sup>265</sup> Thus the God of James, who is reached from the viewpoint of a pluralistic universe, is a finite being in the sense that he does not include all beings. "A theism," remarks Ward, "that is reached through pluralism can never end in an Absolute in which God and the World alike were absorbed and lost: the only Absolute then that we can admit is the Absolute which God and the World constitute."<sup>266</sup> This is practically what James means when he conceives of God as a finite, relative being who is closely related to us in our struggles, conflicts with the forces of the antagonistic world to create a better moral order.<sup>267</sup> Thus the conception of God as a finite being is not after all so radical as it at first sight appears. And this conception of God is wholly in harmony with the avowed empiricism of James.

One other remark we need to make in this connection is in regard to James' view of the relation between God and the world. The primary interest of James, as we have seen, is not to seek in God the metaphysical explanatory principle of the universe, but rather to find in him a spiritual reality which is in close relation with men in their struggles to create a better world. It is the practical moral religious needs of men that first of all lead them to God for their satisfaction. "The gods we stand by," writes James, "are the gods we need and can use, the gods whose demand on us are reinforcements of our demands on ourselves and on one another."<sup>268</sup> One of the considerations which leads James to view God pluralistically (He, however, in his later book, *A Pluralistic Universe*,

<sup>265</sup> *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 125.

<sup>266</sup> *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 141 f.

<sup>267</sup> *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 312.

<sup>268</sup> *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 331.

says that "word 'polytheism' usually gives offence, so perhaps it is better not to use it"<sup>269</sup> is his intense human interest in religious matters.

If, then, we conceive of God as vitally related to us in our moral and religious tasks, and as standing for the ideal tendencies in life, we are not necessarily called upon to speculate as to the problem of evil or how the world came to be. Evil is one of the principles in the world, which has no rational or absolute right to its existence; we need simply to put it out of existence.<sup>270</sup> So it is in regard to the ontological problem of the world. James, in contrast to Royce, Eucken, and Bowne who have more or less sought to solve this problem, does not attempt to set forth his view of God's causal relation to the world. He turns away from the Whence and Why of the world which he regards as the darkest problems in philosophy, to a more practical inquiry into the What of reality.<sup>271</sup> He cannot bear the thought of natural theology that God is revealed in nature so that we may worship her God, because he says that we know too well the processes of nature as to consider her as the adequate expression of God.<sup>272</sup> Yet James does not dogmatically deny that God is causally related to the world of nature. As regards the question of design in nature, for instance, he holds that what he is concerned to know is what design and what designer are there in the process of nature; but the only way to ascertain them is through the study of facts. (Since, however, these facts are not as yet adequate to give us a clear insight into the nature of design and designer, we have to be content with a certain pragmatic benefit, a promise of success, if we consider that there are in nature a divine design and designer.<sup>273</sup>) And with respect to the general problem of teleology, James does not hold that there are no purposes in the world. He is simply opposed to the idea of one absolute purpose to which all things must be subservient.<sup>274</sup> Hence it should be observed here that while James contends for the view that the existence and character of God are finally to be seen in personal religious experience,<sup>275</sup> he is not antagonistic to the theory that God may be causally related to the world. This seems to be his attitude when he says: "Truth of 'God' has to run the same gauntlet of all other truths.

<sup>269</sup> P. 310.

<sup>270</sup> *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 131 f.; *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 124.

<sup>271</sup> *Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 46.

<sup>272</sup> *The Will to Believe*, pp. 43 f.; cf. *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 491 ff.

<sup>273</sup> *Pragmatism*, pp. 113 ff.

<sup>274</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 140 ff.

<sup>275</sup> *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 498 ff.

It is on trial by them and they on trial by it. Our *final* opinion about God can be settled only after all the truths straighten themselves out together. Let us hope that they shall find a *modus vivendi!*<sup>276</sup> Thus for James the problem of God, as all other problems, is always an open problem; he is ready to receive any truths about God which may compel him to modify his present conception of him. But so far as it can be ascertained in the extant works of James, it is quite evident that he has not worked out the problem of God's causal relation to the world.

But a question is whether we can ignore this problem altogether, as does James. It is indeed a difficult problem to ascertain the ontological relation of God to the world. There are astonishingly many facts in the processes of nature and human history which we do not wish to attribute to God. Must we, then, give up the task of construing God's relation to the world? It seems that in the interest of practical religion we need to say something here. This leads to the further inquiry: Can such a finite God as necessitated by the evolutionary theory control the world? It does not appear that God needs to be infinite to sustain the world. The world is admitted to be finite—it is changing and growing toward perfection. So a finite God could be causally related to a finite world.

At any rate the religious man has his knowledge-interest as well as his practical interests, and so we must seek to satisfy the cognitive side of his religion. And this cognitive interest of religion is met by the view that the world in some way is dependent on God for its existence and continuance, and that, as result of our coöperative activity with him, God will bring it to a successful consummation in an indefinitely distant future. Such a view of God's relation to the world is consonant with the empirical position of James which seeks to satisfy the interests of religion. But his extreme anti-intellectualism has led him to ignore the cognitive interest of the religious man.<sup>277</sup>

We may conclude our criticism of James with the observation that while his solution of the problems is most in accord with the essential elements of the evolutionary theory, yet it is open to two objections: first, his point of view with reference to religion is individualistic and so disregards the social elements of religion which constitute a fruitful source for determining the content of religion; and, secondly, he does not give a full recognition to the intellectual elements of religion and so he fails to satisfy the cognitive interest.

<sup>276</sup> *Pragmatism*, p. 109.

<sup>277</sup> For critical exposition of James' philosophy, see Perry, *op. cit.*, pp. 349-378; and for a criticism of James' philosophy of religion, Boutroux, *Science and Religion*, Eng. tr., pp. 355 ff.

This brings us to the close of our exposition and criticism of typical recent philosophies of religion. There remains the task of stating the results and implications of the above discussion. This will form the subject-matter of the third and concluding part.

## PART THREE

STATEMENT OF THE RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE FOREGOING  
DISCUSSION

So far our effort has been to set forth critically the problems due to the attempt to bring the modern doctrine of evolution into relation with the traditional conception of God, and the solutions of these problems in typical recent philosophies of religion. The purpose of the concluding part of our investigation will be to summarize the results and to call attention to certain implications.

In our survey of the situation in the first part of our work, we saw that, since the evolutionary theory stands for an empirical method and a changing, growing, and non-miraculous view of the organic world, exempting no living reality from the process of evolution, while the traditional theology adheres to its *a priori* revelation-method and its conception of God as the transcendent, supernatural, sovereign personality and as the infinite and absolute being, there arose many critical problems, especially, in regard to the theological method of formulating the conception of God and the conception of his nature. A full recognition of these problems is essential to the construction of a modern doctrine of God. The evolutionary point of view has come to be so pervasive and dominating in modern methods of investigation and ways of thinking that we can no longer be content with the uncritical adjustments of the traditional conception of God with the theory of evolution which have marked the apologetic theologies of the past generation.<sup>1</sup> In view of this fact, the theologians must either abandon the logic underlying the evolutionary theory, or accept it in a thoroughgoing fashion and deal with the problems of theology from its standpoint. Realizing the futility of the former alternative, we feel forced to deal with the theory in earnest and to consider the work of theology from its point of view.

In assuming this attitude toward the evolutionary theory, we find two central problems, namely, that of method and that of the conception of the nature of God. The fundamental issues involved, then, are these: First, shall the *a priori* dogmatic method of traditional theology based on an external authority continue to be used? or shall we adopt an empirical procedure in the formulation of our conception of God? Sec-

<sup>1</sup> Such, e. g., are Drummond, *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, and Gr. ffith-Jones, *op. cit.*

ondly, can the traditional conception of God as the transcendent, complete, and perfect being be retained? or must we conceive of him as dynamically immanent in the processes of evolution, hence a changing, growing, finite being? To accept the former alternatives of these questions means to possess a system of finality and of absolutism in matters of religion and ethics. But to take the position of the latter alternatives signifies that there is no finality anywhere, either in the world at large or more specifically in the field of religion and ethics. These issues are indeed of far-reaching significance.<sup>2</sup> With this recognition, then, of the problems and of the issues involved in them, we now pass to a specific consideration of the results and implications of our previous discussion.

### 1. The Problem of Method.

Reference has repeatedly been made, in the course of our study, to the fact that the evolutionary theory demands a new method in dealing with the doctrine of God as well as other religious doctrines. This new method may be stated briefly as an investigation and formulation of our conception of God on the basis of knowledge derived in and through the actual religious experiences of individuals and peoples. In this method there is no reliance on any external authority; material and criterion are both found in the experiences of religious people. To this experiential method demanded by the evolutionary theory, the deductive method of traditional theology founded on an infallible, supernatural revelation is diametrically opposed.

The result of our study respecting the methodology of the men whom we have studied may be summed up as follows:

Royce, whose method is fundamentally based on an Absolute Experience or Thought, or on an All-inclusive Insight, which he assumes *a priori*, nevertheless gives a large space to the examination of the facts of changing, growing, temporal social experience as a means of arriving at his metaphysical conclusions.<sup>3</sup> He is fully aware of the movements of empiricism, especially since the days of Kant, and so cannot ignore inductive investigation in matters of philosophy and religion. Thus he confesses: "Whatever may be the rationalistic bias or tradition of any of us, we are all more or less empiricists, and we are so to a degree that was never characteristic of the pre-Kantian rationalists. Whatever may be our interest in theory or in the Absolute, we are all accustomed to lay stress upon practical considerations as having a

<sup>2</sup> See Moore, *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, pp. 21 f.

<sup>3</sup> This, as we noted, is particularly true of his recent works, e. g., *The Sources of Religious Insight*, and *The Problem of Christianity*.

fundamental, even if not the most fundamental, importance for philosophy; and so in a general, and I admit, in a very loose sense of the term, we are all alike more or less pragmatists.<sup>4</sup> In a very marked degree, the same regard for empiricism characterizes Eucken. He has given up the power of thought relied upon by intellectualistic systems of philosophy, for he finds it incapable of giving us the true insight into the problem of human life. For him the contradictions in life cannot be so easily solved as they are in such a philosophy as immanent idealism. Eucken indeed, affirms as the basis of his philosophy an independent spiritual life, which is underivable in and through the evolutionary experiences of man. Philosophically he undertakes to view the facts of human experience from the standpoint of such a spiritual life. But we find that, in reality, he is constantly dealing with the actual experiences of the life-process in its struggles, conflicts, oppositions, tasks. In Bowne we see distinctly two trends in his method. From the standpoint of his metaphysics, he relies upon the capacity of thought for discovering the nature of reality; and yet he fully admits that we must depend upon experience to furnish the data for thought.<sup>5</sup> From the point of view of his religion, great stress is laid upon the actual experiences of life to solve the problem of God and other problems of religion. Here he depends not on the intellect but on experience to come to an understanding of the nature of God and of other religious realities. "The understanding is only an instrument for manipulating the data furnished by experience; and when the experience is limited or lacking, there is nothing to interpret and really no problem."<sup>6</sup> Thus Royce, Eucken, and Bowne give much consideration to the facts of empirical experience in matters, especially, of religion. Still, in spite of the attention they give to experience, their method consists fundamentally in viewing the problems of religion and of philosophy from the standpoint of some absolute, some final criterion which they have *a priori* assumed. But when we come to James, we find that he has set aside all *a priori* method, and deals with the questions of religion from the viewpoint of actual religious experience. For him the content of religion is not to be assumed, but to be obtained and verified in and through concrete religious experience. Hence in him we note a complete reliance on the capacity of the actual experiences of religion to determine its realities; thus he meets the methodological demand of the evolutionary theory.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The Eternal and the Practical, *The Phil. Rev.*, XIII, pp. 113 f.; cf. *ibid.*, p. 142.

<sup>5</sup> *Metaphysics*, p. 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Theism*, p. 260.

<sup>7</sup> On the methods of these philosophers of religion, see above, pp. 21 f., 27 ff.; 41 f.; 48 f.; 55 f.; 63 f.; 74 f.

Briefly, this is the result of our study of the problem of method. Even the philosophers of religion, Royce, Eucken, and Bowne, who are concerned to relate the problems of religion to a superempirical absolute, nevertheless make so much use of the data of experience, that they tend toward an experiential method. This tendency toward empirical inquiry finds full scope in the inductive method of James.<sup>8</sup> The trend of contemporary religious thought, so far as these men are representative is thus in the direction of empiricism in method.

This methodological tendency means that if theology is to be in line with the inductive, evolutionary spirit of contemporary sciences, it cannot follow the method hitherto employed. Traditional theology follows the method of expounding and systematizing a given quantity of supernatural revelation located in an infallible church or scripture.<sup>9</sup> Such a procedure is becoming more and more unsatisfactory; for the investigations in biblical science are constantly bringing to light the differences between the content of the biblical revelation and that of modern religion.<sup>10</sup> A departure from this method marks the Ritschlian school, which views religion from the standpoint of the revelation of God made in the historical person of Jesus.<sup>11</sup> While this method is an advance upon that of traditional theology, in that it is more in accord with the results of biblical criticism than the latter; yet there is actually much discrepancy between the religious consciousness and teaching of the historical Jesus and the content of our modern religious experiences and views. It thus becomes exceedingly difficult to make the historical Jesus as the complete and absolute norm of religion.<sup>12</sup> Fully aware of this difficulty of the Ritschlian method, the "*Religionsgeschichtliche Schule*" attempts to view the problems of religion from the standpoint of the history of religions.<sup>13</sup> But while this school does actually deal with religion empirically, there is still the desire to link religious belief

<sup>8</sup> Of course this remark does not signify that his method is fully satisfactory, but it means that he has applied the same scientific spirit, which characterizes the theorie of evolution, in his investigations of religion.

<sup>9</sup> See, e. g., Hodge, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 182 ff.; Shedd, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 70 ff.

<sup>10</sup> See, e. g., Piepenbring, *Theology of the Old Testament*; Weinel, *Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, Tübingen, 1913; White, *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom*, 2 vols., 1896, II, Chap. XX.

<sup>11</sup> Herrmann, *Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott*, Berlin, 1903, esp. pp. 79 ff.; Harnack, *Das Wesen des Christentums*, pp. 33 ff.

<sup>12</sup> See, e. g., Schweitzer, *The Quest of Historical Jesus*; Scott, *The Kingdom and the Messiah*.

<sup>13</sup> Troeltsch, The Dogmatics of the "Religionsgeschichtliche Schule," *American Journal of Theology*, Jan., 1913.

to some superempirical absolute. Troeltsch, for example, affirms a religious *a priori* quite after the transcendental method of Platonism.<sup>14</sup> The above typical theological methods of the present are satisfactory to many. But an increasing number of theological thinkers who have felt the power of scientific investigations, especially in the field of religion, can no longer follow esoteric methods. These men feel that in order to take its place among the sciences of our age and to accomplish its work for the furtherance of religious life, theology should employ the method demanded by the evolutionary theory. In adopting such a method of experimentation and verification, theology will indeed lose its claim to finality in content, but it will find a vaster field for its investigation and gain scientific worth for what it discovers through the medium of the new method.<sup>15</sup> Theology, then, in following the inductive method of the evolutionary theory will seek for the sources of its doctrines in the common religious experiences of people as these are critically expounded in investigations dealing particularly with the history of religion and the psychology of religious experience. Christian theology will, of course, study its religious inheritance in the records especially of the Hebrew and Christian peoples, in order to gain suggestive contributions toward the solution of its religious problems. Significant personalities, notably the prophets and Jesus and his apostles, will constitute a specially valuable source of religious insight. But while these will form the primary sources of religion, theology will, in accordance with its empirical method, deal with contributions on matters of religion coming from any other worthy source. It is thus the great field of human religious experience, in the largest sense, with which theology would empirically deal.<sup>16</sup> In the use of such inductive procedure, theology would indeed be in accord with the methodological point of view of the evolutionary theory; and it would also carry out the implication of our investigation with regard to the problem of method in its relation to the formulation of our conception of God.

## 2. The Problem of the Relation between Theology and Science.

The problem as to the relation between theology and science involves especially the question of empiricism and metempiricism in theory. The evolutionary theory based, as it is, upon scientific investigations, would

<sup>14</sup> Empiricism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion, *Harvard Theo., Rev.*, V, esp. pp. 419 ff.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Ames, *op. cit.*, p. 320; Theology from the Standpoint of Functional Psychology, *American Journal of Theology*, X, p. 232.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Johnson, *God in Evolution*, Chap. II, Concerning Method.

necessitate the view that, since all forms of existence are related with one another in an organic whole, the physical and psychical realms are alike open to empirical investigations; that, inasmuch as we do not know of any content of truth obtainable through metempirical means, all our affirmations concerning God and other religious objects should be made on the basis of our evolutionary experience; and that, as our life with all its ideas and ideals is involved in the process of real evolution, all our theories are not the exact representations of objective truths, but are practical means of interpreting and of furthering human life. Traditional theology, however, maintains that while the natural realm is open to scientific investigation, the supernatural realm, where the main facts of religion are believed to be located, is not amenable to inductive experimentation; that the truths of religion are given to us by a supernatural God through supernatural means; and that, therefore, these truths are infallible and absolute. In view of the theoretical antithesis involved in these two systems of thought, there arises the problem of effecting a tenable adjustment between them.

For the solution of this problem, the philosophers of religion whom we have consulted, have given us their contributions. Royce, in accordance with his absolute idealism, holds that philosophy has the final word on the subject of reality. Yet he recognizes the truths of science as inductive descriptions of the temporal order. Moreover, he gives a high value to the deeds and events of our temporal experience.<sup>17</sup> What he opposes in science (natural science) is its uncritical affirmation that all reality consists of physical elements and that all forms of existence are explicable in terms of such elements. Eucken likewise appreciates the place and worth of science in modern life. But he cannot tolerate the scientific naturalism which reduces all reality to the plane of physical mechanism. With Bowne, science can freely concern itself with the phenomenal reality, while philosophy deals with ontological realities. But we note that Bowne bases many of his religious affirmations on the ground of experience. When we come to James, we find that he has given up all the dogmatic elements adhered to by the above philosophers, and bases all his declarations on the discoveries of empirical inquiry; but he is as fully antagonistic as they are to the materialistic contentions of dogmatic natural science. Thus all these philosophers of religion hold that the discoveries of natural science do not constitute the whole of reality; accordingly, theological or religious affirmations must be given

<sup>17</sup> See, e. g., The Reality of the Temporal, *International Journal of Ethics*, XX, pp. 269 ff.

their due validity. Royce, Eucken, and Bowne, who claim finality for their systems, make much of their statements grounded on the facts of experience, while James abandons all dogmatic elements and treats all theories as hypotheses liable to modification and revision in the course of changing human experience.<sup>18</sup> James thus considers the idea of God also as a practical hypothesis of religion.<sup>19</sup> The empirical elements traceable in Royce, Eucken, and Bowne thus find full recognition in James, and are made the basis of his philosophy of religion as well as of science.<sup>20</sup>

Such, in brief, is the tendency of thought among these philosophers of religion on the relation between theology and science. Science has its place to fill in the work of humanity, but it must give up its claim to explain all realities in terms of physical elements; while theology should relinquish its claim to set forth absolute truth. Both are called upon to face the facts of life and of existence in a thoroughly empirical fashion, and to consider themselves as means of furthering the on-going evolution of life. This appears to be the implication of the solutions given by our religious philosophers to the problem of the relation of theology and science.

This implication as to the relation between theology and science calls for a brief comment. The theories of evolution which we have studied are characterized by a thoroughgoing empiricism. Lamarck indicates that he has reached his conclusions as result of observation;<sup>21</sup> Darwin states that his theory of natural selection, formulated after years of close study, does not exclude other means of modification of species;<sup>22</sup> Bergson, too, with his doctrine of a universal change does not claim finality for his system.<sup>23</sup> This undogmatic attitude of the evolutionists is characteristic of contemporary scientists. While Haeckel maintains the view that "all the previous boundaries of natural science have now fallen (in consequence of the progress of science); its domain has become extended thereby over the whole realm of man's intellectual life. *Nature is everything*, and therefore all true science is also at bottom 'natural science' ",<sup>24</sup>

<sup>18</sup> *The Will to Believe*, Preface, pp. vii, f.; *Essays in Radical Empiricism*.

<sup>19</sup> *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 506 f., 517 f.

<sup>20</sup> For the views of these men on the relation between theology and science, see above, pp. 29 f.; 42 f.; 56 ff.; 73 f.; and for a criticism of science, cf. Perry, *op. cit.*, Chap. V, Religion and the Limits of Science.

<sup>21</sup> Packard, *op. cit.*, p. 323.

<sup>22</sup> *The Origin of Species*, cf. *The Descent of Man*, pp. 702 f.

<sup>23</sup> *Creative Evolution*, pp. 44 ff., 265 ff.

<sup>24</sup> The Boundaries of Natural Science, *The Open Court*, Feb. 1914, p. 73, cf. p. 69 f.

yet such an affirmation is not made by the most critically exact of scientists. Pearson, for example, points out the incompleteness of science and its concepts or laws as mental shorthand useful to the work of man: "Although science claims the whole universe as its field, it must not be supposed that it has reached, or ever can reach, complete knowledge in every department. Far from this it confesses that its ignorance is more widely extended than its knowledge. . . . We are thus to understand by a law in science, *i. e.*, by a 'law of nature,' a *résumé* in mental shorthand, which replaces for us a lengthy description of the sequences among our sense-impressions. Law in the scientific sense is thus essentially a product of the human mind and has no meaning apart from man."<sup>25</sup> Ostwald, in a similar tone, says: "The laws of nature do not decree what shall happen, but *inform us what has happened and what is wont to happen*. . . . We must not say, . . . , that because we have been able so far to explain all experiences by natural laws it will be so in the future likewise. For we are far from being able to explain all experiences. In fact, it is only a very small part that we have begun to investigate."<sup>26</sup> Poincaré, on the matter of scientific law, writes thus: "If we look at any particular law, we may be certain in advance that it can only be approximate. . . . No particular law will ever be more than approximate and probable. Scientists have never failed to recognize this truth; only they believe, right or wrong, that every law may be replaced by another closer and more probable, that this new law will itself be only provisional, but that the same movement can continue indefinitely, so that science in progressing will possess laws more and more probable, that the approximation will end by differing as little as you choose from exactitude and the probability from certitude."<sup>27</sup> Such is, in short, the thoroughly empirical attitude of our foremost scientists in regard to the work of science.

But what attitude do we find in the case of theologians? In contrast to the empiricism of the evolutionary theory and of contemporary science, most of our theologies are marked by some dogmatic absolutism. Orthodoxy maintains that it has the final truths in its divinely given scripture,<sup>28</sup> which are beyond the ken of science. The Ritschlian school conceives of reality under two categories: the existential-judgments and

<sup>25</sup> *The Gramma of Science*, pp. 25, 86 f.

<sup>26</sup> *Natural Philosophy*, pp. 28, 31.

<sup>27</sup> *The Foundations of Science*, pp. 340, 341.

<sup>28</sup> See, e. g., Hodge, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 151 ff., 364; Shedd, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 70 ff.; Strong, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 145 ff.

value-judgments. Science deals with the former, while theology is concerned with the latter; the two are independent of each other. "The evangelical faith," says Herrmann, "because it ought to be an independent possession of the moral personality, must remain unentangled with the present-day development of free natural science."<sup>29</sup> For this school, by thus dividing the field of knowledge and of faith, the content of revelation given in the personality of the historical Jesus is theoretically unaffected by historical criticism.<sup>30</sup> The Positive theologians contend that in Jesus *Christ* the absolute truths of religion are found.<sup>31</sup> The "*Religionsgeschichtliche Schule*" as represented by Troeltsch cannot be satisfied with what we find in experience. He falls back on the position of Platonic philosophy.<sup>32</sup> Thus theologians in one way or another with their adherence to some absolute element in their systems contend for the immunity of their theological doctrines from the encroachment of science; for them the findings of empirical study cannot form the foundation for their theological doctrines. These must be grounded on some *a priori* principle underivable in and through human experience.

None of the positions, however, of the above theologians would seem to be in agreement with the implication of the tendency of thought manifested by our religious philosophers on the question of the relation of theology and science. Of these philosophers, James has particularly brought out, in accordance with his empiricism, the functional value of our scientific and theological concepts; for him, they are the practical means of adjusting ourselves to the environing realities for the purpose of developing human life. This functional significance of our concepts is recognized, as we have seen, by at least a few of our contemporary scientists. The theologians, in the main, have not yet come to take such a view of their doctrines; the theological concepts, according to them, are more or less exact representations of objective realities. It is quite manifest, as a result of our study, that the best way, in so far as our present age of culture and civilization is concerned, is to take the hints given by the philosophers of religion and the men of science whom we have consulted respecting the relation between theology and science,

<sup>29</sup> *Die Religion*, etc., Preface, p. iv, quoted by Simpson, *The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*, p. 4.

<sup>30</sup> See Garvie, *The Ritschlian Theology*, 1899; Boutroux, *Science et Religion*, Part II, Chap. I.

<sup>31</sup> See Seeberg, *op. cit.*, cf. Hodge, *The Finality of the Christian Religion*, *Princeton Biblical and Theological Studies*, pp. 453 ff.; Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 74 ff.

<sup>32</sup> Empiricism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion, *Harvard Theo. Rev.*, V, p. 420 ff.

and conceive of the doctrines both of science and of theology as working hypotheses, which we acquire through the process of experimentation, in order to achieve the higher values of life.<sup>33</sup> In so conceiving the function of theology and of science in relation to the interests of human life, there is suggested a tenable relation between them, namely, the relation of coöperative activity in the interest of promoting the development of man in his struggle for existence. The whole realm of existence will be open to science for investigation, as it is held, for example, by Pearson;<sup>34</sup> so that it may go on with its work of observation, description, classification, explanation as to the processes of nature, human society, and of our psychological phenomena in order to have control over them in the behalf of man; while theology is to proceed with its task, aided by the results of scientific investigations in various fields, of interpreting particularly religious phenomena and of formulating concepts, doctrines, hypotheses of the objects of religion which will best further, in a given age, its ideal ends. Such a theory seems to be the implication of the trend of the solutions offered by our philosophers on the relation of theology and science and also to be the bearing of the evolutionary theory, especially, on the formulation of our conception of God.

### 3. The Problem of God as the Transcendent, Supernatural Personality.

The problems which we have just been discussing relate, in a special manner, to the question of empiricism in method and in theory with regard to the conception of God. The problem before us and those that are to follow concern our conception of the nature of God and of his relation to the world. To take up the immediate problem, we have noted that the evolutionary theory stands for a view of realities as organically related into a whole; it, moreover, knows no other world, so far as our experience shows, than this changing, evolving world whose evolutionary process is effected by its immanent forces. God, then, from the standpoint of the theory, must be organically related with this world. Traditional theology, on the other hand, holds that God does not essentially belong to this world; but that he manifests his relation to it by means of specific supernatural acts. So there emerges the problem of God as the transcendent, supernatural personality.

<sup>33</sup> See Ames, Theology from the Standpoint of Functional Psychology, *American Journal of Theology*, X, pp. 219-232, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, Chap. XVI, *Ideas and Religious Experience*; I. King, *op. cit.*, Chap. XIII, *Religious Valuation and Supernaturalism*.

<sup>34</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 24.

Respecting this problem we have found this result. Royce has completely abandoned the Kantian things-in-themselves, and has conceived of God in terms of immanent idealism. For him, there is no other world than the world of thought and will. God is organically bound up with such a world; he is its very life and substance. Eucken cannot endorse the view of God as belonging to a supernatural world and as coming to us by means of miraculous donation. God is considered by him as the very basis of all existence, in spite of the appearances to the contrary. God, according to Bowne, is the omnipresent ground of all things; no finite being exists apart from the immanent activity of such a God. God, in the thought of James, is intimately concerned with us in our struggles for the attainment of higher and higher forms of life. All these philosophers of religion attribute the notion of personality, in varying degrees, to God, yet they do not conceive of him in terms of such a rigid separation from the world as is held by traditional theology; God, for them, is either the all-inclusive being of the universe (Royce), or the independent basis and the ground of the world (Eucken and Bowne), or one of the principal realities of the world (James); but in every case, God is closely and organically related with the world.<sup>35</sup> The view of God, then, as immanently and dynamically related with the world is suggested as the result of our study of the solutions given by typical recent philosophies of religion to the problem of God as the transcendent, supernatural personality.<sup>36</sup>

The significance of this result of our investigation for theology, briefly stated, is this: that, to be in line with and represent helpfully the evolutionary and immanent view of the world, theology has to abandon its traditional heritage of conceiving God in terms of dualistic supernaturalism and to think of him as immanently active in the world of nature and of man. But the ruling theologies of our day decline to carry out this implication; they refuse to conceive of God in terms of dynamic immanence; they are not wholly willing to surrender the supernatural transcendence of God in the traditional sense. The underlying reason of their disinclination to view God in terms of dynamic relation with the world is twofold: they have not, on the one hand, acquired scientific confidence in the normal evolutionary activities of the immanent forces in the cosmos; and, on the other hand, they desire to preserve

<sup>35</sup> See above, pp. 25 f.; 39 ff., 44; 49 ff., 57 ff.; 69 ff., 74.

<sup>36</sup> By this statement it is not intended to convey the idea that they identify God pantheistically with the world. Even with Royce, God and the world are not, empirically at least, the same.

the supernatural character of their religion. This attitude is expressed by orthodoxy in its affirmation of the scripture as the supernatural revelation of God, of the incarnation of Jesus as the miraculous intervention in the course of history, of salvation as the supernatural act of the Holy Spirit, and of the like.<sup>37</sup> In fact, the whole system of orthodoxy is based upon the specific supernatural acts of God interposed in the course of nature and of human history.

The conception of God as the transcendent, supernatural personality is thus connected with the question of miracles. Miracles in the sense of acts performed by God in contradistinction to the known order of nature and of human history are essential to traditional theology.<sup>38</sup> One of the strongest orthodox expressions on the necessity of the supernatural principle in Christianity is made by W. B. Greene. He maintains that the Christian religion stands or falls with the reality of God as the Supernatural, i. e., absolutely distinct from the world. "Christianity insists on nothing so strongly as on this," he writes, "that it is not of this world and so natural, but is directly of the sole because absolute God and thus supernatural."<sup>39</sup> In a similar manner, C. W. Hodge contends that the finality of the Christian religion depends on its supernaturally communicated revelation of truth from an extramundane God.<sup>40</sup> In these recent expressions of these men, there is the sharply defined dualism of the natural and the supernatural, which is characteristic of the older theologians above referred to. According to such a mode of thought God must intervene in the course of the world to make himself known to us and furnish us with his salvation. This supernaturalism is maintained by the Ritschlian school.<sup>41</sup> Other theologians emphasize the element of the supernatural in religion to a greater or less degree.<sup>42</sup>

With all the emphasis thus put upon the supernatural character of God by these theologians, it is interesting to note, especially in the writings of the Ritschlians and other liberal theologians, the fact that

<sup>37</sup> See Wilhelm and Scannell, *op. cit.*, vols. I and II; Hodge, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 151 ff., II, pp. 378 ff., 675 ff.; Shedd, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 61 ff., II, pp. 261 ff., 353 ff.; Strong, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 111 ff., II, pp. 673 ff., III, pp. 777 ff.

<sup>38</sup> Hodge, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 617 ff.; Shedd, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 533 ff.; Strong, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 431 ff.

<sup>39</sup> The Supernatural, *Princeton Biblical and Theological Studies*, p. 145, cf. pp. 143 ff.

<sup>40</sup> See *ibid.*, The Finality of the Christian Religion, esp. pp. 452 ff.

<sup>41</sup> See, e. g., Herrmann, *op. cit.*, Kapitel II; Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 19; Wendland, *Miracles and Christianity*, Eng. tr., 1911, esp. pp. 1, 3, 125, 158, 281, etc.

<sup>42</sup> See, e. g., Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 133 f.; Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 229 ff.; H. C. King, *op. cit.*, pp. 96 ff.

genuine moral and religious elements in life are really considered by them as the fundamental constituents of religion. For the Ritschlians, it is not the miraculous birth or deeds of Jesus but his wonderful moral religious personality which makes him unique among the sons of men; and the great objective of the Christian life is not a pietistic contemplation of the gifts of God but the establishment of the Kingdom of God.<sup>43</sup> So we may say that there is, in contemporary theologies, a tendency toward the elimination of the supernatural aspects of God, so as to conceive of him as genuinely related to our moral religious experiences. A suggestive expression of this tendency is given by G. A. Gordon in his book, *Religion and Miracles*. The central thought of his work is that religion does not stand or fall with the fate of miracle. He holds that miracles are logical possibilities but natural improbabilities. And he confesses that, with his view of God as immanent in the world, miracle has no part in his working philosophy of life.<sup>44</sup> Thus to conceive of God in terms of dynamic immanence and to have confidence in his normal activities in the world would indeed be in accord with the evolutionary theory which eliminates the miraculous from the organic realm,<sup>45</sup> and would be working out the implication of the solutions of the problem of God as the transcendent, supernatural personality offered by our religious philosophers in the work of theology.<sup>46</sup> This conception of God in terms of organic relation with the world is intimately connected with the next problem to be considered, namely,

#### 4. The Problem of God as the Absolute Being.

This is the most critical problem in our investigation. For it immediately opens up the question of absoluteness and finality versus finitude and relativity in matters of ethics and religion. The evolutionary theory stands for the relative and finite view of reality. Such a view of the world is evident in its conception of all the forms of life as involved in the process of change and of growth. God, from this evolutionary point of view of organic reality, is to be conceived of in terms of change and growth, the essential characteristics of the living world with which he is vitally related. Traditional theology, on the contrary, contends

<sup>43</sup> Ritschl, *Doctrine of Reconciliation and Justification*, Eng. tr., Chap. IV, The Doctrine of God; Herrmann, *op. cit.*, Kapitel III; Harnack, *op. cit.*, pp. 34 ff.; cf. Clark, *op. cit.*, H. C. King, *op. cit.*, Chaps. XI f.; Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 326 ff., 377 ff., 182 ff.

<sup>44</sup> See *op. cit.*, pp. 7, 33, 82, 130, 165 ff.

<sup>45</sup> Weismann, *op. cit.*, I, p. 6; cf. Pfleiderer, *Evolution and Theology*, p. 9.

<sup>46</sup> For a very suggestive contribution on this subject, see G. B. Smith, *Social Idealism and the Changing Theology*, esp. Chap. V.

for the system of absoluteness and finality in religion and ethics. This contention of traditional theology is a direct consequence of its conception of God as the eternally complete and perfect being of the universe; he is, as such, wholly above time and history which mark our world.

The result of our inquiry as to the solutions of this problem in recent philosophies of religion is as follows. The God of Royce, from the standpoint of his absolute idealism, is the all-inclusive absolute being of the universe, free from the temporary aspects of our experience. Yet we have found that Royce attributes to his God such characteristics of our evolutionary experience as suffering, striving, satisfaction. Hence the God of Royce, viewed at least from our finite point of view, is involved in the process of change and of growth, so is a finite being; while he is the absolute being, when viewed from an eternal point of view.<sup>47</sup> God, for Eucken, is the absolute spiritual life, the independent basis of all temporal order. But the real interest, from the standpoint of his actual experience, is to view God in terms of our conflict, struggle, and activity. Thus the God of Eucken would be involved in the evolutionary features of human experience. God, in the thought of Bowne, is the omnipresent ontological ground of the world, absolutely free from its evolutionary characteristics. But the very fact that Bowne has repudiated the old static notion of reality, that he has endeavored to establish the distinct existence of finite spirits over against the infinite, and that he has sought to conceive of God in terms of actual relation with our moral and religious experiences, leads logically to the conception of God as a changing, growing, finite being. In James we note no effort to retain the absolutistic conception of God, which the above philosophers theoretically attempt to maintain. James, on the contrary, finds the very essence of life in its experiences of change, growth, risks, successes. Hence he conceives of God in terms of these characteristics of our evolutionary experience. Thus we observe that the evolutionary aspects in the theological thoughts of Royce, Eucken, and Bowne, which appear in spite of their conceptions of God under the category of some absolute, are made the fundamental characteristics of God in the pragmatic religion of James.<sup>48</sup> We may, thus, say that the tendency of thought in these philosophies of religion is to conceive of God in terms of the evolutionary characteristics of our experience; and that this tendency has reached its culmination in the conception of God as held by James.

<sup>47</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, pp. 133 ff.; *The Reality of the Temporal*, *The International Journal of Ethics*, XX, pp. 270 f.; *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, pp. 394 f.

<sup>48</sup> See above, pp. 21 ff., 31 ff., 38 f., 44 ff., 49 ff., 58 ff., 69 ff., 74 ff.

The implication, then, of the result of our study concerning the problem of God as the absolute being, for theology is this: that it should take a full cognizance of the evolutionary and finite characteristics of the conceptions of God, which appear in Royce, Eucken, and Bowne as against their absolutistic philosophical presuppositions, and which are definitely affirmed by James; and that it should conceive of God in terms of those qualities which are in accord with the results of empirical investigations of the world and, particularly, of human religious experience. In following the suggestive contributions of these religious philosophers and in assuming this investigative attitude toward the empirical facts of the world and of life, we find that all realities are involved in the processes of change, movement, development. It has already been indicated that the fact of change and of growth are recognized in both inorganic and organic realms of existence.<sup>49</sup> The reality of evolution is taken for granted and the application of it is made in all the fields of investigation, for example, in sociology;<sup>50</sup> in psychology;<sup>51</sup> in philosophy;<sup>52</sup> in ethics;<sup>53</sup> in theology;<sup>54</sup> in history of religion;<sup>55</sup> and in the psychology of religious experience.<sup>56</sup> All these and other scientific inquiries accept the fact of evolution and proceed on the basis of this fact. One of the clearest indications of our immediate experience is the consciousness of the time-process, of history, of development, of something done.<sup>57</sup> Höffding points out that in view of the fact that our empirical world is not finished,

<sup>49</sup> See above, pp. 10 f., also the books cited on evolution; cf. Morgan, *Evolution and Adaptation*, 1903, Chap. II; LeConte, *Evolution and Its Relation to Religious Thought*, 1889, Part II, note p. 63; Osborn, *op. cit.*; Chamberlin-Salisbury, *Geology*, 1904, etc.

<sup>50</sup> See, e. g., Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*, 1909; Small, *General Sociology*, 1905; Kidd, *Social Evolution*, 1894;

<sup>51</sup> See, e. g., Baldwin, *Mental Development; Development and Evolution*, 1902; Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose*, James, *Psychology*.

<sup>52</sup> See, e. g., Baldwin, *Darwin and the Humanities*; Dewey, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, 1910; *The Studies in Logical Theory*, 1903; Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., 1905; Rogers, *A Student's History of Philosophy*.

<sup>53</sup> See, e. g., Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, 1906; Dewey-Tufts, *Ethics*, 1908, Part I.

<sup>54</sup> See, e. g., Harnack, *History of Dogma*, 7 vols., Eng. tr., 1897-1900; Fisher, *History of Christian Doctrine*; Troeltsch, The Dogmatics of the "Religionsgeschichtliche Schule," *American Journal of Theology*, Jan. 1913.

<sup>55</sup> See, e. g., Jevons, *An Introduction to the Study of Religion*, 1896; Toy, *An Introduction to the History of Religions*, 1913; Jordan, *Comparative Religion, Its Genesis and Growth*, 1905; Allen, *The Evolution of the Idea of God*, 1897.

<sup>56</sup> See, e. g., Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, I, King, *op. cit.*

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Dodson, *Bergson and the Modern Spirit*, 1913, p. 20; Lyman, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

but that it always presents new experiences and new riddles, we cannot have a complete knowledge. And he suggests the idea that this unfinishedness of our knowledge "may perhaps be connected with the fact that Being itself is not ready-made, but still incomplete, and rather to be conceived as a continual becoming, like individual personality and like knowledge."<sup>58</sup> So far as our scientific studies and our empirical experience show, we ourselves and the realities with which we are related are characterized by change, incompleteness, unfinishedness, growth, development.<sup>59</sup> So from the standpoint of our empirical investigation and our empirical experience, we must frankly admit that the world as a whole is involved in the process of real evolution.

The critical question, then, is whether God can be held free from the process of evolution, or whether he is to be conceived in terms of such a process. We have observed that from the standpoint of our actual empirical experience, all the philosophers of religion whom we have studied, attribute to God the evolutionary features of the experience. And this experiential mode of conceiving God should be followed, for it is not in accord with the empirical temper of our age to find God outside of our evolutionary experience and to define him other than in terms of such experience.<sup>60</sup> Scientific spirit has come to be so dominating in our modern world that the speculative arguments for the reality and the nature of God, which were effective in the past, have become weak in their convincing power. Consequently, in order that any conception of God may be a living factor in our religious life, we must, it would seem, conceive God in terms of those characteristics which our evolutionary sciences and experience make manifest. There may be a realm or realms in the universe where change, unfinishedness, development are not found, and where God may be exempt from time and history; but the world of our empirical science and experience, and God as he is known in the experiences of the race are all marked by temporal features. God, then, should be conceived under the category, not of completeness and of immutability, but of becoming and of development.

Thus to conceive God in terms of evolutionary experience, rather than under the category of some metaphysical absolute, is demanded by our religion and ethics. If by religion we mean pietistic contemplation, philosophic knowledge, or passive receptivity, then the conception of God as the absolute being, free from the finite aspects of our world

<sup>58</sup> *The Problems of Philosophy*, w. 120, cf. p. 136.

<sup>59</sup> See Schiller, *Studies in Humanism*, Essay, XIX; cf. Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 37 f.

<sup>60</sup> See Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, pp. 26, 317 f.

and experience, may be satisfactory. But if religion means not merely the faith in the conservation of values,<sup>61</sup> but also an effort of life to attain to its highest values in the world; then we must conceive of God not only in terms of immanence, but primarily as vitally and actively related with us in the achievement of the values of religion.<sup>62</sup> The view of God as merely immanent in the world is practically valueless to the religious life of man who is struggling against the forces of evil to establish the kingdom of righteousness in our world.<sup>63</sup> The God, whom practical religion needs, must be a being who really shares in its struggles, conflicts, failures, successes, victories. Such a God has really been, as James suggests, the God of the Hebrew and Christian religions. It is, then, not the absolute who includes all beings by his all-embracing knowledge, nor the absolute who is completely independent of the world of his creation, that is demanded by practical religion; but it is a God who really hears our prayers and who is actually coöperating with us to realize the aims and values of our religion.

Moreover, from the point of view of our ethics, we need the conception of God as well as of the world as unfinished and becoming. The futility of the traditional conception of God as the absolute being who has definitely determined the course of the world and of human history in accordance with his eternal plan becomes self-evident, when we see that our moral life demands that it ought to and really can change the character of our moral universe. The changeability of the world is thus one of the elemental needs of our ethical life. But if God is essentially an immutable being with an absolute purpose for and control of the world, then there is created an antithesis and unreality between him and our ethical consciousness; for ethically, so far as our moral experience indicates, we are aware of the changes which we effect not merely in the plan and direction of our own life, but also in our social environment. Höffding remarks thus on this point: "If Being were finished, harmoniously and unchangeably, Ethics would be impossible. All Ethics demands that there be effort. But there would be no room for effort, if everything were in eternal and actual completeness."<sup>64</sup> Thus both our religion and our ethics demand that we conceive of God not as an abso-

<sup>61</sup> Höffding, *The Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 9 ff., 215 ff.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. G. B. Foster, *The Function of Religion*, 1909, pp. 173-183.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Lyman, *op. cit.*, pp. 21 f., 185 f.

<sup>64</sup> *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 151, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 158 ff.; cf. Schiller, *op. cit.*, Essay XVIII on Freedom.

lute but as a relative finite being, actually related with us in our religious and moral life.

But thus to bring relativity and finitude into the being of God means, of course, that we possess no absolute ground of our religious and ethical assurance. The traditional conception of God as the absolute and infinite being does assure us that the world, in spite of its appearances to the contrary, will be saved by him at least in so far as he elects. But the view of God as actually involved in the struggles and works of man does not guarantee beforehand the ultimate success of our world.<sup>65</sup> As a matter of fact, however, the most staunch believers in the traditional view of God must admit that the absolute certainty as to their salvation is not a question of fact but of faith; they are to be religious and ethical in the hope that they may be saved. So from the standpoint of our actual moral and religious experience, there is not vouchsafed to us the certainty of final salvation. This will not lead us to pessimism and inactivity. For we are so constituted that when we are thus uncertain as to the ultimate success of the world, we work so much harder in the hope that we may, with God's help, bring it to a happy issue. God, then, from the viewpoint of practical religion and ethics, may be conceived of as that great enveloping reality of the growing universe, who is ever responsive to the calls of our need, who represents our highest religio-ethical ideals and values, and who is constantly working with us for the achievement of these ideals and values. At any rate, such seems to be the conception of God which is in accord with the evolutionary theory and the temporal character of our experience.

This conception of God in terms of evolutionary theory and our changing, growing experience is held not only by James, but also by others who, like him, are interested more or less in the religious and ethical problems of our time.<sup>66</sup> We may, then, conclude this section with the remark that as men are guided by the knowledge brought to light by the empirical investigations of science and by the actual needs of religious and moral life, they tend to conceive of God in terms of our evolutionary world and experience. With this remark, we shall now turn to the last problem of our study.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. McTaggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, pp. 259 f.

<sup>66</sup> See, e. g., Johnson, *op. cit.*, Chaps. V-VIII; Waterhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 400 ff.; Foster, *op. cit.*, pp. 177 f.; Dodson, *op. cit.*, p. 273; E. Herrmann, *Eucken and Bergson, Their Significance for Christian Thought*, 1913, p. 171; Lyman, *op. cit.*, pp. 148 ff.; Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose*, pp. 368 ff.; Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx*, pp. 313 ff.; McTaggart, *op. cit.*, pp. 186 ff., Chap. VII; etc.

### 5. The Problem of God's Relation to Man and the World.

This problem has already been partly discussed in our consideration of the preceding two problems. But the result and the implication of our study regarding the problem should be more definitely stated. To take up, first, the problem of God's relation to man, we observe that while our philosophers of religion differ on this point from the standpoint of their philosophies, they, on the whole, agree from the viewpoint of empiricism. Since Royce philosophically conceives of man as a manifestation of an all-inclusive absolute, he tends to jeopardize the place of man. But, as we have seen, Royce contends, moved by his moral experience, for the ethical selfhood of man. Eucken is not interested in finding out the ontological relation of God and man; his interest is fundamentally a practical one: How can man be saved from the forces of the antagonistic world? In answer to this question, he holds that God is the indispensable presupposition of man's salvation. Yet this salvation is not a matter of donation; man must achieve it through struggle and work. Thus Eucken assumes the dignity and power of man. Bowne attempts to set forth the ontological relation of man to God by his theory of eternal creation, that is, that man is dependent on God for his existence. He admits that, metaphysically considered, man seems to possess only a phenomenal reality. But he appeals to experience to establish the distinct existence of man over against God. In James, we find that no effort is made to construe man's ontological relation to God. The only thing he says on this point is this: that man and God are alike in their nature. James is specially concerned to exalt the powers of man which belong to him empirically. And yet he does not ignore the fact of man's dependence on God; for he sees in God a great spiritual factor, who aids man in his moral conquest. Thus all these philosophers of religion recognize in the relation of God and man the two elements: man's independence of and his dependence on God; and they tend to explain this relationship on the ground of experience and for practical considerations.<sup>67</sup>

The implication, for theology, of this inquiry as to the relation of God and man is that our primary concern should not be to consider their relation in terms of the biblical and traditional anthropology, but to proceed on the basis of the facts disclosed by science and human experience. Theology, working from this point of view to define its conception of the relation of God and man, will be aided by such sciences as anthropology, biology, sociology, general psychology, and, especially,

<sup>67</sup> See above, pp. 33; 47 f. ; 61; 67.

by the history of religion and the psychology of religious experience. In studying the results of these sciences, we shall find that man is conscious of his dependence on and independence of his environment. Man comes to the sense of his dependence on the natural environment, as he thinks of the vastness of the physical universe and of his inability to compete with the forces of such a universe. And as man is led to recognize the existence of social relationships, he becomes conscious of his dependence on the social environment. By thus proceeding from the concrete aspects of human experience, it will be made clear to us that we are dependent, for much of our life and activity, on God who is a great element of our environment. But this sense of dependence is not the whole of man's experience in his relation to God. Man is not wholly of nature, for he can control its forces for his own advancement; and so he transcends the natural life. Man and his social environment are intimately bound up with each other;<sup>68</sup> and yet man's individuality is a fact, for he has the sense of his own responsibility which he does not attribute to his society. Furthermore, man and God, though closely related, we would hold, cannot be identified; for we would not surrender our own consciousness of moral initiative and accountability. So the sense of independence is another aspect of our experience. And this consciousness of autonomous power on the part of man is markedly strong in the modern age, as result of his increasing conquest over the forces of the physical world. Theology must take account of this sense of human power, so that it may not define man's relation to God in terms of receptivity, as is done by traditional theology in consequence of its supernaturalism, but in terms of activity directed toward the establishment of a society of love and righteousness. In thus examining our relation to God on the basis of empirical science and experience, we shall conceive it in terms of dependence and independence and of practical moral religious activity, leaving the question of the ontological nature of this relation until further light is thrown on it by our science and experience. This view of man's relation to God is demanded by the evolutionary theory which, as we have seen, holds that the forces making the evolution of life possible are resident in the organisms and in their environment.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>68</sup> Cooley, *Human Nature and Social Order*, 1902, pp. 2 ff.

<sup>69</sup> It is not our aim here to touch upon the theological doctrines involved in man's relation to God, namely, sin and salvation. For a very suggestive treatment of these subjects from the standpoint of social psychology, see Royce, *The Problem of Christianity*, I, esp. Lectures III-VI.

Lastly, we come to the problem of God's relation to the world. With regard to this problem, it should frankly be admitted that we cannot, so far as we know, give answer to the question of the beginnings of the world. The theory of cosmic evolution traces the development of our world to its small beginnings, and the doctrine of organic evolution conceives of life as arising from some protoplasmic germs; but we do not know, as James says, the Whence and How of the world—they are matters of speculation, as yet, so we must wait for new lights to answer these questions. Meanwhile, what religion wishes to recognize is whether God is now causally related to the evolutionary process of the world. This raises at once the question of teleology and of evil.

The answers, which are given by our religious philosophers, may be stated as follows. Royce conceives of the world of nature as embodying, in a partial manner, the will of God. From the point of view of the absolute, there are no real evils in the world; but Royce maintains, from the standpoint of empirical experience, the temporary reality of evil. Eucken could not suffer the idea that nature as such is the cause of human evolution; for him, God must be working in the process of nature for the production of man. As to the problem of evil, he confesses that it is speculatively and also practically insoluble; evils are in the world, but we do not know why they are there. Bowne definitely stands for the teleological relation of God to the world. That there are evils in the world is fully admitted by him; but he leaves them to the judgment of human experience to decide the why of their existence. In his thought, God is not at all responsible for their being. James concedes that there is some purpose in the world, while he does not consider it as absolute. He suggests the view that God may be teleologically related to the world in that he wishes to think of God, rather than matter, as present in the process of evolution; but he is not explicit on this point. He fully admits the real existence of evils in the world; there is no rational reason for their being there, but they are there. He does not make God causally responsible for their existence; he would hold him responsible, like ourselves, for trying to eliminate evils.<sup>70</sup> Thus all these religious philosopher shold that there is some purpose in the world;<sup>71</sup> and that there are evils in the world, but God is not responsible for their existence.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>70</sup> *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 131 f.

<sup>71</sup> In the case of Royce, Eucken, and Bowne the purpose would be absolute from the standpoint of their philosophies; but from the point of view of the empirical elements present in them with regard to teleology, it must be a limited one. James holds to a finite purpose in accordance with his conception of God.

<sup>72</sup> See above, pp. 25 f., 32 f.; 40 f., 46 f.; 51, 60 f.; 68, 71, 77 f.

That there is some purpose in the evolutionary process of the world seems to be in agreement with the evolutionary theory. Lamarck conceives of organisms as proceeding from less to more perfect forms. Darwin considers that the variations useful to the organic beings are preserved for their good. Since these evolutionists conceive of God deistically, they do not hold that he is teleologically active in the process. But they have to admit that ultimately, from their theistic position, God is causally related to the process. At any rate, they would not deny that there is a limited evolutionary teleology in the process.<sup>73</sup> Bergson, too, would not eliminate all purpose from the process, though he does not hold to an absolute teleology; his teleology is a limited, growing one. And God, for him, is unceasingly creating the forms of life in the world.<sup>74</sup> Hobhouse holds that, from the point of view of empirical investigation, the mechanical theory of the evolutionary theory is untenable; but that it must be admitted that there is a purpose working under conditions, so a limited purpose.<sup>75</sup> Thus, on the whole, it may be legitimately said that there is an evolutionary teleology in the process of evolution.<sup>76</sup>

Moreover, that there are evils in the world is admitted by all the evolutionists. But it is in regard to their explanation that opinion differs. It would seem that the tendency of our philosophers of religion is to take a practical attitude toward the problem of evil. Royce says that "Man's practical business is with the direction of his own will to the service of God,"<sup>77</sup> rather than with the speculation as to the presence of evils in the world. Eucken would not speculate on this problem; but he, like James, urges us to fight against the forces of evil. Bowne, too, exhorts men to put down the powers of evil. We may conjecture that since God is limited, he could not control the world without involving it in evils. Or we may say that the elements in the world are not yet harmonized, hence evils result.<sup>78</sup> This is indeed a dark problem. Theology must deal with it wisely and critically. But from the standpoint of practical religion and ethics, it seems sufficient to say that, in view of the fact that we are unable as yet to give a satis-

<sup>73</sup> See Baldwin, *Darwin and the Humanities*, pp. 81 ff.; Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 261 ff.

<sup>74</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 248 f., 265 ff.; cf. Dodson, *op. cit.*, pp. 230 ff.

<sup>75</sup> *Development and Purpose*, Intr. pp. xxvi ff., 367, cf. 371 f.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. Moore, *op. cit.*, XII, *The Ethical Aspect*, pp. 257-278.

<sup>77</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, p. 388.


<sup>78</sup> So Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose*, p. 368; cf. Höffding, *The Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 136, 150, 158 ff., 173 f.

factory answer to the question of God's real relation to the evils in the world, what is demanded of us is, recognizing their existence and seeing also that they cannot be reduced unless we fight against them, to struggle and work, with God, in opposition to the evils in us and in the world to establish a world of love and righteousness. So we may conclude this last section on the problem of God's relation to man and to the world with the observation that, from the standpoint of man's practical moral religious life, his needs would be met by holding the view that we ourselves and the world are somehow dependent on God for existence and progress, and that God is incessantly working in the world and with ourselves to establish a world of righteousness and love—an ideal religious ethical community.<sup>79</sup>

We have now reached the end of our investigation of the bearing of the inductive evolutionary theory on the conception of God as it is worked out in typical recent philosophies of religion. Our inquiry has specially been directed toward the solutions given by these philosophies of the problems which arose in the attempt to bring the traditional conception of God into relation with the evolutionary theory. These problems, we have found, to center around the question of empiricism or metempiricism in method and in theory. The question, then, is of twofold character: (1) whether theology shall make use of a thorough-going empirical method in the formulation of its conception of God, or whether shall proceed from the standpoint of some *a priori* principle or principles; (2) whether theology shall be content, for the time being at least, with those affirmations concerning God which are in accord with the results of empirical science (in a comprehensive sense) and with the actual religious experiences of the race, or whether shall conceive of God in terms of some content of truth or truths which is derivable neither through the investigations of science nor through the examination of the evolutionary experiences of religion. The one outstanding result of our study of the solutions offered by the religious philosophers on the question is this: that even Royce, Eucken, and Bowne, who do not philosophically stand for empiricism either in method or in theory, employ many elements derivable in and through experience, and make certain affirmations concerning God on the basis of these empirical elements; and that James proceeds on the basis of what he calls "radical empiricism" in his method and in his conception of God. The tendency, then, which is marked in Royce, Eucken, and Bowne in spite of their

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Ward, *op. cit.*, Lecture XI, *The Idea of Creation*.

absolutistic philosophical presuppositions, and which reaches its culminating point in James, is empiricism in method and in theory. This result of our investigation, and its implications for theology should be carefully recognized and considered by theology in its construction of the doctrine of God. At any rate, the evolutionary theory demands a thoroughgoing empirical method and a doctrine of God based on this method. The typical recent philosophies of religion which we have examined give fruitful suggestions for the theologian who desires to grapple with this important and difficult reconstruction of doctrine.





14 DAY USE  
RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED  
**LOAN DEPT.**

This book is due on the last date stamped below, or  
on the date to which renewed.  
Renewed books are subject to immediate recall.

ICLF (N)
----------

APR 17 1967 85

RECEIVED

APR 20 '67 - 10 AM

**SANTA BARBARA**

INTER LIBRARY

LOAN

ONE MONTH AFTER RECEIPT

4/22 MAR 21 1968

LD 21A-60m-7 '66  
(G4427s10) 476B

General Library  
University of California  
Berkeley

YC 30174



